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ABSTRACT
The central theme of this dissertation is the organisational and behavioural 
dimension of the transfer pricing problem as part of the management control process in 
the large decentralised company.
The study examines the origin and developments of the problem through an 
extensive review of both the theoretical literature and a large number of previous empirical 
investigations. It is concluded from this literature review that the divergence between the 
theoretical prescriptions and practice stems from a conceptual and methodological 
deficiency as the problem has been repeatedly studied out of its context of decentralised 
managerial responsibility.
Hence, the present study attempts to provide explanations as to why companies 
have particular transfer pricing policies by locating the problem in its context, that is the 
decentralised company. The organisational and behavioural approach adopted relates the 
transfer pricing system to the company's strategy, structure and culture through a 
multi-disciplinary analysis. The study draws on the literature on contingency theory, 
economics of the firm and agency theory to analyse the intricate relationships between 
the transfer pricing system, the company's structure and strategy and managerial 
behaviour. Great emphasis is placed on the managerial implications of transfer pricing 
through a questionnaire and interview survey of a sample of large divisionalised 
companies in the U.K.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM
1.1.1 THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION
Transfer prices are usually defined as the monetary values assigned to goods and 
services transferred between the units of the same company (Goetz, 1967; Wells, 1968; 
Fantl, 1974; Wojdak, 1968; Mailandt, 1975; Flavell, 1977; Dagher, 1977; Lambert, 1979, 
Venu, 1983; Cats-Baril et al., 1988 and most accounting dictionaries and management 
accounting textbooks).
This definition is limited in scope as it reflects only the accountant's view of transfer 
pricing as a mere cost-revenue exercise and fails to place the problem in its context which 
is the decentralised responsibility-centre structure. This structure is the dominant feature 
of the modern large industrial corporation.
1.1.2 DECENTRALISATION AND THE DIVISIONALISED COMPANY
The growth of organisations into large (and diversified) companies has led to the 
adoption of the decentralised organisational structure whereby authority for 
decision-making is delegated from corporate management to lower level managers. The 
prime objective of decentralisation is to reduce risk and uncertainty and increase 
managerial efficiency by decomposing large problems into smaller ones, solvable by 
semi-autonomous managers motivated to make the best possible decisions. In a large 
company diversified into different markets, the tasks of managing the daily transactions 
from the centre become impractical due to the upward information overload received 
from the various business segments. By shifting the locus of operating decision-making 
power further down the hierarchy, top management (or the centre) seeks to place the 
decision close to facts or the realities of the market place, i.e. where and when the 
information is generated and thus reduce inefficiency by preserving timeliness and 
encouraging entrepreneurship. It is argued that "demand for decentralisation must 
involve either incomplete information by the center or imperfect monitoring ability"
(Demski and Kreps, 1982, pp. 129). Moreover, once the burden of the day-to-day activities 
is shifted downwards, top management has more time to devote to strategic issues or 
long-range decisions. Stated otherwise, there is a separation of major policy-making from 
operational management that has led to the establishment of managerial hierarchies. On 
the other hand, however, the delegation of decision-making authority entails 
responsibility for the efficient use of the resources over which the manager has authority. 
Hence the question concerns the degree of decentralisation, how to structure managerial 
responsibilities and what system of accountability to devise and impose in order to 
maximise efficiency.
Decentralised companies are essentially structured on hierarchical divisional bases 
where each division is a responsibility centre. Depending on the nature of the activities 
of each division - as outlined by company structure and strategy - the responsibility 
incumbent on the divisional manager varies from cost performance (cost centre) to profit 
performance (profit and investment centres). Divisionalisation has been narrowly defined 
by Solomons (1965) and Verlage (1975) as decentralisation plus delegation of profit 
responsibility. This definition is based on the presumption that profit maximisation - or 
the economic motive as measured by the accounting system - is the sole business objective. 
This is, however, not always the case in the modern large business corporation as success 
or failure depends on a web of economic, sociological and psychological factors.
The multi-divisional form of organisation (or M-form) came to existence in the late 
nineteenth century in the USA (Chandler, 1962 and 1977 and Williamson, 1975, 1985 
and 1986); was adopted by some Japanese firms in the early twenties (Pascale and Athos, 
1982); and later spread to Western Europe (Chandler and Daems, 1980). By the early 
1970s it has become the predominant type of organisation in the UK (Channon, 1973, 
1978 and 1982 and Steer and Cable, 1978). This was recently confirmed by the results 
of two studies by Pratten (1986) and Hill and Picketing (1986).
1.1.3 DIVISIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE, INTERNALISED TRADE AND THE NEED 
FOR TRANSFER PRICES
It is often the case that M-form companies have interdependences between their 
divisions in the form of product/service transfers as a result of a policy of vertical 
integration wherein production is accomplished in a sequential processing of a raw 
material through to the final outputs or finished products. Companies develop the need 
to integrate (backward into raw materials, laterally into components, and forward into 
distribution) certain stages of production and distribution - mainly as a response to market 
imperfections - and thus create 'inside markets' by internalising (or substituting) what 
was hitherto external market transactions. By vertically integrating, companies seek to 
gain economies of scale by reducing transaction costs, increase market share, and gain 
and sustain competitive advantage. Interdependence also takes place in non-vertically 
integrated companies because of protectionist policies dictated by technological and 
volume sensitivity. Hence, the focus of analysis is shifted from the market to the business 
corporation or the corporate economy.
The existence of internal trade in the divisionalised company necessitates some sort 
of co-ordination and may be regulation. This has to be done in a way that preserves and 
enhances the objectives sought from decentralising management, i.e., divisional 
autonomy and responsibility and maximising corporate efficiency. In other words, an 
equilibrium has to be achieved between the need to decentralise and the need to 
co-ordinate. For this purpose the transfer pricing mechanism was invented.
Some of the early M-form companies like General Motors and Dupont in the USA 
and Matsushita in Japan developed, as part of their managerial accounting system, a 
market-based system for pricing inter-divisional transfers (Johnson, 1978; Pascale and 
Athos, 1982; Kaplan, 1984; Ansoff, 1984; Eccles, 1985 and Johnson andKaplan, 1987). 
The market-based transfer pricing policy was part of the company's management control 
process, providing some measure of divisional performance (e.g. rate of return on 
investment), and the incentive and profit-sharing plans. However, despite the original 
and innovative treatment of inter-divisional transfers by these firms, serious academic
consideration of and interest in the problem began only in the fifties, i.e. after the Second 
World War due to the growth and the spread of managerial hierarchies and, in particular, 
the vertically integrated M-form. Since then a flow of analytical and some empirical 
literature has revealed different approaches and propositions. However, most of this 
literature is based on the traditional definition of transfer pricing (Section 1.1.1 above). 
This explains the lack of empirical investigation of how transfer pricing procedures and 
policies affect and are affected by managerial policies and behaviour. This pattern applies 
to research on transfer pricing in Britain where all the characteristics of the modern 
corporation are predominant.
1.2 THE BRITISH BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
1.2.1 INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE 
DOMINANCE OF THE LARGE FIRM
An established feature of the British industrial environment is the high degree of 
concentration characterised by the market dominance of the few large companies. This 
high level of concentration was mostly motivated by economies of scale and is the result 
of a continuous wave of mergers and acquisitions (Hannah, 1976; Prais, 1976; Hannah 
and Kay, 1977 and Utton, 1982). This trend is clearly evidenced with the take-over boom 
of the eighties (Grant and Sargent, 1987), sometimes across national frontiers. In sum, 
"the great increase in the relative growth of the largest enterprises in the UK in the last 
twenty years has produced a manufacturing sector which is one of the most highly 
concentrated - if not the most highly concentrated in the world" (Utton, 1982, p. 22).
Beside the high degree of concentration, British large companies in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors are widely diversified (Channon, 1982; Luffman and 
Reed, 1984; and Goold and Campbell, 1987). Diversification is defined as "the way in 
which business activities are related to one another" (Rumelt, 1974, p. 23). The study 
by Channon (1982) shows that by 1980 only 9% of the 200 largest companies operated 
as single sphere businesses whereas most of these companies are progressively becoming 
conglomerates or unrelated business concerns. This pattern of dominance by large firms 
can only be expected to have significant economic, social and political consequences.
Although the vast majority of companies in the UK are small and unincorporated, 
the large manufacturing firms produce most of the national output and are predominant 
in providing employment. By the beginning of the 1970s the share of the 100 largest 
firms in the manufacturing industry was over 40% of net output (Hannah, 1976; Prais, 
1976; Utton, 1982 and Jones and Cockerill, 1984) and accounted for nearly one quarter 
of the total labour force (Abraham, 1974). The development of direct contact between 
large firms and the Government via specialist government divisions and political 
consultancies is observed to be increasing (Grant and Sargent, 1987) and reflects the 
influence of the large firm on the national economy.
1.2.2 DECENTRALISATION AND THE M-FORM COMPANY IN THE U.K.
The evolution of organisational and managerial styles in British companies is 
succinctly summarised by Channon (1973 and 1978), Hannah (1980) and Gourvish 
(1988). The growth of firms in the U.K. has engendered two main characteristics of the 
modern industrial corporation: a) the divorce of ownership and control and b) the 
multi-divisional structure or M-form. Most businesses became shareholder-owned and 
hired professional managers on a contractual basis to look after their interests. 
Simultaneously, most large companies adopted a decentralised profit-centre structure. 
These managerial and structural changes were largely a relatively late emulation of the 
American experience and have become imbedded features of British companies since 
the end of the Second World War.
1.2.3 TRANSFER PRICING IN THE BRITISH COMPANY 
1.2.3.1 HISTORY OF TRANSFER PRICING
Some evidence is provided by Stone (1973), Mepham (1983 and 1988) and 
Fleischman and Parker (1990) on the existence of transfer prices in Britain in the last two 
centuries in the textile and iron industries. Although scanty, research tends to imply that 
the idea of responsibility accounting was a concern long before the advent of the large 
decentralised firm. However, it can only be assumed that the transfer pricing systems 
identified by Stone and Mepham were some form of cost allocation as there was no proper
profit responsibility then due to the prevailing ownership and organisational styles. Most 
businesses were family owned (i.e. there was no divorce between ownership and 
management as it is today) and as such there was no real delegation of responsibility to 
employees that would entail profit accountability. Therefore, what was described as 
transfer prices could only be 'nominal transfer prices' with no managerial implications, 
but only used as inputs to profit centres to determine viability of separate processes. It 
follows that in reality transfer pricing can only be traced in the U.K. to after the Second 
World War when companies started copying American organisational and management 
styles. Evidence on companies' practices first came to light in 1967 with the publication 
of Livesey's study. This will be later reviewed in Chapter 4.
1232 SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BRITISH 
TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICE
Thirteen studies on British domestic and multinational practices are examined in 
Chapter 4. Between 1967 and 1984 over a thousand usable questionnaires were completed 
by companies. This suggest the importance attached to the problem by academics. 
Companies use a variety of pricing methods based either on market or cost. All but two 
studies reported that a certain level of negotiation is allowed in setting the transfer price. 
The negotiation is most often based on the available market price. Moreover, a common 
feature of most companies is the central control exercised over key operating decisions 
such as buying/selling externally and setting and reviewing transfer prices. In reality, 
there is not as much concern with divisional autonomy and motivation as with corporate 
control and preservation of corporate interests. This implies that a great deal of companies 
are structurally, but not managerially decentralised.
A common feature of the previous surveys is their focus on the practices without 
trying to place them in the organisational and behavioural contexts of the companies 
studied. Developing this aspect is one prime concern of the present research project.
1.2J.3 ACCOUNTING AND LEGAL RULES INFLUENCING BRITISH 
TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICE
The annual surveys of companies' published accounts by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) show that very few companies provide 
disclosure on inter-segment revenue as there is no compulsion to do so. Prior to the 
Companies Act 1967, companies were not even obliged to disclose their turnover figures.
The elimination of inter-divisional sales in consolidating accounts is implicit in the 
Companies Acts of 1948, 1967, 1981 and 1985 (Renshall and Aldis, 1985), the first 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP1: Accounting for Associated 
Companies) and SSAP14 (Group Accounts), (Wilkins, 1979). Section 228 of the 1985 
Companies Act emphasises the notion of the 'True and Fair View' in companies' 
financial statements. This implies the application of the fundamental accounting concepts 
in valuing income and capital. Of particular relevance is the concept of prudence (revenue 
and profits not anticipated but recognised when realised) as defined by SSAP2 (Disclosure 
of Accounting Policies), hence the exclusion of unrealised profits generated by internal 
transactions.
There is in effect, at this stage, no specific (domestic) transfer pricing legislation 
in the U.K.. This is true notwithstanding 1) the above hints; 2) the anti-avoidance provision 
contained in section 485 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA, 1970) against 
artificial intra-company pricing (Farrar, 1985); 3) the Oil Taxation Act of 1975 for 
determining arm's length prices; 4) the Inland Revenue notes on multinational transfer 
pricing (1980, Appendix A1 ) and 5) the guide-lines published by CIMA (1981).
At least two reasons may explain the omission of regulation on transfer pricing. 
First, the subject is very sensitive and, it can be argued, has to be shrouded with the utmost 
secrecy in a competitive market economy. The experience with the present survey 
revealed how reluctant companies are to participate in non-statutory surveys. Second, 
the subject has not yet gained enough momentum to require a rigourous code of practice
1 at the end of the thesis on page 323
as in the USA, Canada, Australia and West Germany. In fact the legislation in these 
countries is fairly recent (for instance, Lurie, 1979; Wilkins, 1979 and Radler and Jacobs, 
1984). In Britain, the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) has now published a 
long-awaited exposure draft (ED45) on segment reporting in line with IAS14 
(International Accounting Standard). The exposure draft - soon to become an SSAP - 
proposed the disclosure of inter-segment pricing, so long as such disclosure is not 
detrimental to the company (Management Accounting, 1989). The quest for prescriptive 
transfer pricing regulations is part of the voiced interest in management accounting 
standards in general (Dev, 1984). This quest may now be pressed further in the transfer 
pricing area as an indirect result of the recent support by the Government for profit related 
pay (PRP) in the form of income tax relief on registered PRP schemes (Inland Revenue, 
1987). A pre-requisite for a PRP scheme is the definition of the employment unit it covers. 
The employment unit could either be the group company, a firm or a sub-unit, and 
therefore, it is necessary to consider its financial independence (IDS report N°. 506). The 
Inland Revenue rules on PRP do not specify the extraordinary items that affect the 
employment unit's profits and need to be considered when calculating these profits. The 
absence of regulation on segment reporting and transfer pricing may explain the lack of 
enthusiasm for PRP by large companies (IDS reports Nos 508 and 538). This issue will 
be discussed further in Chapter Seven where the incentive and compensation schemes 
of the participating companies will be studied in the light of agency theory.
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND JUSTIFICATION 
1.3.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM
The prime objective of this research is to try to find out why companies use particular 
transfer pricing procedures and policies, through an investigation of how such procedures 
and policies affect managerial behaviour. This is a clear departure from the traditional 
descriptive approach of companies' practices (as it will be later detailed in Chapter 4) 
in favour of an organisational and behavioural approach. The study is confined to the
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U.K. domestic market. Cross-border transfer pricing is not covered by the survey as it 
only adds unnecessarily to the complexity of the problem. It rather requires a separate 
cross-cultural investigation.
As the topic of transfer pricing is one of the most controversial issues on which 
there is an abundant literature, the reasons for adding to this literature require elaboration. 
The present study makes a worthwhile contribution as 1) the issue is of such fundamental 
and increasing importance, i.e., here is a necessity for deeper probing, and 2) by focusing 
on the organisational and behavioural dimensions of the topic, I adopt a distinctive 
approach somewhat neglected in many previous investigations. Two recent contributions 
by Eccles (1985) and Spicer (1988) are of particular relevance to the present study.
1.3.2 THE NECESSITY OF RESEARCH ON TRANSFER PRICING IN THE 
BRITISH COMPANY
The information presented throughout Section 1.2 above implies there is a major 
need for further in-depth investigations of transfer pricing which reflect the changing 
circumstances surrounding the issue. This necessity is particularly emphasised as formal 
legislation on transfer pricing practice is possible in the future (Management Accounting, 
CIMA, 1989).
1.3.3 THE REASONS FOR AN ORGANISATIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH
Learning is a continuous process, and the very nature of accounting theory as a 
social science requires constant observation and investigation of the environmental 
factors with which it interacts. The traditional definition of accounting practice as the 
process of recording, classifying and communicating economic events in financial terms 
reflects only the craft side of the discipline and fails to recognise its organisational and 
social setting. In other words, accounting has long been considered as the financial 
expression of the daily activity of organisations but if accounting theorists became too 
preoccupied with how the craft is practised they will pay too little attention to the 
interaction of accounting theory with all the other disciplines that analyse organisational 
functioning (Hint and Shaw, 1981). Thus, the prime concern has long been with
accounting the art, not accounting the social science. For instance, the extensive, but 
frequently narrow, coverage that transfer pricing has received in an array of books and 
journal articles is but one example of the neglect of the organisational and social 
importance of the discipline although there are signs of change with the recent works of 
Eccles (1985) and Spicer (1988).
The treatment of the pricing of internal trade has focused on finding the best or the 
all-purpose transfer price procedure. This has produced more questions than it has 
answered. The ambiguity stems from looking at transfer pricing - which is an integral 
part of the management control process - as a mere cost-revenue exercise, or as a special 
cost-allocation problem with the emphasis on profit responsibility. Even this 
responsibility is often isolated from the real context of decentralised management of 
which transfer pricing is a by-product. Despite the abundance of published material on 
transfer pricing, there is the need for research that combines the technical side of the 
problem and its organisational and behavioural dimensions and implications.
A response from researchers of this complexity is dictated by the fabric of the 
modern industrial corporation whose main features include 1) the large size in terms of 
market value, turnover and labour force and thence, real social and economic significance 
attaching to its resource utilisation, 2) the multi-divisional decentralised structure, 3) 
product and market diversification, 4) the divorce of ownership and control, and 5) as a 
result of the foregoing, decision-making processes of such consequence and complexity 
that key behavioural issues - in that individuals and groups have different perceptions 
and aspirations and degrees of responsibility - must not be ignored.
If the company is diversified, this means that there are a number of manufacturing 
environments and this requires a variety of control policies. Therefore, in a decentralised 
organisation where delegated decision-making power entails responsibility and, 
consequently, penalisation or rewards, the study of any control mechanism like transfer 
prices must take two vital factors into account: 1) the internal organisational 
characteristics, and 2) the people and groups affecting and being affected by the 
decision-making process and the outcomes thereof. Such an approach requires the
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integration with the accountant's technical solutions; explanations from other disciplines 
like marketing, behavioural science (including contingency theory and agency theory) 
and the economics of the firm. This is not an easy task but a feasible one. Hence, the 
present study is not merely concerned with transfer prices but with transfer pricing systems 
or processes viewed in the organisational contexts. As a starting point it needs the 
formulation of a definitional framework to guide the investigation. But first, to put this 
in a context requires a critical exploration of the existing literature.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.4.1 SYNOPSIS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The next three chapters synthesize the transfer pricing literature from a variety of 
perspectives. The multi-disciplinary nature of the problem has provoked a stream of 
academic proposals based on economic theory, mathematics, accounting and behavioural 
science, as well as a considerable number of laboratory experiments and empirical 
investigations. The focus of this literature review is to draw on all these significant sources 
in a simple study and hence, do justice to the complexity and importance of transfer 
pricing.
From this critical assessment of the different proposals and surveys it will be shown 
that transfer pricing cannot be properly understood unless studied in a broad 
organisational context which takes into account the particularities and peculiarities of 
companies. This includes both the internal and external settings that affect and are affected 
by the internal transaction. By internal settings is meant the organisational structure, the 
technology, the culture, the managerial systems and the people of the company. The 
external settings refer in broad terms to the economic, political and social environments. 
Enough evidence is provided at the beginning of the current chapter and in Chapter 4 on 
the serious interest of governments and accounting bodies outside the U.K. in segment 
reporting and transfer pricing often in the form of strict legislation and accounting 
regulations. The possibility of the British authorities following suit only underlines the 
need for the type of broad investigation presented in this thesis.
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The latest publications available (Grabski, 1985; Ezzamel and Hart, 1987; Spicer, 
1988; Dejong et AL, 1989 and Chalos and Haka, 1990) clearly press for empirical 
investigation in such research as theoretical speculations alone cannot be relied upon for 
an adequate understanding of real world phenomena. The careful observation of practice 
is critical for testing hypothetical judgements, highlighting shortcomings and guiding 
corrective actions. Moreover, so long as British companies are only required to publish 
consolidated accounts - which give little idea of the interdependence between and within 
divisions - the only source of information on transfer pricing will be direct approaches 
to the companies themselves to provide researchers with the appropriate data.
1.4.2 THE SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR A BEHAVIOURAL STUDY 
OF TRANSFER PRICING
1.4.2.1 A PROPOSED DEFINITION
Transfer prices are the monetary values attached to internalised market 
transactions between units of an organisational set-up which are separated by 
management responsibility.
1.4.2.2 A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
A transfer implies a movement in time and space of something quantifiable, and 
pricing indicates the placement of a monetary value or a price. Transfer pricing is therefore 
a process which involves an object (WHAT), a subject or agent (WHO), a place 
(WHERE), a time (WHEN), a reason (WHY) and a procedure (HOW):
1 - the WHAT factor concerns the thing transferred, be it goods (raw materials and 
products) or services, and its importance to the company, the transferor and the 
transferee,
2 - the WHO factor concerns the people involved in, responsible for and affected by 
the transaction,
3 - the WHERE factor concerns the origin and the destination of the transfer (or the 
transferor and the transferee),
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4 - the WHEN factor concerns the point in time of the transaction. This is important 
for cost and revenue allocation across time periods and performance evaluation and 
reward, as performance reports and feedback to divisional managers should be 
timely,
5 - the WHY factor concerns the underlying reasons for the transaction to take place 
internally, especially when there is an external market for the transferred 
commodity,
6 - the HOW factor concerns the internal procedures and regulations that control both 
the physical transfer and its costing.
This six-factor framework of the process of transfer pricing should constitute the 
point of departure for research on transfer pricing. The review of the literature in Chapters 
2-4 reveals that studies of this sort are very scarce. In general, most research on the 
subject has been primarily concerned with the WHAT and the WHERE questions, i.e. 
the technical and quantitative aspects. This explains why, more often than not, empirical 
studies fall short of explaining why particular systems are in use. The deficiency is not 
in the results but rather in the approach adopted at the outset. For instance, the analysis 
of the WHERE factor should go beyond a simple description of the buying and selling 
units to a full study of the structure of the company that encompasses the degree of 
decentralisation, diversification, vertical integration and the extent of divisional 
interdependence. This is crucial as the essence of responsibility accounting is to hold 
managers responsible for those activities over which they exercise at least some control.
In further elaboration of the above framework, the following five hypotheses are 
proposed:
13
1.4.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
MAIN HYPOTHESIS
/) The acceptance of the transfer pricing system is highly effected by the extent of 
decision-making responsibility delegated to divisional management and the way 
in which the accounting information system measures that responsibility.
SUB-HYPOTHESES
2) - The evaluation/re ward of divisional performance in the large company on the 
basis of a single corporate objective (e.g. maximum profits) can have adverse 
motivational consequences, particularly if divisional managers have no or limited 
control over the factors they are judged on.
3) - The greater the impact of the transfer pricing system on performance evaluation 
of profit centres, the greater the conflict over transfer prices.
4) - The degree of dysfunctional behaviour is likely to be affected by company culture 
and division managers f perception of fairness of the transfer pricing system.
5) - Changes in organisational structure and strategy result in changes (or the need 
for changes) in transfer pricing policies.
1.4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
The original interest into the subject of transfer pricing had developed a few years 
ago while writing an MSc dissertation on performance evaluation in divisionalised 
companies (Mehafdi, 1983). This formed the first round of the literature review on this 
subject. However, this has been much extended and up-dated for the purposes of the 
present study. In fact the literature review in Chapters 2-4 constitutes the platform from 
which the entire study develops its unit and the data gathering and analysis of Chapters 
5-9.
14
The research process for this study involved the following stages:
1) conceptualisation, definition of research problem and objectives, and 
formulation of research hypotheses after reviewing both the theoretical and 
empirical literature,
2) selection of the data collection methods and the design of the questionnaire,
3) selection of the survey samples, the testing of the questionnaire through pilot 
studies and the identification of the adequate statistical techniques for data 
analysis,
4) assessment of the results of the pilot studies, refinement of questionnaire and 
conducting of the full-scale study
5) conducting the telephone and field interviews,
6) analysis of findings and testing of hypotheses,
7) cases studies based on interviews in selected companies,
8) conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
1.4.5 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The study is based on the following assumptions and limitations: 
1A5.1 ASSUMPTIONS
1) the transfer pricing problem is a subject of concern in British companies,
2) the sample of companies is representative of the total number of companies 
with transfer pricing systems,
3) the data obtained give a true and fair picture of companies' practices and 
policies,
4) consequently, the numerical translation of the data reflects these practices 
objectively,
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5) hence, the statistical analysis is adequate for testing the hypotheses and 
inferring conclusions.
1.4.5.2 LIMITATIONS
1) the sensitive nature of transfer pricing does not encourage a high response 
to questionnaire surveys,
2) the study focuses only on domestic issues and thus excludes the multinational 
aspects of transfer pricing which preoccupy a number of the participating 
companies,
3) the analysis is based solely on corporate views as access to divisional 
managers could not be obtained,
4) only five companies accepted to be visited for field interviews.
1.5 PLAN OF THE THESIS
The remaining of the research stages described in Section 1.4.4 above are covered 
in the following eight chapters.
In Chapter 2 the classical approach to transfer pricing as advocated by economists, 
mathematicians and academic accountants is critically reviewed and its flaws and 
shortcomings exposed. Consequently, the necessity for an organisational and behavioural 
approach is emphasised in Chapter 3 where ten prior theoretical frameworks are 
discussed.
The validity of the theoretical proposals of both the classical and organisational 
approaches is tested in Chapter 4 which offers a transnational comparative analysis of 
47 previous empirical studies in ten countries.
Chapter 5 gives a full description of the present study and the detailed findings 
are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Agency theory is introduced in Chapter 7 as a
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framework of analysis for the contractual relationships in the context of divisional 
interdependence. Case studies based on completed questionnaires and field interviews 
in five large British companies are presented in Chapter 8.
Finally, in Chapter 9 the research hypotheses are evaluated in terms of the analysis 
and results in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. A second evaluation of the results is also performed 
in terms of Spicer' s (1988) theoretical model, followed by a comparison between the 
present study and other studies in the U.K. and overseas. Conclusions are then derived 
and suggestions for further research on both the domestic and multinational dimensions 
of transfer pricing are formulated.
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSFER PRICING IN THEORY:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CLASSICAL APPROACH.
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Transfer pricing is a complex management problem. It requires the interaction - 
beside accounting theory - of many disciplines including behavioural science, economics 
and marketing. An abundant literature has been written on the subject since the early 
fifties. This literature can be classified according to the model employed. There are three 
major models: a) economic, b) mathematical programming and c) behavioural.
It should be noted at this stage that most of the theoretical work has been done by 
economists and academic accountants who dealt with the problem within the limited and 
restrictive boundary of profit maximisation. This traditional business objective is, 
however, too restricted to allow a comprehensive study of transfer pricing in all its 
complexity, particularly in today's modern multi-unit, multi-purpose business enterprise 
characterised by the separation of ownership and management.
The complexity of the subject has indeed revealed the inadequacy of those studies 
that restricted its analysis to the boundaries of the one discipline or isolated it from the 
business environment in which the problem is found. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
a large gap exists between the presentations of theoreticians and the actual procedures 
used in practice as the empirical evidence in Chapter 4 makes clear.
The present review of the literature covers more than three decades of thought and 
effort from the mid-fifties until the most recent developments on the subject. It should 
however be anticipated that, although the theoretical basis for solving the problem has 
been laid down by Dean (1955), Cook (1955) and Hirshleifer (1956,1957 and 1964), the 
very earliest thought on the subject can be traced back to the eighteenth century.
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For example, Stone (1973) found substantial evidence from accounting archives 
that some transfer pricing systems were used by some English cotton mills as far back 
as 1810. Drumm (1983) contends that the first conceptual proposals were made in 1908 
in Germany by Professor Schmalenbach, a renowned German accountant. Eccles (1985) 
traced the origin of transfer prices back to 1883 and more recently, Fleischman and Parker 
(1990) provided evidence on transfer pricing in the Scottish iron works between 
1759-1786. While Eccles' source is really no more than an assumption made by Sidgwick 
(1901), an economist, the articles by Stone (1973) and Fleischman and Parker (1990) are 
based on the preserved data of company practice. It shows that internal pricing was not 
confined to the large company only but it could be of significant importance for the small 
and medium company. This was later confirmed by the first survey of British transfer 
pricing practice undertaken by Livesey (1967). Moreover, the time gap between the data 
sources - though all of British origin - implies that more investigation is probably needed 
on the historical development of the problem even prior to the birth of the large company.
The importance of such investigation which deals with accounting change within 
the context of organisational change is emphasised by Flamholtz (1983). Nevertheless, 
in the above examples, firms were small, with limited production capacity and managed 
as a one-unit enterprise. Thus transfer pricing was not a complicated and thorny issue as 
it has become since the end of the Second World War. It was argued in the preceding 
chapter that the modern transfer pricing problem is always identified with the 
decentralisation of organisations into responsibility centres, particularly profit centres.
Leaving the historical research to one side, the early attempts to theorise on transfer 
pricing were very sporadic with the first articles appearing in the Journal of Accountancy 
(Camman, 1929), NACA Bulletin (Seybold, 1935), Economica (Coase, 1937) and the 
Accounting Review (Broom, 1948). However the problem came under the serious scrutiny 
of academics and practitioners after the publication of articles by Cook (1955) and Dean 
(1955). This was followed by a more systematic approach by Hirshleifer (1956 and 1957). 
These three works helped stimulate a continuous flow of analytical and empirical research 
that has never stopped since. At least one hundred articles were published in accounting
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and non-accounting journals between 1955 and 1990. This is probably an underestimate 
given the scattered nature of the transfer pricing literature across more than eighty 
periodicals. Added to this are the discussions of the problem in numerous accounting and 
non-accounting books.
Most of this literature has been reviewed - either partially or comprehensively - by 
Arpan (1972), Abdel-khalik and Lusk (1974), Bailey and Boe (1976), Nieckels (1976), 
Tang (1979 and 1981), Thomas (1980), Yunker (1982), Eccles (1985), Grabski (1985) 
and more recently by Ezzamel and Hart (1987). In the present critical review it was felt 
necessary to classify the tremendous amount of theoretical proposals according to the 
approach or model used, namely: economic theory, mathematical programming, 
accounting and management theory.
2.2 THE ECONOMIC THEORY APPROACH.
2.2.1 THE CLASSICAL APPROACH: HIRSHLEIFER'S MODEL
Most of the literature under the economic category has built on the analysis made 
by Hirshleifer (1956) who approached the transfer pricing issue as a problem in marginal 
analysis. Prior to Hirshleifer, Cook (1955) and Dean (1955) made some thorough 
reflections on decentralisation and the pricing of inter-divisional transfers. While Cook 
advocated market prices and Dean negotiated competitive prices, both authors were, 
however, concerned with finding the solution that would preserve divisional autonomy 
and lead to goal congruence. This initial work by Cook and Dean stimulated a more 
rigourous analytical treatment by Hirshleifer who concluded that market price was the 
correct transfer price only where the transferred commodity was traded in a perfectly 
competitive market. If the market was imperfectly competitive or no market existed for 
the intermediate goods, the correct procedure was to transfer at marginal cost.
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Similar to Cook and Dean's concern, the goal of Hirshleifer's analysis was to 
establish that mode of pricing which would lead the autonomous profit centres to make 
decisions that would yield the largest profit for the firm as a whole. For this Hirshleifer 
considered the simple case of a firm with two profit centres or divisions : 1) a 
manufacturing (or selling) division and 2) a distribution (or buying) division, where there 
is an intermediate product which is the output as it leaves the manufacturing division, 
and a final product or output of the distribution division. The main assumptions made 
were that of technological and demand independence between the operations of the 
divisions. By technological independence was meant that the operating costs of each 
division were independent of the level of operations of the other division; whereas demand 
independence implied that additional external sales by either division would not reduce 
the external demand for the products of the other, i.e. the external markets for the 
intermediate and final products were entirely independent.
Three market settings were envisaged. First, there was no external market for the 
intermediate product, i.e. there was no demand and supply of the good other than generated 
by the two divisions internally. Second, there was a perfectly competitive external market 
for the intermediate product. Third, the market for the intermediate product was 
imperfectly competitive. The original analysis of these three situations and the solutions 
developed are detailed in Appendix B. 1
1 at the end of the thesis on page 327
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When no external market is available for the intermediate product, i.e. there is no 
market price, a joint-level of output is assumed to be reached by the two divisions. Given 
that each division produces only one product, the optimal solution for the firm is to equalise 
the quantity of output of both divisions so that the buying division would handle as much 
output as the selling division would produce. Stated otherwise, the divisions act as quantity 
adjusters (Ezzamel and Hart, 1987). For this purpose, the manufacturing division would 
supply the distribution division with a schedule giving the quantity produced at any given 
transfer price. Then the distribution division - whose final product is supposed to sell in 
a perfectly competitive market - would determine its average revenue curve which is the 
difference between the market price of its product and the transfer price paid for buying 
internally. The output schedule agreed upon represents the selling division's marginal 
cost curve. The transfer price is set at this division's marginal cost at the optimal output 
level which maximises company profits.
When a market existed for the intermediate product, it could be either perfectly or 
imperfectly competitive. These are Hirshleifer's other two market situations. If the market 
is perfectly competitive, the assumption of joint-level of output is relaxed so that each 
division is free - i.e. has full autonomy - to determine its own output. The marginal cost 
of each division is independent of the marginal cost of the other and thus, both divisions 
and the company are indifferent between trading the intermediate product within or 
outside the firm. In this case the marginal cost of the selling division equals the market 
price of the intermediate product and the transfer price should be the market price of the 
transferred product.
In the last market situation covered by Hirshleifer where the intermediate market 
is imperfectly competitive; the general solution is still the same. The transfer price should 
be set at the marginal cost of the selling division at the optimal output level. In this case 
the market price for the intermediate product exceeds the marginal cost of the selling 
division. Consequently, if transfers are priced at market, this would lead to excessive 
output by the manufacturing division and insufficient output by the buyer division.
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Considering the case of demand dependence and technological dependence, 
Hirshleifer concluded that when demand dependence existed, the analysis was rather 
complex and the solution fell between market price and marginal cost. When technological 
dependence existed, the situation was found to be so complex that no solution was derived.
Having exposed Hirshleifer's theoretical treatment of transfer pricing, it is essential 
to balance the study with the major developments that have built on his path-finding 
approach. Undoubtedly, a lot of issues have been left out by Hirshleifer and the solutions 
proposed do not provide panacea for all situations. The three decades that have passed 
since the formulation of the theory have witnessed the development of important 
approaches to the problem. With the continual growth of companies and the steady 
increase in the adoption of decentralisation, a flow of analytical and some empirical 
studies has produced a large number of proposals. These developments constitute the 
bulk of the following section.
2.2.2 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Hirshleifer's initial work has in turn stimulated further thoughts and contributions 
over the last thirty years.
Cook (1955) had briefly mentioned the case where the net prices the buyer and seller 
divisions could get on the outside market were different - i.e. imperfect market - and the 
transfer was indeterminate. Gould (1964) built first on this and proposed a remedy to this 
practical market situation. The existence of the costs of using an outside market such as 
freight absorption, selling expenses, credit terms and bad debt expenses was already 
argued to be an important reason for vertical integration (Coase, 1937 and Cook, 1955).
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Drawing on the works of Hirshleifer (1956) and Arrow (1959), Gould (1964, 
Appendix C2) then goes on to adopt the method of successive approximations to arrive 
at the optimal transfer price. First, an arbitrary transfer price is determined by central 
management. Given this price, each division is then required to calculate the output level 
that would maximise its profits. This is subject to a major constraint. Gould, like his 
predecessors, was also concerned with balancing divisional autonomy and corporate 
goals. Hence the necessity for corporate interference to make the requirements of both 
divisions converge so that they would lead to the optimum solution for the firm. If supply 
is greater than demand, the price is lowered by central management; if supply is lower 
than demand, the price is raised until convergence is reached. The transfer price is thus 
determined by central management.
This approach has a number of weaknesses. First, the interference of corporate 
management in the whole process of determining the transfer price hampers the autonomy 
of the profit centres. Second, as Gould (1964) pointed out, there is room for dysfunctional 
behaviour by divisional managers if their performance is evaluated and rewarded on the 
basis of their divisional profits which are function of the transfer price. As the procedure 
requires that divisions must supply corporate management with information used in the 
determination of the transfer price, divisional managers might manipulate that information 
to the detriment of corporate goals. A third difficulty with the procedure is of 
administrative nature. The series of approximations necessary for the determination of 
the optimal transfer price might be costly and time consuming. Finally, as divisions must 
report to central management their maximum profitability levels this also might require 
costly information flows. Thus the costs of using an outside market would multiply. 
Consequently, the infringement of divisional autonomy and the irrelevance of book profits 
for the evaluation of performance lessen the feasibility of the procedure despite providing 
a possible solution to the problem of additional market costs mentioned by Cook (1955).
2 at the end of thesis on page 330
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A possible remedy was proposed by Ronen and Mckinney (1970) who, for simplicity 
reasons, considered the case of a firm with two divisions only. The aim of the approach 
was to enable the implementation of Hirshleifer's system while preserving divisional 
autonomy. This required the channelling of information between the profit centres and 
corporate headquarters concerning production and purchase at various non-linear transfer 
prices, through a seven-step procedure. Basically the divisions supply information to 
central management on their marginal manufacturing cost and net marginal revenue, i.e., 
their production and purchase schedules. From this data central management derives an 
average cost curve (of the selling division) and an average revenue curve (of the buying 
division). The average cost curve is given to the buying division as its supply curve, and 
the average revenue curve is given to the selling division as its demand schedule. These 
cost and revenue curves designate the transfer price to each division for alternative 
quantities produced and transferred. Obviously the price to the selling division may not 
be the same as the price to the buying division. For Ronen and Mckinney suggested that 
the difference between the two prices be bridged by a subsidy to or tax on the selling 
division, depending on whether its price is higher or lower than that of the buying division.
The above rules applied for all intermediate market situations so that optimal 
decisions could be achieved regardless of the market situation the firm faced. The 
suggested approach was believed to lead divisional managers to make decisions that 
would maximise corporate profits. At the same time divisional profits would reflect 
divisional contributions to corporate profits because the divisions would "enjoy the same 
degree of control over the variables they would influence as an independent supplier or 
buyer" (Ronen and Mckinney, 1970, p. 112). In other words, divisional profit 
contributions shown by accounting reports would always reflect the amount by which 
corporate profits would be reduced in the short-run if the division is abandoned. Thus, 
the accounting data could be used by central management for non-marginal decisions 
like abandoning or keeping a division.
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Tomkins (1973) observed that one advantage of the Ronen-McKinney system is 
that of overcoming the zero profit problem which arises with constant marginal cost or 
revenue. Abdel-khalik and Lusk (1974) noted several deficiencies with the solution 
advanced by Ronen and Mckinney. They argued that the subsidy/tax scheme is centrally 
administered, therefore book profits would not reflect divisional profit contributions. It 
is doubtful that divisional managers would accept the accounting reports as the measure 
of autonomous divisional interaction. Similarly it would be difficult to implement the 
abandonment-continuance decision on the basis of data from accounting reports. In 
addition to that, as the average revenue curve of the selling division is equal to the average 
revenue of the final product less the average distribution cost, inefficiencies incurred in 
the buying division could be passed on to the selling division. Under such circumstances 
the selling division would secure its position by asking the central office for cost auditing 
of the buying division. Such action would definitely result in impairing divisional 
autonomy.
This assessment of the approach has triggered a debate between Ronen (1975) and 
Abdel-khalik and Lusk (1975). Ronen rejected the remarks as resulting from a 
misunderstanding of how the Ronen-McKinney system worked. Neither the supplying 
division nor the buying division lost autonomy because of the supply and demand curves 
(i.e. sets of prices) supplied by headquarters. They acted just like any independent seller 
or buyer in a free enterprise system facing a given set of prices. The subsidy-tax scheme 
was also not imposed by central management but resulted automatically from the payment 
of a price unit to the selling division. The profits produced were representative of the 
divisions' contributions and thus they would serve both performance evaluation and the 
abandonment-continuance decision. Ronen also rejected the argument regarding the 
communication of incorrect information by the buying division because the latter gained 
no benefit from inflating its cost schedule. Rather the system provided the incentive to 
increase profits by decreasing costs. Therefore, neither division was encouraged to cheat 
but both would be motivated to providing correct information.
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Holding to their criticism of the Ronen-McKinney system, Abdel-khalik and Lusk 
(1975) added that the system would result in information diseconomies because of the 
re-routing of communication through central management instead of making direct 
contact between the divisions.
The result of the above discussion is that Ronen and McKinney (1970) attempted 
a possible implementation of Hirshleifer's model that would preserve divisional 
autonomy by removing cumbersome restrictions. As their solution is based on 
Hirshleifer's analysis and is only a variation on it, it is equally subject to the deficiencies 
of the marginal cost approach.
The two major weaknesses of Hirshleifer's model, namely 1) the loss of divisional 
autonomy and 2) the possibility of dysfunctional behaviour by divisional managers are 
stressed by Thomas (1980) in his state-of-the-art synthesis. He strongly argues that the 
Hirshleifer's model is not goal- congruent in using book profits (affected by transfer 
prices) for evaluating division managers because these profits do not reflect their success 
in operations. The same reasoning holds "with respect to decisions whether to increase, 
hold constant or decrease investments (and related resource allocations to individual 
divisions) if the central office bases such decisions wholly or partly on total divisional 
book profits" (Thomas, 1980, p. 152).
In addition to that, the system does not provide a basis for abandonment/continuance 
decisions and fails to prescribe an operational method of implementation. With regard to 
the first issue Hirshleifer admits that the autonomous calculations based on the transfer 
price discussed would not be a correct decision to take because an overall examination 
of the cost and revenue functions of the firm as a whole would be required. Such an 
approach was taken by Ronen and Mckinney (1970) as just examined above. Another 
attempt was made by Koutsoyiannis (1982) but with a slight variation. Instead of the 
simple case of two divisions, Koutsoyiannis assumed a firm with two final-product 
divisions and a common supplier division or what is called an "internal monopoly" 
(Dopuch and Drake, 1964). The decision to close down a final-product division should 
be based on that division's separate profit plus its contribution to the profit of the single
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supplier division. The decision to abandon the supplying division should be based on its 
marginal cost curve, its separable fixed cost and the market price. As long as the 
intermediate product could be bought externally at a fixed price equal to the transfer price, 
the common supplier division should be maintained provided that its fixed cost is less 
than its gross profit (Koutsoyiannis, 1982).
These solutions are, however, constrained by the assumption that the demands of 
the final products are independent so that the demand curves of the two final product 
divisions for the intermediate product are mutually consistent at all levels of output. The 
intermediate product market was also assumed perfectly competitive so that the firm 
could buy any quantity at a fixed price.
A major criticism of Hirshleifer's approach is its neglect of risk and uncertainty. 
While one of the aims of decentralisation is to try to cope with uncertainty, Hirshleifer 
dealt only with situations in a certainty environment whereby divisions have perfect 
knowledge about input/output prices, production functions and demand curves.
An extension of the model to incorporate uncertain environments was suggested by 
Kanodia (1979) but his analysis also suffers from some weaknesses. The author himself 
admitted that his paper "characterizes and analyzes several transfer price systems but 
does not formulate mechanisms for achieving them". Moreover, "the most serious 
problem with the transfer price systems developed here is that they are not incentive 
compatible" - in the presence of risk - (Kanodia, 1979, pp. 74-75 and 97). The approach 
assumed that divisional managers communicated honestly but, as Gould (1964) and 
Abdel-khalik and Lusk (1974) mentioned, these managers might misrepresent their 
demand and supply functions in order to secure more favourable transfer prices.
Similar to Kanodia, Ismail (1982) developed a system whereby he incorporated 
external demand uncertainty for the selling division's products, particularly the 
intermediate product. The rule developed assumed that the price to the buying division 
was a decreasing function of the quantity demanded and the price for the selling division
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was an increasing function of the quantity demanded. This model which assumed linearity 
is subject to the criticism of the linear programming models which will be made later in 
Section 2.3.
Other contributions have been made by Enzer (1975), Jennergren (1977) and Blois 
(1978). Enzer (1975) argued that the general rule of pricing at the marginal cost of the 
selling division under static conditions and certainty was not correct because the transfer 
price was not independent from the amount acquired. He suggested instead that the transfer 
price be a form of average cost. Enzer's solution was criticised by Jennergren (1977) in 
that it would lead to centralising decision-making for the selling division which would 
no longer be considered as a profit centre.
Blois (1978), on the other hand, expanded Hirshleifer's analysis to determine the 
price and quantity at which a transaction between a large customer and a supplier would 
occur in an imperfectly competitive market. The main conclusion of the analysis was that 
a large customer was able to impose special requirements upon its suppliers, for example, 
price concessions. The model showed also that the large customer could impose the 
marginal cost transfer pricing rule on its suppliers. To be able to do this, the customer 
would need accurate estimates of the suppliers' costs.
Building on the works of Hirshleifer (1956 and 1957) and Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1961), Copithorne (1976) made an analysis identical to Gould's in the use of successive 
approximations to arrive at the profit maximising transfer price. The analysis is therefore 
plagued by the usual problems of central management interference and the lack or loss 
of divisional autonomy, the need for excessive information flow; and the possibility of 
dysfunctional behaviour by division managers. To counter the last of these problems, 
Copithorne (1976) noted that divisional managers should not be rewarded on the basis 
of their division's profits which were a function of the transfer price, but he failed to 
provide an alternative basis of evaluation and reward. He also argued that the method of 
successive approximations was not complicated given today's highly efficient 
information technology, but again lost sight of the costs it would incur.
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A model of transfer pricing in a socialist economy was proposed by Gordon (1970). 
The model sought to approximate the properties of perfectly competitive market prices 
in the absence of the market mechanism. Briefly, the firm in a socialist economy was 
simulated to a unit or division in a decentralised firm in a market situation. The firm's 
standard transfer price is equal to its expected average full cost of production plus a 
standard or predetermined profit per unit of output. The firm's sales are assumed equal 
to its standard output. If actual sales are higher (lower) than standard output, the actual 
transfer price moves above (below) the standard transfer price.
Most (1971) commented that Gordon's model is affected by the restrictive 
assumptions of the neo-classical theory of the firm on which it relies. For pure competition 
to exist there must be 1) no restrictions on buyers and sellers, 2) complete mobility of 
factors of production, and 3) buyers and sellers should have perfect knowledge of the 
activities of other traders. Otherwise, the suggested system could not be operational. 
Abdel-khalik (1971) also showed that the system could induce dysfunctional behaviour.
Horwitz (1970) examined transfer pricing within the decentralised Soviet enterprise 
which consists of departments or shops. The primary concern of the control system is the 
allocation of bonuses to these shops depending on their efficiency, measured by profit 
and the accounting rate of return. The unit transfer price is similar to that suggested by 
Gordon (1970). It is calculated "by adding a portion of the enterprise's planned profit to 
the fully allocated shop cost" (Horwitz, 1970, p. 62). This implies that instead of affecting 
divisional profits, the transfer price is itself affected through the allocation of profit to 
the individual shop. Thus, the assigned price does not measure opportunity costs and, 
consequently, the system "does not serve the goal of profit centre responsibility". It is 
rather "an internal reporting mechanism which serves to interest personnel in profit and 
to provide a crude mechanism for distributing bonuses" (Horwitz, 1970, p. 63).
The foregoing exposition of the classical economic approach of the transfer pricing 
problem and the major developments and extensions of the original analysis needs some 
thorough discussion supported by data from practice wherever possible.
2.2.3 DISCUSSION
2.2.3.1 PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE INTERMEDIATE MARKET AND THE 
MARKET PRICE.
The perfectly competitive intermediate market is probably the easiest case for which 
to determine the correct transfer price. In such a market there is only one price for the 
product and that price is not sensitive to quantities bought or sold by any division of a 
single firm. Also, the marginal revenue obtainable for the intermediate product is equal 
to its external market price at all levels of output. The external market price may require 
adjustments to account for cost savings (selling, shipping, etc) on trading internally.
It seems also that there is a universal agreement in support of Hirshleifer's advocacy 
for the use of external market price. For instance, Gould (1964) strongly argues that where 
the intermediate product can be traded in a perfectly competitive market outside the firm, 
the transfer price should be the market price and the divisions should be free to trade 
inside or outside the firm. In fact, the selh'ng division would be indifferent as to whether 
it sold its units to an outside customer at the going market price or to a sister division at 
a market-based transfer price. Moreover, as pointed out by Dopuch and Drake (1964) 
and Anthony and Dearden (1980), when transactions are recorded at market price, 
divisional profitability represents the real economic contribution of the division to 
corporate profits. The use of such prices is believed to expose divisional managers to the 
same competitive pressures on cost as they would experience if they were the managers 
of independent companies. In these circumstances and since the primary objective of 
decentralisation is to create autonomous units operating as independent enterprises, 
market prices provide the most logical prices for transferred goods for a number of reasons. 
The following are suggested in some of the literature (Dopuch and Drake, 1964; Shaub, 
1978; Choudhury, 1979; Miller, 1982; Anthony et al., 1984; Lynch and Williamson, 1983; 
and Arnold and Hope, 1983):
1 - market prices represent an appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of 
internal transfers as opposed to external sales.
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2- since they represent an opportunity cost, their employment will permit 
optimal allocation and efficient utilisation of the resources of the firm.
3 - as market prices are externally determined (i.e. independent of internal 
conditions), they provide an objective basis by being free from possible 
internal bias.
4 - a market-based transfer price is likely to provide an incentive for production 
efficiency because excessive cost cannot be passed on to buyers.
5 - divisional managers have full control over their sources of revenue (both 
internal and external) and thus the evaluation of their performance based on 
profitability will have positive motivational response.
6 - divisional profitability can be compared directly to the profitability of outside 
companies in the same type of business in order to allow better informed 
capital budgeting and strategic decisions to be made.
The above advantages are apparently supported by empirical findings. Solomons 
(1965) found that the most common methods used among his sample firms were market 
price or market price less selling expenses. More than half the firms surveyed in the 1967 
Conference Board study used market-based transfer price either alone or in combination 
with some form of cost method. In Piper's (1969) study on transfer pricing practice in 
British industry, 53% of the respondents used either going market price or market price 
adjusted for transport, quantity discounts, quality or other factors. Rook (1971) found 
that 54% of 193 responding firms used market-based transfer prices. The prices used 
were, however, not uniform. The market price was modified in 61 companies to allow 
for costs of access to the market, or in the presence of idle capacity. The modification 
was operated basically to encourage internal trading in order to mop up excess capacity 
or reflect savings in costs of going to the markets. In the remaining 43 companies, goods 
were transferred at the going market price. Several of these companies thought that a 
system of unmodified market prices encouraged usual competitive pressure and ensured
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keen pricing and regular review. Obviously this could be justified if the firms were 
operating under conditions of full capacity and negligible costs of access to the market, 
or when internal trading is encouraged because the respective opportunity costs are less 
than when trading externally.
Similar supporting empirical evidence can be found in some other major studies. 
The results of the Manchester Business School's project (1973), Tomkins (1973), 
Emmanuel (1976), Vancil (1978), Wu and Sharp (1979) and Benke and Edwards (1980) 
indicate that market prices are important, if not predominant in industrial practice.
In a survey undertaken in West German companies, it was found that most transfers 
between divisions were valued on market-based prices (Forrester, 1977 and Jennergren, 
1981).
Scapens et al. (1982) found that most internal transfers were negotiated and in most 
cases (68.6% in the U.K. and 50.9% in the U.S.A.) negotiation was based on market price. 
Price Waterhouse's (1984) survey revealed that negotiation was also practised in the 
majority of companies (36/50) and 42 of the 50 companies using transfer prices based 
their prices on the market. The survey reported by Whiting and Gee (1984) showed that 
market-based methods were used by 23 companies, i.e. 41% of the respondents. The 
detailed analysis presented later in Chapter 4 and 6 confirm these results.
Despite the empirical evidence, it should not be hastily concluded that market-based 
transfer prices are the ideal and the best whatever the situation. There are indeed limitations 
to their claimed usefulness.
A primary disadvantage of a market-based transfer pricing system is that it relies 
on the assumption that a stable market exists for the product and that the divisions have 
access to that market. Unfortunately, few firms can either buy or sell in such a market in 
real life. Even when it does exist, prices often fluctuate widely. Cook (1955) mentioned 
the case where the net prices that the buyer and the seller can get on the outside market 
might be different owing to freight absorption, selling expenses, credit terms, bad-debt 
expense, etc. Which of the two prices should be the optimal transfer price? Cook (1955)
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asserted that this difference of price allowed some room for negotiation between the 
divisions but there was no rule that could say where in that range the transfer price should 
fall. This situation has been dealt with by Gould (1964) and Tomkins (1973) as is 
graphically depicted in Appendix C.
Another limitation is that the market price does not always represent the firm's 
opportunity cost. It does so only if the supplier has an external purchasing offer to decline 
(Emmanuel, 1977 andShillinglaw, 1982). In other words, the transfer price should reflect 
the amount the selling division could have received from its next best alternative, and 
that the buying division should not be made to pay a price greater than that of its next 
best alternative. Therefore, it can be deduced that, if the market-oriented transfer price 
provides relevant information to a division's profit performance measure, its use in 
decision-making can have adverse consequences.
The divisional manager may be tempted to improve his own performance to the 
detriment of the firm as a whole. For example, the manager of the division producing the 
intermediate commodity may opt for an external sale if the price offered on the external 
market is higher than an internal (transfer) price because he is motivated to improve his 
unit's profit performance. The risk with the reliance on the external market is that the 
external supplier may quote a temporarily low price in attempt to buy into the business 
and dispose of excess inventory or to use idle capacity, with the expectation of raising 
prices later (Gray and Ricketts, 1982 and Kaplan, 1982). One can imagine the disruptive 
effects of such eventuality on the selling division and the potential internal conflict that 
it can lead to. The same result would also happen if the buying division acquires the 
intermediate product externally at a price lower than the internal transfer price. This 
situation becomes more complicated when the internal supplier with excess or idle 
capacity has no alternative use for that capacity. Thus the relevance of market-oriented 
transfer prices is rather questionable when there is price fluctuation and competition in 
the (external) intermediate market.
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In addition to the above shortcomings, Solomons (1965) mentioned some other 
forms of imperfection:
'The transfer product may have special characteristics which differentiate 
it from other varieties of what may loosely be termed the 'same' product. 
As a result, the market for it may in fact be restricted. This means that the 
ruling price will not be independent of the activities of the two divisions. In 
particular, it is likely to be sensitive to any quantities which the supplying 
division sells on the market or which the consuming division buys on the 
market. A given price may mean many different things according to the 
terms relating to delivery, payment, service and warranty which constitute 
part of the deal. The price for a given commodity may be widely different 
in a long-term contract from what it would be in an isolated transaction" 
(Solomons, 1965, pp. 177-78).
Nonetheless, when the market imperfection is slight, the firm may still be able to 
sell all its intermediate product externally but at some price concessions. Thus the market 
price can be used for internal transfers. However, when the market imperfections are 
major, external sales of the intermediate product would be possible only with substantial 
price concessions and thus the prevailing marketprice cannot be used for internal transfers.
These arguments find support from empirical research. Benke and Edwards (1980) 
found that only two of the companies surveyed used strict market prices, whereas the 
most popular method in use was the adjusted market price. The adjustment is made to 
allow for market imperfections because the essential requirement for the use of the 
prevailing price - which is the existence of a perfectly competitive market - is unlikely 
to exist at least for certain kinds of goods.
In summary, there is substantial theoretical and empirical support for 
market-oriented transfer prices. However, for the market-based system to work efficiently 
there is the pre-requisite of an active, competitive outside market for the transferred 
commodities. In such a market any company can trade a product in arm's length 
transactions at the prevailing or going market price, i.e. whereby profit centres have the 
freedom to act independently. Unfortunately, very few markets are perfectly competitive 
and very few products are perfect substitutes for each other. This has led companies not 
to use the prevailing market price as this would result in dysfunctional decisions. They
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opted instead for adjusting the market price to allow for imperfections, or to let the 
managers of the supplying and buying divisions engage in negotiations to arrive at fair 
adjustments to the going market price.
The negotiated prices are also subject to some conditions. First, an external 
intermediate market must exist; second, managers of concerned divisions should have 
full access to market information; third, either division should have access to external 
sources of the same or a substitute product; and finally, top management must be fully 
supportive of the negotiation process. Otherwise, the negotiations would be unlikely to 
succeed in setting the correct transfer price.
Given that markets for intermediate commodities are, in most cases, not perfectly 
competitive, i.e. the market price is not always relevant for internal transfers, let us now 
turn to the solution advocated by Hirshleifer - the marginal cost approach - for the more 
common situation of market imperfection.
THE MARGINAL COST APPROACH WITH IMPERFECTLY 
COMPETITIVE EXTERNAL MARKETS
The most general results of Hirshleifer's work are that transfer prices should be set 
at marginal costs. The marginal cost is the change in total costs resulting from a one-unit 
increase in quantity. Similarly, the marginal revenue is the change in total revenue 
resulting from a one-unit increase in quantity (Dixon, 1966).
Economic theory concludes that the most profitable price-output combination will 
be the one where marginal revenue and marginal costs are equal. This economic theory 
of pricing was suggested by Hirshleifer when no market existed for the intermediate 
product and for the more complicated case where the market exists but is imperfectly 
competitive. Even in the case of a perfectly competitive intermediate product market, he 
demonstrated that the transfer price - the market price - was also equal to the marginal 
manufacturing cost. The contention that marginal cost pricing was the more general 
solution was thus justified. This is explained by Solomons (1965, p. 179) in the following 
terms:
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"even when there is an outside competitive price which can be used, the 
marginal cost rule still holds. The transferor division should produce up to 
the point where its marginal cost equals the competitive price, so that by 
setting the transfer price equal to the competitive price we are also setting 
it equal to the transferor division's marginal cost for its marginal unit of 
output".
In short, the incremental cost rule and the market price rule for transfer pricing are not 
in conflict when a perfectly competitive intermediate market exists.
A similar strong argument in support of marginal cost was made by Goetz (1967). 
He proceeded by the case method and contended that both market price and average 
historical cost would be irrelevant and dysfunctional to corporate welfare. He concluded 
that "the unique correct transfer price in intra-company transfers is incremental cost" 
and that "relevancy and goal congruence demand that incremental costs be used as 
transfer prices" (Goetz, 1967, pp. 436 and 440).
The above arguments imply that marginal cost measures the supplying division's 
short-run incremental cost of supplying the intermediate product. Stated otherwise, when 
no intermediate market exists or once the assumption of a perfect market for the 
intermediate product is released, it results that opportunity costs are not measured by 
market prices but rather by the marginal or incremental cost to the selling division. 
Therefore, marginal cost measures the sacrifice the selling division makes by supplying 
the product. This claim of setting the transfer price equal to the marginal cost of production 
at the optimal output is simply based on the notion that the manufacturing division will 
go on producing up to full capacity so long as the marginal revenue of the product sold 
is greater than the marginal cost of producing it. The same reasoning applies if the selling 
division operates both internally and in an outside market. It will continue to produce and 
sell to both markets until the marginal revenue in each market is equal to the marginal 
production cost at the optimal output level.
The marginal cost approach in not free from problems. The most obvious 
disadvantage is that the system implies that all the units of the transferred product are 
charged at the marginal cost of the final unit. If the marginal cost increases with output,
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then it will provide the supplying division with some contribution to its fixed costs and 
profit. If the marginal cost is constant (or decreasing) then clearly the supplying division 
does not absorb its fixed costs in the transfer price and thus is not permitted to earn a 
profit on the transfer product. Most of the profit contribution will be lodged with the 
buying division. In this way the supplying division is forced to operate at a loss and 
thereby its autonomy is reduced, especially if the transferred product represents the 
majority of its output. The problem is obviously more acute if the internal trading takes 
places between several divisions in sequence with the final division accruing much of 
the profits. Consequently, such a system of pricing ignores the divisional performance 
measurement aspect when considering profit centres in a divisionalised firm. Therefore, 
as noted by Young (1976), Kaplan (1982) and Grabski (1985), marginal cost pricing 
cannot be employed without the removal of the decision-making autonomy from 
divisional managers and, evidently, must not be used for evaluating performance or for 
the motivation of divisional managers.
A reciprocal disadvantage is that, if the manager of the supplying division is 
evaluated on the basis of his division's profit, it is very likely that he will - at least in the 
short run - overstate the marginal cost of production in order to obtain a higher transfer 
price and thereby increase his divisional profit. Thus, the marginal cost pricing may 
provide strong incentives for the manager of the supplying division to build slack in the 
cost function of producing the intermediate product. Hirshleifer (1956) discussed the 
problem of manipulation of the marginal cost curves by divisions and the consequent 
exploitation of one division by the other, particularly when no market exists for the 
intermediate commodity. This refers to the simple maximiser case where the supplying 
division behaves as a monopolist seller or the buying division as a monopsonist buyer 
(Onsi, 1970). Naert and Janssen (1971) demonstrated that sub-optimisation could also 
occur without inter-divisional exchange of marginal cost information. Obviously when 
divisions (and their managers) are judged on their profits, each division will try to 
maximise its own profit even if it is at the expense of other divisions and the firm as a 
whole. In other words, "there is both the incentive and the opportunity to cheat1" (Gould,
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1964, p. 67). To counter this non-optimum behaviour it is often suggested that central 
management's intervention is necessary and unavoidable (Hirshleifer, 1956 and Fremgen, 
1970). However, such intervention implies that the purpose of controlling managerial 
performance through decentralisation is not served (Dorward, 1987).
A third difficulty with the system is the calculation of the marginal schedules. In 
practice both the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves are not known (Flavell, 1977 
and Maciariello, 1980). Even if they are estimated, they are still likely to change rapidly, 
particularly in the large multi-division, multi-product firm. Moreover, the data obtainable 
from the internal cost accounting system are only average (constant) variable and full 
costs, not marginal costs. It should be noted at this point that Hirshleifer has used the 
term "marginal cost" in the context of economic theory whereby it signifies "the 
additional cost of producing an additional unit where cost includes returns to all factors 
of production including the cost of capita?9 (Abdel-khalik and Lusk, 1974, p. 13). A 
straightforward deduction from this is that such a definition differs largely from the 
accounting meaning of the term, i.e. the variable or direct cost of producing one additional 
unit. This difference in meaning and context creates a practical difficulty in implementing 
the marginal transfer pricing system because the accounting marginal cost does not include 
investments in fixed assets or returns to capital. Given that marginal cost is usually 
approximated by companies by means of the accounting notion of variable cost (assumed 
constant for all levels of output), this results in "the producing (selling) division, at best, 
breaking even in terms of the marginal profitability on the internal transfers. This is 
hardly likely to provide a strong motivation to sell internally within the group, even if it 
is in the group's interest" (Tomkins, 1980, pp. 249-250).
The essence of this practical difficulty stems from the non-realism of economic 
theory in assuming optimal behaviour (Tomkins, 1980) in a world of risk and uncertainty. 
As seen earlier, this is one of the shortcomings of Hirshleifer's analysis which assumed 
that divisional decisions were made in an environment of certainty. In a world of 
risk-taking because of uncertainty, the notion of maximising profits - which is the depart 
point of Hirshleifer - loses most or all of its significance. Therefore, the transfer price
39
based on variable cost can be maintained only if the divisions (or the company as a whole) 
contend themselves with achieving satisfactory profits instead of maximum profits (Gunn, 
1981). In this sense the variable cost can be adjusted by adding, for example, a 
percentage-on-cost for profit and fixed costs. Tomkins (1980) argued that this procedure 
will preserve the apparent theoretical optimum and yield satisfactory divisional 
performance.
A further practical limitation to the marginal cost system is when there are capacity 
constraints, that is when there are restrictions on divisional resources. If the supplying 
division is operating near a capacity constraint, it will not be able to increase its production 
to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. If it is operating below capacity, 
its opportunity cost will no longer be represented by the marginal cost but rather by the 
profits foregone by not meeting all the demand for the product. Similarly, marginal cost 
may be less than opportunity cost when operations are at or above capacity.
The adequacy and relevance of marginal cost pricing should also be considered in 
the light of the time factor. This fits in with the purpose of the present research: the study 
of transfer pricing in the organisational context. More than two decades have now elapsed 
since Hirshleifer's proposal and during this time the manufacturing company has 
undergone tremendous technological and organisational changes. Companies have grown 
bigger through internal expansion, mergers and acquisitions, modernised their 
technologies and became more diversified in their products and markets. As a 
consequence, direct costs no longer represent a high proportion of total manufacturing 
costs as they used to be (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988, Johnson and Kaplan, 1987 and Sponza, 
1989). Thus, fixed costs cannot be ignored even in short-term decisions in the modern 
corporation. Given that variable costs are only a small part of total costs, a transfer price 
comprised of only variable costs would be totally unfair and unacceptable to the selling 
profit centre. If total cost is used then a major part of the buying division's variable cost 
will consist of the selling division's fixed costs passed on in the transfer price. In such a 
situation, the marginal cost to the company is significantly different from the marginal
cost to the buying division. If the selling division's fixed costs increase with production 
levels and the buying division is bound to buy internally then the marginal cost concept 
obscures decision making. The unpopularity of marginal cost transfer pricing reported 
by previous empirical studies later discussed in Chapter 4 substantiates this claim and 
indicates that the problem is more of an organisational and behavioural nature than of 
mere cost calculations.
2.2.4 CONCLUSION
Economic models seek the application of economic efficiency principles to the 
transfer pricing problem. The decentralised organisation is viewed as a small economy 
made of a number of interacting units or divisions. Just as for an economy, the 
co-ordination of these interactions can be achieved by means of the price mechanism. 
Seminal works have been provided by Hirshleifer (1956, 1957 and 1964). Hirshleifer 
developed the micro-economic foundation of the problem and demonstrated the 
optimality of using the marginal cost of the supplying division as the appropriate transfer 
price even when a perfectly competitive market exists for the intermediate product. This 
would achieve maximum efficiency for the firm, namely the maximisation of the firm's 
profits.
The discussion of the system has highlighted its advantages and disadvantages and 
most writers conclude that there are theoretical and practical limitations to its 
implementation. Moreover, the suggested solutions are valid only under a set of 
assumptions appropriate only to the highly restrictive case of a two-division firm. This 
rendered the system rather questionable with regard to divisional autonomy and 
performance evaluation, particularly in real world situations of multi-division, 
multi-product companies. Furthermore, no practical method for implementing the system 
was formulated. An attempt to fill in this gap was made fourteen years later by Ronen 
and Mckinney (1970) but the usefulness of the proposed solution in practice is 
questionable.
Despite its shortcomings, Hirshleifer's theoretical analysis has always been 
considered the foundation reference for any reader or researcher on the controversial issue 
of transfer pricing. It has, in fact, stimulated a stream of literature supporting, criticising, 
amending and expanding his model.
In general, the economic models fail to adequately study the transfer pricing problem 
because they deal only with simple cases under a set of limiting assumptions. Being based 
on marginal cost analysis and focusing on profit maximisation, economic models do not 
preserve divisional autonomy as the level of production and consumption as well as 
transfer prices and profits are predetermined - hence the inadequacy of profits for 
evaluating performance. Dysfunctional behaviour, such as the manipulation of cost 
information by divisional managers, is also more likely because of the inequities of the 
marginal pricing system. In addition to that, economic models assume the firm to be 
operating in certainty environments where no capacity (or other) constraints exist.
To overcome the aforementioned problems and in order to handle the pricing of 
inter-divisional transfers in a more realistic and efficient manner, solutions have been 
proposed through the application of mathematical programming. Three major approaches 
have been developed for this purpose. These are 1) the linear programming models, 2) 
the decomposition models, and 3) the goal programming models. They are discussed in 
the next section.
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2.3 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODELS
The literature in this domain can be classified into two groups (Demski and Krepps, 
1982). The first group focuses on the imperfectly competitive market and develops 
algorithms to determine transfer prices that would achieve efficient allocation of resources 
under capacity constraints. The second group is concerned with the agency relationships 
and investigates how the centre could provide incentives to get divisional managers 
truthfully reveal the private information they possess in order to optimise results. It seems 
that the later group is a promising area of research (for instance, Harris et al., 1982 and 
Cohen and Loeb, 1982).
While economic models are based on the marginal cost analysis, the transfer price 
under mathematical programming is set at the opportunity cost of producing the 
intermediate product. Several procedures have been developed and applied to the 
determination of transfer prices and the allocation of scarce resources. They can be 
classified under three major headings: 1) linear programming models, 2) decomposition 
models, and 3) goal programming models.
The present review will only shed light on the major developments in the application 
of these models to transfer pricing. Thomas (1980) has already succinctly summarised 
and discussed most of the contributions in this field.
2.3.1 LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODELS
Linear programming is a method basically developed for determining optimal 
programmes of interrelated activities given a limited amount of resources during a certain 
period of time. The optimum of the programme may be a maximisation or minimisation 
of some measure of effectiveness called the objective function. Typical objective 
functions are the maximisation of profit contributions or the minimisation of costs in view 
of a set of limiting factors or constraints.
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The linear programming approach to transfer pricing has dealt with two problems 
simultaneously: 1) the allocation of scarce resources and 2) the determination of transfer 
prices. The latter result from the calculation of the shadow prices (or dual values) of the 
scarce resources.
An early application of the approach was proposed by Dopuch and Drake (1964) 
who identified three types of market orientation :
a) - Internal monopsony, which means that there is only one buying division and 
more than one selling division. In this case, marginal costs were suggested 
as the basis for setting transfer prices. As there is only one buyer, divisions 
would compete on internal efficiency and have no control over the selling 
price.
b) - Internal monopoly, which means that there is only one selling division and 
more than one buying division. In this case, the selling division occupies a 
dominant position that reduces the autonomy of the buying divisions with 
regard to their inputs. Thus, decentralisation is rather hampered.
c) - Monopolistic competition, which means that there is more than one buying 
and selling division using fixed common facilities to produce a variety of 
possible outputs. Transfer prices are either set by central management 
according to some allocation model, or they may be negotiated.
These three market situations could be supplemented with Thompson's (1967) three 
types of interdependence:
a) - Pooled interdependence, here divisions share a source but have virtually no 
contact with each other.
b) - Sequential interdependence, where the output of one division becomes the 
input of another as in the case of vertically integrated companies,
c) - Reciprocal interdependence, where the outputs of divisions become the inputs 
for each other.
The situation of monopolistic competition and reciprocal interdependence is too 
complex to be dealt with using a simplistic approach. This has prompted the introduction 
of linear programming. Under this approach, the transfer price is, as stated earlier, set at 
the opportunity cost of producing the intermediate product, measured by shadow prices 
associated with the scarce inputs. The opportunity cost is the cost of the next best 
alternative foregone to the one actually taken. The most important contributions in the 
use of linear programming for pricing transfers are discussed below.
Samuels (1965 and 1969) argues that programming is a natural extension of the 
principle of marginal costing to situations with more than one limiting factor or constraint. 
He proposes an opportunity cost procedure similar to Hirshleifer's but based on a linear 
programming solution to resource allocation and transfer pricing. Divisions are charged 
for lost contributions or opportunities so as to discourage them from engaging in sub- 
optimal behaviour. This system of penalties is also an efficient means of control that 
would enable the firm to optimise its objectives.
Commenting on Samuel's solution, Bernhard (1968) indicates that shadow prices 
are accurate measures of opportunity costs as long as two conditions prevail : 1) the 
product mix does not change and 2) resources are efficiently utilised. Otherwise, the 
solution would no longer be optimal. Nevertheless, this is not considered as a severe 
limitation as constant revisions are always necessary to update plans and objectives 
(Samuels, 1965).
However, the approach suffers from the familiar problems of autonomy and 
performance evaluation. It leaves divisions with zero profits at the final iteration and 
requires terminal intervention by the central office to ensure optimisation (Thomas, 
1980).
The use of opportunity cost for pricing transfers has been suggested by Onsi (1970) 
as a better approach than economic transfer pricing systems. Onsi illustrated this with an
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example of two profit centres where the selling division produces two independent 
products. One of the products has no external market and is transferred to the distributing 
division. The transfer price of this product is equal to the opportunity cost or the shadow 
price of the resources utilised in its production. This solution is arrived at through a 
mathematical programming approach based on the decomposition principle which will 
be examined in Section 2.3.2.
A simultaneous attempt was made by Manes (1970). Considering the possibility of 
using shadow prices to calculate transfer prices, Manes worked through a numerical 
example based on the Birch Paper Company. This is a well known Harvard Business 
School case study written in 1957 and reprinted in Anthony and Dearden (1980). The 
linear programme formulated for the problem shows - after twice modifying the original 
case - that it is possible to calculate transfer prices from shadow prices.
The usefulness of the model is subject to the following comments. Solomons (1965) 
noted that shadow prices could not be used directly as transfer prices but have to be 
supplemented by the variable costs of the materials incurred up to the point of transfer. 
Moreover, as shadow prices are the dual values of capacity constraints, divisional 
managers may tend to underestimate their capacity, or generally not to have excess 
capacity because divisions with excess capacity would have zero dual variables. This is 
particularly true when profits are allocated to the most tightly constrained divisions. 
Shadow prices - and the linear assumption - imply that large changes in transfer prices 
(as well as profits) would occur depending on whether divisions reach or recede from 
capacity. Furthermore "when a dominant restrictive constraint is relaxed, then a second 
constraint will become dominant and a change occurs in shadow prices. Consequently, 
this will set a new 'ruling' shadow price for the sub-system. There is nothing in a 
sub-system model to say that this new shadow price will be in even the same range as 
the old - or in that range adjusted for the costs and gains accruing to the relaxation 
expenditure" (Hayhurst, 1976, p. 98).
This sensitivity and volatility of transfer prices in response to changes in capacity 
conditions would affect divisions whose performance is judged on the basis of those
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transfer prices. Kaplan (1977) observed that when there are constraints other than 
production or capacity constraints, it is not clear which division would be credited with 
the shadow price and the imputed profit.
Monden (1982) examined the problem of human resources re-allocation among 
departments in the decentralised firm by using a transfer price based on a shadow price. 
The transfer price is a backward transfer price in that it is used by control management 
to ensure efficient absorption of excess manpower. The receiving departments are 
"rewarded" by top management with the transfer price for taking in staff from other 
departments. However, no assumption is made for outside markets for excess resources 
and the transfer price is centrally fixed.
Above all the linear programming approach impairs divisional autonomy as the 
optimal output decisions are determined by central management. This requires detailed 
knowledge of the divisions operating conditions and thus the information economies 
sought from decentralisation are counterbalanced. As a consequence, the motivational 
effects expected from the creation of (autonomous) profit centres are impeded and 
probably lost altogether because of the imposed inputs, outputs and transfer prices. 
Therefore, the efficiency and fairness of a linear programming transfer price system are 
as much discredited as the marginal cost pricing approach.
The above problems led Manes (1970) to conclude that it is rather difficult to 
consider the use of linear programming shadow prices as relevant transfer prices. This 
view is not shared by Onsi (1970) who considers that an optimal solution derived from 
shadow prices and accepted by both corporate management and divisions is feasible.
Manes' conclusion finds support from Barron (1972). Commenting on Samuel's 
(1965 and 1969) and Solomons (1965) interpretations of the Hirshleifer's model, Barron 
concluded that linear programming prices were of little value in helping to set internal 
prices for divisional control. A great deal of loss of autonomy was required for an optimal 
allocation of company resources.
Both Manes' and Barren's conclusions seem to be in conflict with the views held 
by Onsi. However, there is not much comparison because Onsi (1970) used the 
decomposition principle, an approach favoured by Barren (1972).
2.3.2 DECOMPOSITION MODELS
Decomposition has been developed primarily as a computational tool for complex 
linear programming problems. The major breakthrough was made by Dantzig and Wolfe 
(1960 and 1961) in discovering the decomposition principle.
Baumol and Fabian (1964) demonstrated that the principle could be applied to 
decentralised planning to solve complex optimisation problems. This is a major step in 
the application of mathematical programming to inter-divisional pricing. It is also a 
considerable effort to circumvent the limitations associated with the typical linear 
programming models. The method aims at providing internal prices for decentralised 
decision-making in the presence of external economies and diseconomies. In other words, 
it decentralises the mathematical programme.
The decomposition involves the breaking up of the overall corporate optimisation 
problem into a master problem and a set of sub- problems based on a number of constraints. 
Each division may have its independent constraints and at the same time compete with 
other divisions for common resources. The allocation of these scarce resources in an 
optimal way is a major concern in the application of linear programming models as 
discussed in the previous section. This is also a major objective of the decomposition 
approach.
There are two basic different styles of decomposition algorithms: 1) the 
price-directive and 2) the resource-directive; (Geoffrion, 1970 and Burton et al, 1974). 
The price-driven model allocates resources on the basis of transfer prices, while the 
resource-driven model deals with the direct allocation of fixed quantities of scarce 
resources to each division. The Baumol-Fabian algorithm mentioned above is 
price-driven, and just as resource-driven models, it is iterative in nature. It involves 
considerable back and forth exchange of information between central management and
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divisions as if both parties engage in a series of negotiations. The procedure uses a 
generalised interpretation of the shadow prices of linear programming duality theory. 
Each division has its linear programme which generates details of its plans to central 
management. The procedure contains the following steps :
1) - Top management sends information to divisions on prices of company scarce 
resources and a set of transfer prices,
2) - Given these prices, each division submits its optimal plan of operations to 
top management, including the amount of resources required,
3) - Top management uses the divisional plans as inputs for its mathematical 
formulation to determine new prices,
4) - Steps two and three are repeated until top management decides that the total 
profit is satisfactory,
5) - When there are no more changes in the prices, top management tells divisions 
what combination of their plans to achieve.
A close look at the above steps reveals that under this iterative approach, central 
management need not know too much about division technological arrangements. 
Divisions need only report to corporate headquarters their optimal plans based on current 
prices sent by the latter. This minimises the information flow between divisions and 
corporate headquarters. Beside that, the method establishes negotiation between top 
management and the divisions, and hence eliminates confrontation which leads sometimes 
to conflict between divisional managers. The approach may, however, be criticised on 
lack of divisional autonomy. Just as with the method of successive approximations 
discussed previously, the decomposition procedure centralises the determination of 
transfer prices at corporate level and thus does not permit autonomous divisionalisation. 
Since the figures are imposed on the divisions by central management, Baumol and Fabian 
themselves noted that "there is no automatic motivation mechanism which will lead 
division managers to arrive at such a combination of output of their own volition. In this
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way, the decentralisation permitted by decomposition breaks down completely at this 
point" (Baumol and Fabian, 1964, p. 14). Therefore, the information economies 
advantage of the approach is inevitably offset by the lack of divisional autonomy and 
motivation.
Prior to Baumol and Fabian, Whinston (1964) arrived at similar results by applying 
the iterative procedure to decentralised decision-making. Whinston observed and 
concluded that in the presence of externalities (dependence between divisions) and price 
guides (as devised by economic theory) were no longer adequate for individual 
decision-makers to achieve joint-profit maximisation. For this, the decomposition was 
carried into non-linear cases and mechanisms were developed for altering input and output 
prices and fixing transfer prices.
To address the aforementioned deficiencies of the decomposition approach, Charnes 
et al. (1967) argued - via the Birch Paper Company case - that control through 
decentralisation by prices alone was not possible and that additional information (called 
pre-emptive goals) was necessary. Basically, central management would delegate part of 
the company's resources to each division in the form of goals placed in a priority order, 
and penalties for deviations. This would leave divisional managers with more autonomy 
in the decision process. This unique organisational structure was termed "coherent 
decentralisation" as the unit's drive to individual profit goals would result in overall 
optimal profit and not in a competitive behaviour. Moreover, divisional managers' 
performance would be evaluated with respect to the activities under their control. The 
ambiguity of the model is on how much autonomy is left to divisions when all the 
pre-emptive goals have been dictated by corporate headquarters.
In general, this pre-emptive goal model is an extension of the decomposition 
principle and a basis for Mass's (1968) decomposition algorithm for quadratic 
programming. This latter was designed to overcome the loss of autonomy for 
decision-making by divisions because of intervention by corporate headquarters. Hass 
(1968) found at least two problems with the linear programming decomposition model.
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It dealt with flat demand and supply curves, whereas most industries were (thought) 
oligopolistic. Secondly, it did not take into account any type of demand and supply 
dependence.
The quadratic decomposition algorithm differed from previous models because of 
the inclusion of divisional demand curves. Optimal plans are again found through an 
exchange of information between corporate management and divisions. The mechanism 
used is a linear adjustment of the divisional demand curves, taking into account constraints 
of the resources shared by the divisions. Under this model, externalities are accounted 
for and divisions could still make profits even though they were charged with the 
opportunity costs for the scarce resources they use. Nonetheless, central management still 
intervenes to specify transfer prices as well as deciding on the final iterations of the 
programme. Thus, divisional profits are centrally administered. This renders divisional 
autonomy as well as performance evaluation on the basis of such profits rather 
questionable.
Another version of the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm was proposed by Jennergren 
(1972). Under this approach instead of issuing optimal production orders to the divisions, 
top management issues optimal price schedules. On the basis of these schedules, each 
division buys corporate resources and produce so as to maximise its divisional profits. If 
a division demands more corporate resources, the central office responds to this by raising 
prices by non-constant amounts or margins. It is thought that such an approach would 
more positively motivate divisional managers than it could if production orders were 
issued instead.
Jennergren's and Mass's analyses are identical in the sense that "optimum solutions 
were found by communicating a price function rather than a single price to the divisions. 
Upon receiving the final price function, the divisions behaved in an independent but 
optimal manner with respect to the firm's objective" (Bailey and Boe, 1976, p. 561). 
Under these price-directive models, divisions' book profits are to be determined by 
iterative exchanges with a manipulative central management.
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A different approach to the ones described so far was suggested by Godfrey (1971). 
Having noted the major drawbacks of the decomposition models, mainly the centralisation 
of decision making and the consequent impediment of divisional autonomy, Godfrey 
presented a resource-directive alternative. The solution was later adapted by Mepham 
(1980) to incorporate transfer pricing. Their combined model consists of the following 
sequential phases:
1 - divisions submit their forecasts to corporate headquarters, including their 
demand for products, prices and divisional resources available. With this 
information central management constructs an overall linear programme for 
the whole firm.
2 - central management solves this large model and sends proposals to divisions 
on provisional amounts of resources allocated to each division, minimum 
expected profit levels, transfer prices and a suggested plan of operations.
3 - given these proposals, each division can reconsider its forecasts and any 
changes may be discussed with central management so as to formalise final 
divisional plans. Each division uses its own linear programme.
4 - finally, accounting controls such as profit contribution and rate of return 
targets are used as measures of divisional efficiency.
While this approach seeks to combine the allocation of corporate resources and 
maintain autonomous decision-making by the divisions, it is however similar to other 
programming approaches in stressing the necessity for central rationing of resources. This 
makes room for some ambiguity as to how optimisation could be achieved while giving 
enough autonomy to divisional management to act independently.
Burton and Obel (1980) considered the nature and influence of the information used 
in a simulation of decomposition. They concluded that the price-driven algorithm 
performed the best when there is: 1) no a priori information, 2) high initial transfer price 
and equal resource sharing, 3) market-based transfer price, 4) equal resource sharing and
52
production constraints, and 5) historical prices and budgets. A combination of price and 
resource approaches performed next best whereas the resource approach performed the 
worst. Generally the best results were obtained with more a priori information, preferably 
not historical.
A price-driven decomposition model was adopted by Love (1980) to determine 
optimal equipment transfers. This aimed at using the service facilities of companies as 
profit centres. However, as the model is centrally manipulated and the transfer prices 
imposed on the divisions, profits are thus predetermined. Divisional managers could not 
be held profit responsible as they are only decision executors and not makers.
2.3.3 GOAL PROGRAMMING MODELS OR SATISFICING APPROACHES
In the models described so far, the programming was based on an objective function, 
usually the maximisation of corporate profits. In the real world, however, this sole 
objective is not the only parameter on which success is judged. Businesses set a multitude 
of targets among which is the realisation of satisfactory profits or rates of return. "These 
goals may be complementary, but more often than not, they are conflicting and 
incommensurable" (Ringuest and Gulledge, 1983, p. 76). The shift from linear 
programming and decomposition algorithms to goal programming was a response to the 
multi-goal situation, and the emphasis became to find a satisfactory plan instead of the 
best (or optimum) plan.
Goal programming is a special type of linear programming whereby the manager 
can deal with multiple goals. These goals are competitive and of varying priorities and 
are satisfied in an ordinal sequence. The objectives of lower order are considered only 
after high priority goals have been dealt with. Therefore, "if the manager can specify the 
priorities for the different goals, a goal programming technique can be used to provide 
the best solution under multiple goals" (Lin, 1980, p. 377).
Goal programming was originally developed by Charnes and Cooper (1961). 
Refinement and extension of the technique as a tool for planning and control in 
multi-objective situations was made by - among others - Ijiri (1965). Carefully noting
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that profit maximisation could not be the sole objective for the sake of accounting control, 
Ijiri formulated a linear programming model for multiple goals as a logical extension of 
the normal break-even analysis of profitability.
Building on Ijiri's formulations, Salkin and Kornbluth (1973) and Kornbluth (1974) 
presented a multiple-objective linear programme that would lead to a satisficing solution. 
The dual values of company resources are used as transfer prices that divisions are charged. 
However, the model suffers from the same drawbacks as the decomposition solutions. 
Optimal decisions could not be ensured on the basis of prices alone. Additional 
information was required. As seen earlier, a possible remedy was proposed by Charnes 
et al. (1967) and Kydland (1975). Moreover, Lin (1980) argues that one of the limitations 
of Kornbluth's approach is that it assigned a priori weights to each of the objectives 
instead of generating them by a weighting method or algorithm. An alternative procedure 
was suggested to provide an ex-post analysis. Lin's work was later extended by Kornbluth 
(1986) to accommodate changes of managerial preferences over the period of operations.
A further contribution has been made by Bailey and Boe (1976). Noting that 
competition for scarce resources and the effects of externalities were strictly intermediate 
conflicts that stemmed from the lack of complete information about the company's needs 
for the achievement of goals, Bailey and Boe (1976) proposed a behavioural interpretation 
of mathematical programming. Their model seeks to overcome the incompatibility of the 
usual mathematical programming approaches and the behavioural aspects within 
hierarchical organisations. They adopted Ruefli's (1971) generalised goal decomposition 
model which is a three-level multiple objective programming model. It treats the 
organisation as a variable in the decision-making process. The three levels considered 
are: 1) corporate management, 2) division management, and 3) operating management. 
The role of corporate management is to determine the goals of the organisation. Unlike 
other models which seek only profit maximisation, goals under this model include other 
variables such as resource usage, prices and levels of production. Given the goals assigned 
by corporate management, divisional management must determine the inputs to be used 
in the products or projects. Thus, the model differs from previous ones (e.g. Baumol and
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Fabian (1964) and Whinston (1964) on two major points. It is a multiple goal model and 
is organisation dependent. Like other models, however, it is based on shadow prices or 
dual values of divisional goals (relative to corporate ones) and corporate management 
need to know little about divisional constraints.
This satisficing, decomposed multi-goal programming model also has its 
shortcomings. As goals are determined and resources allocated by corporate management, 
this might reduce divisional autonomy. Another pertinent problem is, as noted by the 
authors, the potential of gamesmanship. As the model relied on is a multi-goal one, conflict 
over goals might arise. The goals prescribed by corporate management might not suit 
divisions, and vice versa. For example, a division might set goals that would not be in 
line with corporate ones. Gaming is therefore a latent problem that could be expressed 
in biasing and building slack in the information communicated to corporate headquarters.
2.3.4 DISCUSSION
The programming techniques offered sophisticated ways for dealing with pricing 
internal transfers in multi-division, multi-product companies. Transfer prices are derived 
from the dual values or shadow prices of the resources used.
There are, however, limitations to the applications of these techniques. The first and 
most important is the loss of divisional autonomy because of central determination of 
inputs and outputs. The decomposition principle has been introduced as a better alternative 
to the simple linear programming models in ensuring more autonomy for divisions through 
their participation in the programme. This was sought to preserve the essence of 
decentralisation into profit centres. This assumed advantage has not been fulfilled. As 
mentioned earlier, Baumol and Fabian (1964) - the pioneers in adopting the decomposition 
principle - noted at least two limitations. First, the extent of decentralisation because the 
output decisions are made and enforced by corporate headquarters. Second, the 
consequent loss of motivation because of the loss of freedom of activity and 
decision-making. Stated otherwise, divisional managers have freedom to do whatever
they want as long as it coincides with predetermined corporate objectives. This 
centralisation of decentralised decision-making affects divisional profits because of the 
transfer prices prescribed.
Beside these shortcomings, Belkaoui (1983) has highlighted the following 
drawbacks. First, the method relies on the ability of programmers to interpret the inputs 
and represent them mathematically. Second, divisional managers may supply inaccurate 
data in their optimal plans to ensure maximum shares of scarce resources, particularly if 
they are not motivated towards achieving the optimal corporate plan. Finally, the iterative 
process could become complex and time consuming and, as a consequence, cease to be 
sufficiently practical. These problems persist even with the goal programming models 
suggested to encompass a multitude of goals, including the traditional maximisation of 
profits.
The existence of the above difficulties makes the application of the models quite a 
controversial issue. Solomons (1965) concluded that the use of mathematically based 
transfer prices did not make it possible to preserve the autonomy of divisions as profit 
centres and, at the same time, ensure that their operations be optimal from a corporate 
viewpoint. This controversy is also stressed by Godfrey (1971) who says that it is 
impossible to allow complete autonomy to the divisions in their decisions about using 
scarce resources. The conflict between the two issues requires a centralised coordinating 
mechanism to ensure the distribution of the resources among competing divisions. A 
similar comment was made by Thomas (1980) who notes that the programming 
approaches require explicit central office stipulation of divisional decisions once the final 
iterations have been completed. Such terminal interventions are inevitably destructive of 
divisional autonomies. Thus, none of the models provides what is mostly sought: 
decentralisation into meaningful autonomous profit centres. Once plan is "agreed", 
divisional managers are decision executors, not decision makers.
Kaplan (1977 and 1982) mentioned at least two reasons for not using mathematically 
derived transfer prices for decentralised decision-making. First, it is evident that profits 
are imputed to the scarce resources, for example, capacity constraints in the selling
56
division. Therefore, a division with scarce resources is rewarded whereas a division with 
adequate or surplus capacity is penalised. Consequently, this creates incentives for bias 
and building slack in the information supplied by divisional managers to top management 
to use as inputs in the model. As the programming approach inputs profits to the divisions 
with scarce resources, dysfunctional behaviour would be difficult to rule out, especially 
if that information is the basis for performance evaluation. In sum, even if known, shadow 
price-based transfer prices cannot be relied upon alone to co-ordinate divisions (Dopuch 
et al., 1982).
The complexity of the mathematical models made them administratively 
impractical. However, some writers like to suggest that this should not be an obstacle 
because of the development in information technology. This assertion is only half the 
truth because:
1 - the introduction of sophisticated technology means that funds are to be 
invested. Such investment requires that a budget is available beforehand to 
ensure that higher priorities and better opportunities are not foregone.
2 - the introduction of this technology creates the need for developing skills to 
use the machines efficiently. Moreover, with the speed of scientific 
development, today's computers are obsolete tomorrow.
3 - most importantly, are divisions going to have their own computer centres 
which will be coordinated by a main terminal from the headquarters or will 
there be a common laboratory for the divisions and the central office? In both 
cases, and particularly in the second case, will the costs be allocated to the 
divisions or borne by the central office?
This last question was addressed - among others - by Sollenberger (1977), Drury 
and Bates (1979), Weelock (1982), Wilkinson (1986), Ward and Ward (1987), and Goyal 
and Beiner (1988). The central computer resource is either considered as a service or 
profit centre. Hence our main concern of allocating resources and pricing internal transfers
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arises again in a rather vicious circle. The computer resources are essential for the analysis 
of the mathematical programmes but before using them it is necessary to know on what 
basis to split the usage cost among users.
A survey by Higgins and Opdebeeck (1984) shows that of 47 respondents using 
micro computers in management accounting areas, only 4 (i.e. 9 %) use them for transfer 
pricing. This was the lowest percentage compared to a variety of other uses where 
budgeting scored 91% (43 respondents).
The foregoing discussion is also substantiated with data pertaining to the practicality 
of mathematically based transfer prices. For example, Livesey (1967) noted that they 
were just theoretical models found most in American literature and that there was no 
evidence for their practicality even in the largest British companies. According to Tang 
(1979) and Wu and Sharp (1979), they are almost non-existent in company practice. Most 
of the American and Japanese firms surveyed by Tang (1979) had no shadow price-based 
transfer prices. Wu and Sharp (1979) also observed that transfer prices based on 
mathematical programming were unpopular among the responding American firms on 
both the domestic and international levels. Among nine pricing bases mathematically 
derived transfer prices ranked last whether market prices were available or not. In the 
studies reported by Vancil (1978), Price Waterhouse (1984) and Eccles (1985) no such 
prices were mentioned in the practice of the U.S. companies surveyed. Similar results 
were arrived at by Mostafa (1981) in a survey of U.K. transfer pricing practice. Linear 
programming based prices were restricted to only a small proportion of companies with 
only 4.2 % and 5.5 % of all the methods used for domestic and international transfers 
respectively. One may conclude that because "mathematical models are so complex and 
intractable...few managerial implications have been derived from them" (Baiman, 1982, 
p. ). In short "mathematical elegance has taken precedence over practical usefulness" 
(Scapens, 1983, p. 8). A transfer pricing system that is not feasible and understandable 
cannot be applicable.
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2.3.5 CONCLUSION
Linear programming has been applied to transfer pricing as a more sophisticated 
approach than the economic approach which assumed no constraints. The transfer prices 
derived mathematically are not independent variables because they are a by-product of 
optimal allocations of scarce resources, the primary concern of the mathematical 
programming approach. In other words, two problems have been dealt with 
simultaneously: 1) resource allocation and 2) transfer pricing. Most models are iterative 
in nature and are based on inputs from divisions. The decision-making process rests, in 
fact, with central management which instructs divisions on transfer pricing and prescribes 
the adequate quota of resources to each division. The iterative nature of the models requires 
high levels of co-operation between divisions and this in itself can always lead to collusion, 
particularly if divisional performance and reward is at stake. Thus the mathematical 
models overcome only the problem of constraints but still suffer from the complexity of 
calculation, the impairment of divisional autonomy and the lack of fairness.
It may be concluded that however attractive the mathematical programmes could 
be, they have so far failed to satisfy the basic requirements of decentralised profit 
responsibility. Despite all the attempts to incorporate decentralised decision-making into 
the programmes, the parties to the transfer price do not independently formulate the entire 
problem. In other words, there is always central intervention. Moreover the complexity 
of the programmes made them almost non-existent in company practice. To the contrary, 
the economic approach presented in the previous section seems to have more impact in 
the real world. Marginal cost is at least approximated by the accounting variable cost.
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2.4 THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
The accounting approach draws essentially on the internal cost data, particularly in 
the absence of an external market for the transfer goods and services. Moreover, like the 
economic models, the accounting approach is based on profit maximisation and 
motivation of divisional managers towards goal congruence. Many programming models 
are also designed alongside these lines.
A variety of solutions have been proposed by both academic and practising 
accountants. The basic premise for these proposals is that the transfer price represents a 
revenue for the transferor and a cost for the transferee. In other words, the transfer price 
affects divisional profitability by influencing the cost function of the buying division and 
the revenue function of the selling division. When there is interdependence in the 
production functions of two or more divisions, each has contributed to, and thus should 
share, the revenue generated by the sale of the final product. Transfer prices are used to 
distribute this revenue and to reflect each responsibility centre's economic contribution.
In the introduction to the present literature review the accounting treatment of 
transfer pricing was traced to as far back as 1759 (Fleishman and Parker, 1990). Serious 
development of the problem started, however, with the creation of the divisionalised 
company at the beginning of this century. The transfer price based on market price was 
the general policy. This requires the existence of a perfectly competitive intermediate 
market which is not affected greatly by the company's transactions. Otherwise the market 
transfer pricing system would not preserve divisional autonomy or prevent dysfunctional 
behaviour. As the perfectly competitive market is rare in practice, the market price cannot 
be relied upon alone in formulating the transfer pricing policy. Hence the concern in the 
accounting approach is on whether to use the market price when it is available, some 
formula based on internal cost data, or a combination of both, possibly involving 
negotiated transfer prices.
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The accounting literature is both analytical and empirical and can be classified 
according to its scope or coverage of the subject into two groups: 1) the one-formula 
proposals, and 2) the comprehensive studies. The first group includes all those proposals 
of 'cure-all' single formula prices that are frequently encountered in the literature. The 
second group represents all those works which examine the problem from its complex 
nature and usually recommend different pricing policies for different purposes and 
situations. Nonetheless, the main concern of both groups has always been the 
establishment of goal-congruent intra-company pricing, whereby divisional managers by 
furthering their own objectives act in the best corporate interests. The trade-off between 
divisional autonomy (or division incentives) and corporate optimality (or busines 
efficiency) is one of the most critical issues of decentralised profit responsibility. 
Accounting information contained in budgets and performance reports plays a major role 
in this trade-off. It is believed (Benston, 1963) that the firm's accounting information 
system (AIS) facilitates the motivational advantages of decentralisation while preserving 
the unity of goals. The transfer pricing mechanism, as part of the AIS in a profit 
responsibility environment, is supposed to facilitate the optimum trade-off by the fair 
distribution of costs and revenues between the divisions involved in the internal trade. 
Before proceeding any further, it should be mentioned that there have been few instances 
in the literature where profit centres and transfer prices were categorically rejected.
2.4.1 PROFIT CENTRES AND TRANSFER PRICES: THE RAISON-D'ETRE
The case against has been voiced by Goetz (1967 and 1969) and reinforced by Wells 
(1968). Goetz argued for the use of incremental cost as the unique and most proper pricing 
basis that would lead to optimal decentralised decision-making and enhance goal 
congruence. A direct implication of Goetz's contention is that divisions can no longer be 
considered as profit centres but rather as cost centres. As the author noted, the incremental 
cost transfer price invalidates the concept of profit centres and consequently, performance 
cannot be measured in terms of profits. A system of budgets to control the actions of 
managers - already proposed by Henderson and Dearden (1966) - was thought more 
suitable.
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This means that Goetz's proposal of incremental cost cannot be taken as a transfer 
price, but rather as a cost allocation method. When the transfer price is some version of 
cost, it is indistinguishable from a cost allocation technique. Wells (1968) stresses this 
point because the notion of transfer prices is a corollary of the notion of profit centres. 
Thus, the rejection of the latter implies also the rejection of all forms of transfer prices. 
Wells dismissed transfer prices and profit centres altogether and considered them rather 
as fictions and mystical inventions.
Goetz's and Wells' views are not shared by many. Lemke (1970) criticised both as 
offering false conclusions and improper generalisations from an irrelevant specific case. 
With regard to Goetz's claim that incremental cost is the unique transfer price, Lemke 
shows that this is unrealistic as the case did not provide for a full assessment of market 
prices. Wells' argument that a net profit basis of evaluation is a necessary condition for 
the existence of a profit centre is also refuted because controllable profit provides a more 
appropriate basis. Therefore, the relevance of market prices and the appropriateness of 
controllable profits disprove the claims that profit centres and transfer prices are 
superfluous.
McNally (1970) also defended both concepts but noted that they have often been 
misused. Taking profit centres and transfer prices as a panacea is a conviction not less 
harmful than their complete dismissal. In fact, Benke and Edwards (1980 and 1981) 
observed that some transfer pricing techniques like contribution margin and variable 
cost-plus are frequently used by American companies to create pseudo-profit centres, i.e. 
profit centres with artificial profits. This is usually done for motivational purposes but it 
leads to difficulties in evaluating performance. As the mark-ups are arbitrary, performance 
cannot be properly measured on the basis of artificial profits generated by the pricing 
method. In other words, the responsibility centres cannot be considered as profit centres 
and the transfer pricing bases used cannot be realistic.
An effective reply to Goetz and Wells is both empirical and theoretical. The ubiquity 
of profit centres, and hence transfer prices, is clear from a number of empirical surveys. 
Mauriel and Anthony (1966) found that 82% of 2,658 largest US firms were organised
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into multiple profit centres. Similar results were found by more recent studies conducted 
by Reece and Cool (1978), Vancil (1978) andDittman andFerris (1978). Reece and Cool 
(1978) reported that 95.8% of the 620 responding companies had profit centres compared 
to 94% found by Vancil (1978). Lastly, the results from the survey by Dittman and Ferris 
(1978) on job satisfaction in different responsibility centres show that of the 480 
respondents, 292 centres were profit centres. Moreover, it appears that profit centre 
managers were more satisfied with their jobs than any other type of responsibility centre 
managers. The transfer pricing used in such profit centres could well have contributed to 
this as it could add felt autonomy of divisional managers. Thus, it is certainly the case 
that transfer prices are well established in practice and have a clear place in the evolution 
of the corporate sector. Even if Goetz and Wells recognized the existence of profit centres 
and transfer prices and only suggested that budgets were better a tool for internal control, 
their theoretical objection can still be refuted as they omit the behavioural context of 
transfer pricing. The historical analysis of transfer pricing contained in the introduction 
to this chapter sheds enough light on this issue.
2.4.2 COST ALLOCATION AND TRANSFER PRICING: THE NUANCE OF THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
Cost allocation is at the heart of responsibility accounting and management control. 
By tracing various costs to cost objectives across specified time periods, top management 
seeks, among other aims, to measure income and assets, allocate available resources 
efficiently, pinpoint managerial responsibility, monitor performance and motivate for 
better performance. This is particularly true for companies decentralised into profit and 
investment centres whereby a substantial amount of transfer of goods and services takes 
place between the responsibility centres. As mentioned earlier, transfer pricing involves 
an element of profit and therefore, if it were not for profit responsibility, it would be hard 
to distinguish between cost allocation and transfer pricing. Horngren and Foster (1987, 
p. 836) stated that "all cost allocation is a form of transfer pricing". Conversely, it 
should be said that all transfer pricing is a form of cost allocation, especially when the 
profit element is removed from the transfer price. The nuance is even bigger when there
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is no external market for the intermediate commodity and the transfer price is empirically 
imverifiable. Such intricacy makes cost allocation and transfer pricing rather 
"incorrigible twins" (Emmanuel and Otley, 1985, p. 193). This applies also to 
pseudo-profit responsibility where divisional autonomy is impeded and the results of a 
division are greatly affected by the operations of other divisions and uncontrollable 
factors. In this case even if the transfer price includes a profit mark-up, it can be considered 
as a cost allocation method since the profit element is arbitrary.
Under decentralisation decision-making responsibility is delegated to the manager 
of the semi-autonomous division who in return is held responsible for the outcomes of 
his performance as well as his unit's results. In the modern corporation characterised by 
the separation of ownership and management, this creates an agency problem whereby 
the owner (or principal) hires the services of the manager (or agent) to perform tasks on 
his behalf. The agent is expected to act in the best interests of the principal but, as the 
agent is also motivated by his own interests, the principal's welfare is not always 
maximised. This is particularly true when the agent is a profit or investment centre 
manager whose performance is evaluated and rewarded in terms of his division's profit. 
This manager might indulge in all possible activities (for example over-consumption of 
company resources and over-pricing internal sales to other divisions) in order to achieve 
and report a high, or at least a satisfactory, profit figure. Cost allocation is one of the 
means that the principal may use to prevent such suboptimisation (Zimmerman, 1979). 
The same purpose is also served by transfer pricing which is a special form of cost 
allocation. It becomes clear that both cost allocation and transfer pricing have 
consequences on both divisional and corporate decisions. Therefore the question is not 
only on how much of central costs is to be charged to a particular unit or at what price 
should an internal transaction be valued but rather a question of underlying causes, reasons 
and consequences. This requires an organisational and behavioural examination that 
considers issues like the decisions delegated to the divisional manager, his goals and
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preferences, and the performance evaluation system (Magee, 1986). These issues are 
neglected in the traditional treatment of transfer pricing by accountants as is discussed 
below.
2.4.3 THE CURE-ALL APPROACH
A direct consequence of treating transfer pricing as a mere technical problem is the 
search for panacean formulae to resolve it. The accounting literature abounds with such 
proposals which are summarised in Tables 2.1 to 2.4 (Appendix D1). Basically there are 
two types of proposals: 1) single transfer prices and 2) formula pricing, and these are 
either cost or market-based. The most commonly advocated single prices are market price 
(adjusted for savings on internal trade), marginal cost, shadow price and negotiated price. 
The first three have already been discussed in the preceding sections. Negotiated price 
will be reviewed in the next chapter.
The advantages and disadvantages of single transfer prices are extremely well 
documented in management accounting textbooks.
To counter the fallacies of single pricing, some writers suggested formula pricing. 
This includes dual pricing, two-part tariff, three-part tariff, split contribution and the 
Shapley formula. Most of these proposals are also grouped by decade in Tables 2.1 to 
2.4. The following observations can be made from these tables:
1 - the data contained in the tables are by no means exhaustive,
2 - transfer pricing is a multi-disciplinary subject,
3 - there is no one best pricing basis for all situations,
4 - marginal cost pricing, much advocated in the 1950s and 1960s, almost 
disappeared in the 1970s and the 1980s. Empirical data in Chapter 4 confirm 
this.
1 at the end of the thesis on page 333
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5 - mathematical programming (mainly proposed by economists) was received 
with little enthusiasm by accountants as the latter prefer simplicity and 
understandability over complexity and sophistication. Evidence from data 
gathered from practice and presented in Chapter 4 proves this. As with 
marginal cost, there is a gradual loss of interest in the programming 
techniques in the last two decades,
6 - there is more emphasis on negotiation in the 1950s and the 1970s than in the 
other two decades,
7 - there is a resurgence of the two-part tariff method (i.e. formula pricing) in 
the 1980s probably because there is more concern about fixed costs and their 
impact on divisional performance.
2.4.4 THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
In contrast to the cure-all approach, the general stance here which is shared by many 
academic accountants is that no single pricing method can satisfy all the information 
needs of the decentralised organisation (Bierman, 1959; Dearden, 1964; Knighton, 1965; 
Wojdak, 1968; Binding, 1971; Troxel, 1973; Sharav, 1974; Madison, 1979, Battacharyya 
et al., 1979; Benke and Edwards, 1980; Farmer and Herbert, 1982; and Smiths, 1984). 
This is also the attitude adopted in most management accounting textbooks such as Kaplan 
(1982), Belkaoui (1983), Helmkamp (1987), Horngren and Foster (1987), Horngren and 
Sundem (1987), Decoster et al. (1988) and Dearden (1988). The underlying logic for this 
belief is flexibility in order to take advantage of all possible pricing alternatives and hence 
avoid, or at least minimise, their disadvantages (Arvidsson, 1973). Such an approach 
avoids the arbitrariness of single pricing. The choice of a particular pricing basis depends 
on the particular uses of accounting data and the objectives they serve, the significance 
of the transfers, the availability of an external intermediate market and the freedom of 
sourcing externally.
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The objectives to be served by the transfer pricing system are a direct consequence 
of the organisational structure and strategy of the company. As Hirshleifer (1964) put it, 
transfer prices had not been introduced into practical business operations as desirable 
innovations in their own right but they had rather been the by-product of the institution 
of decentralised profit centres. The following set of objectives is usually encountered in 
the accounting literature:
1) enhance divisional autonomy,
2) motivation of divisional managers for goal congruence (traditionally profit 
maximisation),
3) Performance evaluation and management control,
4) Decision-making (e.g.: make or buy, pricing of end product, level of output, 
and capital budgeting decisions).
The accomplishment of some or all of these objectives takes place in a complex 
internal and external company setting. Transfer pricing is often described as a mechanism 
that simulates external market conditions within companies, especially when they are 
vertically integrated so that all or most of the production stages are internalised. 
Consequently, market factors are expected to have a decisive influence on transfer prices. 
This is not always the case as not all transfers are significant or have external markets. 
In section 2.2 above, possible solutions to different market situations proposed by 
economists were discussed. Their conclusions (particularly Hirshleifer, 1956) were 
adapted by Solomons (1965) who identified five situations and recommended different 
pricing policies as summarised below:
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Table 2.5: Solomons' Transfer Pricing Recommendations
SITUATION POLICY
There is an outside competitive 
intermediate market and divisions 
have free access to it.
Outside price
There is no outside competitive 
intermediate market and transfers 
are in large or potentially large 
amounts.
Negotiated price, usually 
standard full cost plus return on 
capital mark-up.
There is no outside competitive 
intermediate market, transfers 
are significant but are not a 
predominant part of the selling 
division's business.
Two-part tariff price:
- a charge per unit 
equal to marginal cost
- annual lump sum
for fixed costs and profit
There is no outside competitive 
intermediate market, transfers are 
a predominant part of the selling 
division's business, and it can 
meet all probable requirements.
Selling division treated as 
service centre. 
Standard variable cost. 
Fixed costs charged as 
periodic costs.
There is no outside competitive 
intermediate market, transfers are 
significant, but selling division 
has capacity constraints and cannot 
meet all requirements.
Programming methods
Thus, Solomons draws on most of the pricing methods advocated as cure-all on 
their own, but he suggests that in reality, each has only a zone in which it is most 
appropriate and outside this, it is not useful.
Similar to Solomons (1965), Benke and Edwards (1980) identified different 
situations and suggested a general rule for selecting the transfer price in the light of three 
criteria: a) performance evaluation, b) profit maximisation, and c) simplicity. The general 
rule is expressed as follows (Benke and Edwards, 1980, p. 77):
TP = SVC + LCM where SVC stands for the standard variable cost and
LCM for lost contribution margin.
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Depending on the situation, the general rule would be expressed as the outside 
market price, adjusted market price, phantom market price, or standard variable cost. As 
with Solomons' recommendations, sub-optimisation is avoided by not passing the fixed 
costs to the buying divison through the transfer price. The problem of 'upstream fixed 
costs' and profits (Dearden, 1988) is a serious shortcoming of full cost pricing as divisons 
pass on their fixed costs (and inefficiencies thereof) to the division making the final 
product which ends up with no apparent contribution to company profits. The final product 
division may even be forced to operate at a loss in order to stay competitive. Solomons' 
recommendations and the general rule suggested by Benke and Edwards alleviates this 
problem. However, unlike Solomons, Benke and Edwards made no recommendation for 
the use of mathematical programming. This is justified by the simplicity criterion as 
"business managers do not have the time to learn complicated processes" (Benke and 
Edwards, 1980, p. 75). It is also supported by the findings of the many surveys presented 
and discussed in Chapter 4.
2.4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Over the last three decades both academic and practising accountants have been 
actively involved in research on transfer pricing. The literature is replete with profit 
maximising pricing methods that would preserve divisional autonomy. It is observed, 
however, that most of what has been published is only a duplication of Solomons' attempt 
to apply Hirshleifer's conclusions, as well as a continuous repetition of classical 
accounting textbook treatments of the problem. Companies have since gone through 
drastic changes through internal growth and expansion, mergers and acquisitions, 
technological modernisation and internal reorganisation. In companies where a great deal 
of manpower was replaced with automation, a variable cost transfer price would represent 
only a very small fraction of the supplying division's costs. If the transfer constitutes a 
predominant part of the division's activity it would be hard to conceive that a variable 
cost transfer price would be adequate. Furthermore, the accounting literature has not been 
very much concerned with the impact of the transfer pricing system on the reward/sanction
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of responsibility centre managers, a vital issue that can either impede or enhance 
motivation, performance and goal congruence which are the core objectives that 
accountants assign to transfer pricing systems.
For such reasons one can now witness a change of approach calling for an 
organisational and behavioural examination of transfer pricing. Kaplan (1982) concluded 
that little was known about optimal transfer policies from both the economic and 
accounting perspectives and predicted that future editions of his text would have more 
to say on the subject. The latest moves in this direction are examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: TRANSFER PRICING IN THEORY: THE1
ORGANISATIONAL APPROACH
As established in the previous chapters, this is the area where research is most 
lacking. The study of accounting as an organisational and social process and the 
application of behavioural knowledge is a relatively recent move (Caplan, 1971 and Oliver 
et al., 1977) and a promising area of research (Hopwood, 1977 and Chenhall et al., 1981). 
Oliver et al. (1977) found that the investigations in this field covered a variety of 
accounting aspects. They listed a sample of twelve topics; internal control, performance 
evaluation and transfer pricing figured large in the sample and these are, of course, basic 
to this study.
This organisational direction for research in accounting has attracted a number of 
contributions from academics including Hopwood (1983), Jensen (1983), Kaplan (1983, 
1984 and 1986), Covaleski and Aiken (1986), Johnson and Kaplan (1987) and Otley 
(1987). Of special interest are the challenges facing Management Accounting Systems 
(MAS) in the modern corporation. Johnson and Kaplan (1987), Burns and Kaplan (1987), 
Dearden (1987) and Cooper and Kaplan (1988) have questioned the relevance of existing 
management accounting tools for today's organisations. Their recent calls for change can 
be considered only as broad, seminal works that may stimulate and guide future outlines 
of research in accounting in the next decade or so.
For such research to be fruitful and practical, it is necessary to develop specific and 
detailed theoretical frameworks, testable hypotheses and obtain relevant empirical data 
to support or dismiss the theoretical proposals. Hypothetical and simulated cases, and 
inductive reasoning can all be beneficial but cannot give a true and fair picture of the 
realities of the modern corporation. Management control systems like the ROI and transfer 
pricing systems were developed not in an assumed world but as a response to the needs
1 the recent experiment by Chalos and Haka (1990) is not covered in this review.
71
of the multi-divisional firm in the 1920s. It is equally true that research into improving 
existing mechanisms or developing alternative ways must stem from the requirements of 
today's firms. The review and analysis of all the past empirical studies on transfer pricing 
presented in the next chapter reveals that almost all of these studies were limited to 
exposing the transfer pricing bases in use but without relating them to the context in which 
they were used. Thus, most of the past analytical and empirical research was just a 
duplication of the original thoughts laid down by Cook (1955), Dean (1955) and 
Hirshleifer (1956 and 1957) and the first survey of company practice conducted by The 
National Association of Cost Accountants in the USA in 1956. The study of transfer 
pricing in an organisational context has so far received scant attention.
Most of the work done to date on transfer pricing has been primarily concerned with 
the technical aspects of the problem. The obvious logic for this focus is that the transfer 
pricing technique has first to be determined before its impact is known. This is, in fact, 
the methodology adopted since the application of economic theory by Hirshleifer (1956). 
In other words, the problem has long been treated in isolation from the rest of the 
interacting factors which include the organisation itself, and the individuals working in 
and managing the organisation. Whinston (1964) concluded that economic theory had 
very little to offer on problems like transfer pricing and stated that:
"a mixed behavioral science, economic approach - as well as other 
approaches - is probably the best course to follow in any study of the kinds 
of organization information arrangements that could be effected for practical 
managerial use. But then it might be assumed that such "mixed" approaches 
might also yield results of further value such as 1) the limits of prices when 
serving as a general guide to economic development or 2) the kinds of pricing 
artifacts used" (Whinston, 1964, pp. 444-45).
It may be understandable that in the fifties transfer prices were dealt with in effect 
as independent variables when simplistic models of reality were so common. However, 
the subsequent development of Hirshleifer's pioneering work and the introduction of 
mathematical programming have testified that all the solutions put forward have serious 
flaws because the problem was viewed as a technical one, and the solutions were tailored
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TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH ON TRANSFER PRICING
U)
AUTHOR(s)
CYKRT 
4 
MARCH
WATSON 
4 
BAUMLER
GRANICK
BAILEY 
4 
BOE
EARNEST
LAMBERT
ACKBLSBERG 
4 
YUKL
SWIERINGA 
4 
HATERHOUSE
ECCLES
SPICBR
YEAR
1963
1975
1975
1976
1979
1979
1979
1982
1963
1968
MODEL/APPROACH ADOPTED
Behavioural theory of 
the firm.
Lawrence & Lorsch's 
(1967) differentiation 
and Integration 
f ramework .
Cooperative atudy of 
inpact of national and 
societal differences 
on transfer pricing 
practices .
Goal prog r ami) ing 
sat is f icing model.
House's (1971) model 
of expectancy theory 
(or work motivation).
Empirical study of the 
relationship between 
transfer prices and 
internal conflict.
Business game using 
undergraduate students 
as subjects.
Cyert 4 March's (1963) 
behavioural theory 
Cohen et al. (1972) 
garbage can model 
Welch's (1969 & 1979) 
organizing model 
Williamson's (1975) 
markets & hierarchies
Inductive Judgements 
or normative framework
Organisational theory
MODEL PRECEPTS or STUDY RESULTS
Firm is a coalition of participants 
with disparate aspirations/goals. 
Transfer prices are the outcome of 
long-run bargaining. Conflict only 
partly resolved.
Varying degrees of differentiation 
for varying degrees of uncertainty 
and conflict is resolved through 
confrontation. Hence negotiated 
transfer prices as integrator.
The transfer pricing system should 
not be viewed only as a technique 
for transmitting information but 
also in terms of its incentive and 
organisational effects .
Using mathematical programming to 
derive transfer prices without 
constraining divisional autononmy.
Higher levels of work motivation 
associated with transfers based on 
market prices .
Same level of conflict with either 
market price or full cost price 
Higher level of conflict with nego- 
tiated price than market price.
Negotiated transfer prices can have 
integrative properties.
Focus on the factors that determine 
an outcome. Thus the process of 
devising transfer pricing rules, 
procedures and prices is as impor- 
tant as the rules, procedures and 
prices themselves for obtaining 
some organisational control.
Transfer pricing policies depend on 
two dimensions of strategy, the 
level of diversification and the 
degree of vertical Integration.
Combination of Watson 4 Baumler's 
approach and Williamaon's (1975) 
markets and hierarchies framework .
OBSERVATIONS ON MODEL 
OR STUDY
Bargaining is time consu- 
ming and leads to informa 
tion bias by managers. 
Hence performance can be 
misevaluated .
Potential of gaming by 
divisional managers 
Model does not address 
evaluation and reward of 
peformance .
Analysis based on dated 
material and therefore 
the results should not be 
taken for granted .
Potential of gaming and 
decisions may be centra- 
lised.
Analysis based on trivial 
hypothetical case.
Analysis based entirely 
on corporate perceptions 
of conflict.
Subjects of analysis were 
not acting In the real 
world .
Analysis based on the 
Birch Paper Company case 
study designed in 1957 
for class discussions at 
Harvard University. 
Field work in large firms 
is required for testing 
the validity of results.
Quick dismissal of the 
existing economic and 
accounting literature on 
transfer pricing.
Most comprehensive theory 
to date. Needs empirical 
testing
to suit the single objective of profit maximisation. The bulk of the academic examination 
of transfer pricing went in this direction. A natural consequence is that only a limited 
research on the behavioural aspects of the problem emerged. Only fairly recently has this 
situation began to change and the organisational dimension draw some attention.
Table 3.1 provides the focus for the following detailed examination of the key 
contributors to the development of a behavioural approach to transfer pricing.
3.1: CYERT and MARCH'S BEHAVIOURAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
Cyert and March's (1963) classic organisation study which detailed a "behavioural 
theory of the firm" had something to say directly on transfer pricing as well as constructing 
a broad approach of considerable importance. Basic to the latter is the rejection of the 
traditional concept of a single organisational goal, namely profit maximisation. They 
instead view the organisation as a coalition of participants with disparate demands, 
changing focuses of attention and limited ability to attend to its problems simultaneously. 
The coalition's goals include production, inventory, sales, market share and profit. These 
goals are predetermined by a bargaining process but this leads only to partial resolution 
of conflict within the organisation. Consequently, economists' schemes (e.g. Hirshleifer, 
1956 and Arrow, 1959) of transfer pricing and resource allocations are rejected because, 
for a coalition or participants in which conflict is partially resolved, "the concepts of 
efficiency and fairness have limited ability" (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 276). Moreover, 
Cyert and March observed that divisional performance is determined partly by the return 
from the external environment and partly by the transfer pricing rules they can arrange 
by bargaining. Therefore, transfer prices are the outcome of a long-run bargaining process 
rather than from a technical problem-solving solution; this is particularly so when 
transactions with the external environment are not viable. In addition to that the units 
(or divisions) that have been unsuccessful would be more active in seeking new transfer 
price rules than the successful ones.
Cyert and March concluded that in general, "transfer payments are made on the 
basis of a few simple rules that 1) have some crude face validity, and 2) have shown some 
historic viability. "We should find that they are the focus of conflict among subunits in 
the same way as other allocative devices" (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 276).
It is worth remembering at this point that the case for bargaining or negotiating was 
originally advocated by Cook (1955), Stone (1956) and Dean (1955). Cook suggested 
the use of 1) negotiation to adjust the market price for internal trade, or 2) free negotiation 
in the absence of an external market. Nonetheless, Cook recognised two disadvantages 
of negotiated prices: 1) the amount of executive time it is likely to take, and 2) the distortion 
of profit centres financial reports. Moreover, because of probable inability to agree on a 
price, this may result in turning to top management to resolve the differences of opinion 
or in setting the price. This may end up in removing the profit responsibility from the 
buyer and seller and placing it with the chief executive (Keller, 1957, and Rook, 1971).
Stone (1956) recommended bargained pricing in the absence of an adequate standard 
cost method. A list price (based upon cost or market) was needed to counter endless and 
tedious negotiations.
Dean (1955) pressed for the use of negotiated competitive prices but, as noted by 
Watson and Baumler (1975) and Thomas (1980), Dean's proposal implies an internal 
simulation of an already existing outside market for the transfer commodities.
The second disadvantage noted by Cook is stressed by many antagonists of the 
negotiation approach. For instance, Dopuch and Drake (1964), Abdel-khalik and Lusk 
(1974), Hilton (1980) and Ferguson (1981) argued that with regard to performance 
evaluation, negotiated prices might lead central management to evaluate the managers' 
ability to negotiate rather than their performance itself.
Nevertheless, some writers find negotiation as the most defensible basis for 
determining transfer prices (Fremgen, 1970; and Shaub, 1978) or very promising for 
behavioural research on transfer pricing (Watson and Baumler, 1975; and Grabski, 1985).
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3.2: WATSON AND BAUMLER'S BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH.
Watson and Baumler (1975), who argued in favour of negotiated prices despite the 
often mentioned dysfunctionalism, attempted an examination of transfer pricing in a 
behavioural setting in terms of Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) differentiation and 
integration framework. The latter pointed out that organisations require varying degrees 
of differentiation in order to cope with varying degrees of uncertainty. Thus, the most 
successful firms are those which achieve the required differentiation and integration of 
their diverse units. As decentralisation and differentiation are viewed as a response to 
environmental and technological uncertainty, Lawrence and Lorsch also argued that in 
uncertain environments, the most successful firms in resolving inter-departmental conflict 
were the ones which used confrontation or, in other words, negotiation. Basing their 
analysis on this premise, Watson and Baumler asserted that if the appropriate conflict 
resolution process was negotiation, then negotiated transfer prices would be the best to 
enhance differentiation and facilitate integration. The authors arrived at this conclusion 
after critically appraising some pricing methods as integrative mechanisms. They noted, 
for example, that the final phase in mathematical programming solutions is usually 
centrally dictated. This implies the sacrifice of decentralisation, a common criticism 
shared by many as already detailed in previous sections. These approaches also represent 
the simplest integrating device of rules where "the environments are stable and the 
interdependencies are of the simplest kinds" (Watson and Baumler, 1975, p. 470).
Given that the operating environment of multi-division companies is substantially 
complex, i.e. such organisations are strongly differentiated and organisational units highly 
interdependent, the recognition of this complexity is fundamental to the discussion of 
transfer pricing. Otherwise, "an algorithmic approach that does not take into 
consideration these behavioural issues was doomed to provide little insight into the 
transfer pricing problem" (Bailey and Boe, 1976, p. 562). In other words, transfer pricing 
should be considered as an aspect of a multidimensional conflict resolution process.
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Watson and Baumler's analysis has at least two shortcomings. First, it focuses on 
transfer pricing as an integrator but neglects the potential for gaming that managers may 
indulge in through negotiation and data manipulation. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
agreement between negotiators is secured without some central direction (Dearden, 1964). 
Secondly, it fails to address the evaluation/reward process, i.e. how to evaluate and 
compensate divisional efforts. This is a crucial issue because, as mentioned earlier, one 
of the dangers of negotiation is that it may lead to evaluating the managers' ability to 
bargain rather than their performance itself. Some explanation to these points could be 
found in the study reported by Granick (1975).
3.3: GRANICK'S COMPARATIVE STUDY.
The author conducted a comparative survey of transfer pricing practice in the U.K., 
France and the U.S.A. through in-depth interviews of different level managers in major 
corporations. The study examined the differences of practice in terms of organisational 
and managerial career patterns. It was found that in Britain, the education background 
did not serve for the selection or promotion of managers. Promotion depended on job 
performance and thus managers moved upward through a simple narrow job function. 
Hence, performance evaluation was greatly influenced by the transfer pricing system. In 
contrast, education was the principal criterion for determining promotion within 
managerial ranks in French companies. Although the analysis was based on data from 
the 1960s, Granick highlighted the importance of the organisational and environmental 
factors. He concluded that "a system of transfer pricing should not be judged simply as 
a technique for transmitting information within the company, but also in terms of its 
incentive and organizational effects. These effects must differ depending upon the total 
pattern of managerial expectations and behaviour in large firms of the country 
concerned" (Granick, 1975, pp. 39-40). These careful observations have in fact been the 
focus of subsequent analytical and empirical studies as reviewed below.
3.4: BAILEY AND BOE's BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
Bailey and Boe (1976) relied mostly on Watson and Baumler's (1975) work to 
elaborate a behavioural interpretation of a goal programming model of resource allocation 
and transfer pricing. They observed that Watson and Baumler matched the following 
conflict issues: 1) degree of homogeneity of attitudes and behaviour, 2) stability of the 
environment, and 3) types of super and sub-unit interdependence, with Thompson's 
(1967) three types of interdependence: 1) pooled, 2) sequential, and 3) reciprocal.
The recognition of different degrees and types of interdependence is essential in 
studying transfer pricing within its organisational context. This will lead to bridging the 
gap between the normative approaches designed so far and the organisational settings 
where they are applied. Fortunately, it seems that recent endeavours are pointing to the 
importance of the organisational approach. Interesting experiments were conducted by 
Ackelesberg and Yukl (1979), Lambert (1979) and Eccles (1983 and 1985).
3.5.: EARNEST'S HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A possible relationship between work motivation and transfer pricing was drawn 
by Earnest (1979). A model of expectancy theory developed by House (1971) was used 
to analyse three pricing methods: incremental cost, opportunity cost and market price. 
Market-price transfer prices were found to result in a relatively higher level of work 
motivation for profit centre managers. This conclusion is unfortunately not flawless.
The analysis is based on a trivial hypothetical case which the author admits is 
oversimplified. Thus the deductions made do not derive from observations of reliable 
data. Moreover, divisional performance is judged on absolute profits, a yardstick largely 
disqualified either for evaluating performance or motivating managers, particularly when 
divisions are charged with uncontrollable costs (Solomons, 1965). A further flaw is the 
author's assumption that all internal demand should first be met internally. This impedes 
divisional autonomy and forcibly disregards the incremental cost and opportunity cost 
pricing methods. If a market exists for a transfer commodity but divisions are not free to 
sell and buy outside the company, it is hard to perceive full motivational impact for the
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market price. As Horngren (1967, p. 5) puts it: "when substantial freedom of choice is 
not available, the resultant transfer prices are artificial to a point which severely 
contaminated the rate of return and similar measures of profit performance". 
Nevertheless, the restrictions on external sourcing leave some room for justification of 
the market price. The position of the company in the market, the nature of the product, 
the product life cycle, technological sensitivity, the need to force divisions to compete 
with the external market, and the desire to provide maximum fairness to the transfer 
parties and reduce conflict may all justify a market-based (negotiated or mandated) 
transfer price.
3.6: LAMBERT'S SURVEY
Earnest's conclusion is in apparent contradiction with the results of a survey of 
financial officers undertaken by Lambert (1979). Conflict was investigated in relation to 
three transfer pricing methods: cost-based, market-price and negotiated. Lambert found 
that 1) there was a similar amount of conflict with either a market price of full cost transfer 
price, 2) there was a higher level of perceived conflict with negotiated transfer prices than 
with a cost or market price-based transfer price, and 3) conflict was higher when the 
buying division was not permitted to purchase from outside suppliers items available 
internally. In addition to that, the reported level of inter-divisional conflict increased if 
the transfer pricing system affected the buying division's profits. This implied that the 
evaluation process was based on divisional profits.
The behavioural interpretation of these results should, however, be made with some 
caution. As the survey addressed corporate controllers, perceptions of conflict were thus 
requested from a party not directly involved in it. Therefore the data collected are not 
representative of the real concerned party, the managers of the responsibility centres.
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3.7: ACKELSBERG AND YUKL's EXPERIMENT
Similar results to Lambert's were also arrived at by Ackelesberg and Yukl (1979) 
who conducted an experiment on conflict and negotiated transfer prices, using nearly two 
hundred students.
The authors found that negotiation resulted in more integrative and problem solving 
and less competitive and aggressive behaviour when performance is evaluated on 
corporate rather than divisional profits. However, when the evaluation process was based 
on divisional profits, more competitive behaviour occurred. The results were amplified 
when the transferred product was important. When the product was unimportant i.e., was 
not an important source of profits for the divisions, the basis of evaluation had no effect 
on competitive behaviour. The importance of the product also had little effect on 
cooperation when corporate profits were emphasized.
Ackelesberg and Yukl's experiment is another example where a hypothetical case 
was used to deduce conclusions. Since the analysis is based on a business game involving 
students as subjects, the results have great external validity limitations and, hence, they 
may be just fictitious. The cooperative and friendly relationships noticed in the negotiation 
process had obviously to be expected from students enrolled on the same course. It is 
quite possible that they compromised or arrived at a consensus just because of their 
friendship or as a result of face-to-face bargaining. This may have been reinforced by the 
feeling that they were only acting in an assumed world. Therefore, whatever the 
performance of these undergraduate students in the conduct of the experiment, it is hard 
to generalise the findings to the complexities of the real world.
3.8: SWIERINGA AND WATERHOUSE's FOUR MODELS
Cyert and March's (1963) behavioural model was recently used alongside three 
other models by Swieringa and Waterhouse (1982) in an organisational behaviour 
approach to the transfer pricing problem. Similar to Watson and Baumler, Swieringa and 
Waterhouse noted that the analytical approaches usually encountered in the literature - 
like in Abdelkhalik and Lusk's (1974) synthesis - have all been designed as
80
problem-solving procedures which presume "the existence of a well-defined pre-existent 
organisational objective, the drive for behavioral and attitudinal consistency, and the 
dominance of economic rationality in organizational decision-making" (p. 150).
The three other models used beside Cyert and March' s are: 1) the garbage can model, 
2) the organising model, and 3) the markets and hierarchies model.
The garbage can model presented by Cohen et al. (1972) and Cohen and March 
(1974), views organisations as vehicles for solving problems and structures for resolving 
conflict through bargaining, as well as collections of choices.
The organising model suggested by Weick (1969 and 1979) comprises three 
processes denoted 1) enactment processes, 2) selection processes, and 3) retention 
processes. These are directed at information processing and the removal of uncertainty 
from information inputs.
The markets and hierarchies framework proposed by Williamson (1975) considers 
transactions and contracts as the basis of all economic exchange. It views markets as 
'organisations' in which exchange is achieved by contract, and hierarchies as 
organisations which economise on transaction costs by replacing a series of contracts 
with a single employment contract and common resource ownership. The applicability 
of this model to management accounting was also assessed by Johnson (1983) and 
Flamholtz(1983).
These four models of organisation were used to present different interpretations of 
the classic Birch Paper Company case. This was a step forward to place the transfer pricing 
problem in an organisational context. Each model was used as a conceptual lens to interpret 
a series of hypothetical events in the case.
S wieringa and Waterhouse observed that these alternative lenses presented different 
perspectives from the traditional view in where there are pre-existent purposes, rationality 
and consistency. Stated otherwise, the traditional view seeks to determine what goal (or 
goals) explain the choice of a particular action. Hence this approach focused on finding
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the appropriate transfer pricing system that would lead divisional managers to make 
firm-optimal decisions, usually the maximisation of profits. The models or lenses 
described above focused on the factors that determine the outcome and, thus, transfer 
pricing was viewed in a much broader context.
The behavioural model reflected the situation described in the Birch Paper Company 
case as an episode in a long-term bargaining process between divisional managers.
The Garbage Can model analysed the situation as a choice opportunity that "provides 
an occasion for executing standard operating procedures, for defining what the 
organization is all about, for distributing glory or blame for what has happened in the 
organization, for expressing and discovering self-interest, for having a good time and so 
forth" (p. 154).
With the organising model, "the ultimate choice of a transfer price rule may be 
seen as a means for legitimating past action" (p. 155).
Finally, the markets and hierarchies model suggested that "the decision about 
whether to purchase the order outside or inside the hierarchy should involve a 
consideration of whether the contract terms are likely to require revision. If contract 
revision is expected, outside contracting will become less attractive" (p. 157).
It results from this presentation that the models offer different and rather paradoxical 
conceptions. Swieringa and Waterhouse contrasted the four perspectives in terms of goals 
versus determinants, process versus outputs, adaptability versus stability, and simplicity 
versus complexity. They concluded that the models shared an orientation towards 
outcomes and their determinants, which means that they were complementary and hence 
a combination was possible. With regard to the process of devising transfer pricing rules, 
procedures and prices, the results emphasised that the process was as important as the 
rules, procedures and prices themselves for structuring and controlling. Moreover, each 
model stressed the importance of learning, adaptability and flexibility as well as stability. 
Transfer pricing rules enhance stability as they guide resource allocations and 
performance evaluation and rewards. On the other hand, the balance between learning,
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adaptability and stability is determined by environmental pressures to which the 
organisation needs to respond. For this it was suggested that "transfer pricing rules 
should incorporate specific last date of use routines, that multiple reporting dimensions 
be adopted to encourage organizational learning and adaptation" (Swieringa and 
Waterhouse, 1982, p. 16).
By and large, the important implication of these four models is that transfer pricing 
cannot be treated in isolation from the organisational context. As different explanations 
were given to the hypothetical events, it occurred that it was necessary to pay attention 
to the organisational settings, the determination process, the implementation process and 
the evaluation process.
These interesting findings were unfortunately based on an assumed case designed 
for classroom discussions. Beside that, no specific transfer pricing method - apart from 
negotiated prices under the behavioural model - was examined in the light of the points 
raised and the suggestions made. These shortcomings seem to have been overcome by 
Eccles (1983 and 1985).
3.9: ECCLES' NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK.
Eccles (1983 and 1985) reported on a survey conducted in 13 American companies 
operating in three different industries: chemicals, electronics and heavy machinery. The 
aim of the study was to find out how transfer pricing was managed in practice and to 
develop a theory supported by empirical evidence. An in-depth clinical approach was 
adopted involving extensive interviews with 144 managers.
Similar to Swieringa and Waterhouse (1982), Eccles insisted that transfer pricing 
must be studied in an organisational context. The cause-effect relationship between 
transfer pricing practices and other company characteristics is reproduced in Figure 3.1.
Four transfer pricing policies were identified: 1) exchange autonomy, 2) mandated 
full cost transfers, 3) mandated market-based transfers, and 4) dual-pricing. No mention
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was made of marginal cost or mathematically derived transfer prices. The four policies 
were related to four types of organisation: a) competitive, b) cooperative, 3) collaborative 
and 4) collective.
Eccles developed a descriptive theory to determine which transfer price should be 
used in practice. The theory revolves around a two-dimensional strategy framework called 
the Manager's Analytical Plan (MAP). The two dimensions of strategy on which transfer 
pricing policies are dependent are: vertical integration (the degree of interdependence 
between profit centres), and diversification (the extent of product market segmentation). 
In Figure 3.2 Vertical integration is represented on the MAP by the Y axis, whereas the 
X axis represents diversification. In addition to that the following causal relationship was 
drawn between five organisational characteristics and transfer pricing:
The degree of integration and diversification differs from one type of organisation 
to another. There is low integration and low diversification in collective organisations as 
these consist of small and new firms with few functions and products and no formal 
management. However, when these one-man organisations expand and evolve from 
informal to more formal structures, they grow into cooperative organisations with high 
level of vertical integration and low diversification (with only a narrow line of products). 
All managers cooperate towards maximising company objectives defined by a global 
strategy. In contrast to this, there is the competitive organisation with high degree of 
diversification and low integration and where the firm's strategy is largely made up of 
the sub-units strategies. Lastly, a collaborative organisation is high on vertical integration 
(i.e. similar to the cooperative organisation). The matching of pricing policies to 
organisational types varied according to the degree of integration and diversification. 
Depending on the position of the company on the MAP, an appropriate transfer pricing 
policy that would suit the company's needs is proposed.
Transfer pricing is precluded in the collective organisation as this is characterised 
by low integration and diversification. Hence the analysis of the problem is reduced to 
the remaining three types of organisation. As mentioned previously, four transfer pricing 
policies were identified. Exchange autonomy applies to situations of no strategy of vertical
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integration whereby divisional strategies are independent of each other and inter-unit 
transactions are not mandated. When there is vertical integration to link business units, 
internal trade is mandated and so are transfer prices. Mandated full cost transfers and 
mandated market-based transfer are more appropriate in such a situation. Dual-pricing is 
a hybrid policy which involves two prices: one price (full cost) to the buying division 
and another (market price) to the selling division.
High
Low
COOPERATIVE 
mandated 
full cost
COLLECTIVE 
no transfer 
pricing
COLLABORATIVE 
mandated 
market-based
COMPETITIVE 
exchange 
autonomy
Low Diversification High
Figure 3.2: Transfer pricing in the MAP 
(Eccles, 1985, p. 279)
Exchange autonomy was found in the competitive organisation as profit centre 
managers had substantial freedom and were dealing as if in a market place. Thus 
market-based pricing was the common policy. However, if the particular company 
intended to increase interdependence between divisions and consequently seek more 
vertical integration then a policy of dual-pricing was appropriate. Yet such an approach 
would be used only on a short-time basis due to its shortcomings.
Mandated transfers were found suitable for the cooperative and collaborative 
organisations because of the high degree of vertical integration. However, there is low
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diversification in the cooperative organisation and supplying divisions serve as 
manufacturing units. On the other hand, the high diversification in the collaborative 
organisation implies that each division is regarded as an independent business. Hence the 
need for different bases of pricing transfers. Full cost transfer prices applied to the 
cooperative type whereas market-based transfers were practised in the collaborative 
organisation. Mandated full cost transfers included actual full cost, standard full cost and 
cost plus return on investment. One can deduce now that transfer pricing becomes a 
serious problem when there is more interdependence between business units and 
consequently more need for vertical integration. When this is coupled with a strategy of 
diversification, the problem becomes more complex as in the case of the collaborative 
organisation. More conflict is resented and thus the choice of the transfer pricing policy 
is delicate. In summary, Eccles argued that transfer pricing depends on strategy, and 
contended that "without a policy of mandated transactions, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to implement a strategy of vertical integration" (Eccles, 1985, p. 9).
Eccles proposed a set of 38 testable hypotheses and proceeded to test them using 
data from a study by Vancil (1978). The results supported the theoretical framework put 
forward. Hoshower and Mandel (1986) have partly tested the validity of the framework 
for diversified American multinationals. The results of their small study also showed 
consistency with Eccles' proposals.
Eccles' contribution lies only in being the first study on the organisational aspects 
of transfer pricing based on inductive judgements. As one peruses through the voluminous 
literature, it becomes clear that the two dimensional strategy framework is not a new idea. 
The hypothesis that organisation structure follows strategy has been discussed by 
Chandler (1962). Naturally, it follows that the design of management planning and control 
systems - including transfer pricing - "has to take into account the specific context and 
characteristics of each organisation's structure and operations". Moreover, "the design 
of a transfer pricing system is as important to an organisation as are the decisions to
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establish a divisionalised structure and to evaluate the performance of each division on 
profits" (Battacharrya et al. 1979, p. 252). In other words, "the role of transfer pricing 
depends largely on the organisational structure" (Stone, 1959, p. 631).
Furthermore, Eccles was quick in dismissing much of the existing accounting and 
economic literature on transfer pricing. This makes his proposed theory rather less 
inter-disciplinary than the study of the problem requires. Nonetheless, Eccles' work has 
at least set forth some guide-lines for future research. A more elaborate framework has 
been developed by Spicer (1988).
3.10.: SPICER'S ORGANISATIONAL MODEL
Spicer (1988) draws on the works of Watson and Baumler (1975), Swieringa and 
Waterhouse (1982), Eccles (1985) and on the growing literature on the economics of 
internal organisation (particularly the works of Oliver Williamson) and suggests an 
organisational theory for the study of transfer pricing which is schematically represented 
in Figure 3.3. Basically the theory combines and elaborates the Watson and Baumler's 
approach and the markets and hierarchies framework or Organisational Failures 
Framework (OFF) developed by Williamson (1975). A set of nine hypotheses is then 
suggested.
Hypothesis 1: The dimensions ofintra-firm transfers of intermediate product are 
jointly related to a firm's diversification strategy, its product design and its 
organisational structure.
Hypothesis 2: The greater: (a) the degree of transaction-specific investment, (b) 
the frequency and volume, and (c) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity 
associated with intra-firm transactions, the stronger will be the firm's interests in 
centrally controlling the make-or- buy decision.
Hypothesis 3: The greater: (a) the degree of transaction-specific investment, (b) 
the frequency and volume, and (c) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity 
associated with intra-firm transactions, the more likely it is that the firm will have 
well specified arbitration procedures to safeguard the firm's interest in the 
make-or-buy decision.
Hypothesis 4: The greater: (a) the degree of transaction-specific investment, (b) 
the frequency and volume, and (c) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity 
associated with intra-firm transactions, the more likely it is that the firm will 
de-emphasize performance measurement and incentive mechanisms that focus 
entirely on divisional profitability, in favour of broader measures and incentives 
that recognise the need for cooperation and adaptation.
Dominant
Hypothesis 5a: The greater: (a) the degree of transaction-specific investment, (b) 
the frequency and volume, and/or complexity associated with intrafirm 
transactions, the more likely is conflict between divisional managers involved in 
internal transfers of intermediate products.
Hypothesis 5b: Conflict between divisions involved in intra-firm transfers of 
intermediate product is more likely for ex-post proposals for transfer price 
adjustments than it is for ex- post proposals for quantity adjustments.
Hypothesis 6a: Where standardized intermediate products are the subject of the 
transfer, or the transfer involves products for which the degree of customization
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is minor, market prices will be the primary basis for setting internal transfer prices 
and for profit center managers choosing between internal and external suppliers 
and customers.
Hypothesis 6b: Where the internally transferred intermediate product involves a 
moderate degree of customization and a material transaction- specific investment, 
internal manufacturing costs will play a greater role in the initial negotiations to 
set transfer prices and in ex-post proposals to adjust them.
Hypothesis 6c: Where the internally transferred intermediate product is 
idiosyncratic, and involves a large investment in transaction- specific human 
and/or physical capital, internal manufacturing costs will be the primary basis for 
setting transfer prices; and there will be strong central control over the 
make-or-buy decision.
These proposals bear a lot of similarity to those suggested earlier in the current 
study. The first hypothesis relates internal trading to the firm's diversification strategy 
and organisation structure; hypothesis 2 defines the locus of decision-making 
responsibility; hypotheses 3, 5 and 6 relate to the conflict over transfer pricing and the 
need for central intervention to settle the differences for the best interests of the firm; 
hypothesis 4 relates to the crucial issue of performance evaluation and reward; and finally 
the last three hypotheses propose a set of rules for transfer price determination.
What is needed now is the appropriate field investigation of these proposals. It 
seems, however, that it is unlikely that one set of data will be sufficient enough to cover 
all the specific requirements set forth by all hypotheses. For Spicer suggests that: "the 
investigation should start by looking at how the firm's various strategies affect the 
dimensions of transfers between specific buying and selling centers throughout the 
organization, and then, having done this, investigate how control problems and transfer 
prices differ among them. On a priori ground it seems useful to distinguish between these 
two parts of the investigation because, in large companies, different strategies may apply 
to different parts of the firm " (Spicer, 1988, pp. 320-21).
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3.11 CONCLUSION
Research into the behavioural and organisational context of accounting is only at 
is infancy. Of particular interest is challenging the common notion that transfer pricing 
should be treated as a technical problem. Many a formula has been advocated as the best 
by either economists or accountants including the application of mathematical 
programming technics without however paying attention to the organisational and 
behavioural settings of the problem. Recently there have been few attempts in this 
direction but apart from Eccles (1983 and 1985) who developed a theory from observations 
of company practice, all the works reviewed in this chapter are pure theoretical 
propositions or based on assumed and simulated cases. The contents of these works have 
now been updated and elaborated by Spicer (1988) in the light of the economics of internal 
organisation in yet another theoretical framework for the organisational study of transfer 
pricing. This latest framework is in line with the outline adopted for the present study, 
the results of which will be used to test the validity of Eccles' and Spicer's propositions.
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSFER PRICING IN PRACTICE:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES ON TRANSFER PRICING AND 
RELATED TOPICS IN TEN COUNTRIES.
The present chapter extends the foregoing literature review with a description of a 
series of empirical studies on transfer pricing practice in ten countries. The aim of this 
description is to substantiate, with evidence from practice, the arguments advanced in 
Chapter 1 on the need for an organisational and behavioural treatment of the transfer 
pricing problem. This chapter also illustrates the gap between accounting theory and 
practice and shows that accounting practice is marked by great diversity.
The first study was undertaken in the U.S.A. by the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA) in 1956. Table 4.1 in Appendix E1 summarises all the empirical 
studies published to date in English. Copies of three studies by Drumm (1972), Whiting 
and Gee (1984) and Price Waterhouse (1984) were obtained through personal contact 
with the authors. Three unpublished doctoral dissertations by Bisat (1967), Okpechi 
(1976) and Petty (1977) are not covered by the present review.
It can be clearly seen from Table 4.2 (Appendix E) that most of the studies were 
carried out in the U.S.A. and the U.K. It is only in the 1970s and 1980s that the subject 
has received some attention in the rest of the world, particularly capitalist countries where 
decentralisation is based on profit responsibility. Except for a theoretical proposal by 
Gordon (1970), some observations made by Horwitz (1970) about the Soviet enterprise 
and Sacks (1983) about the Yugoslav large company, no detailed study of transfer pricing 
in non-capitalist countries could be found.
Nine of the studies reviewed below are published parts of doctoral dissertations 
(Table 4.3). On the other hand, the majority of the important surveys were sponsored by 
specialised institutions: (NAA, FERF, BIC, NICE, Price Waterhouse in the U.S.A.) and 
(BIM, MBS, ICMA, ICAEW in the U.K.).
1 at the end of the thesis on page 337
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Most of the questionnaire samples were drawn from extensively used sources such 
as Fortune 500 in the USA and the Times 1000 in the U.K. This may partly explain the 
low response rates scored by many surveys. It is also observed that the more complicated 
and sensitive the questionnaire, the lower the response rate. This is the case of Mautz 
(1968), Emmanuel (1977), Yunker (1982), Mostafa (1982) and Whiting and Gee (1984).
TABLE 4.3: PhD-BASED RESEARCH
AUTHOR
WHINSTON
SHULMAN
ARVIDSSON
CHANNON
EMMANUEL
MILBURN
TANG
YUNKER
MOSTAFA
YEAR OF 
COMPLETION
1962
1966
1971
1972
1976
1977
1977
1981
1981
UNIVERSITY
C.I.T. PITTSBURGH
HARVARD
STOCKHOLM SCHOOL 
OF ECONOMICS
HARVARD
LANCASTER
ILLINOIS
NEBRASKA
ST. LOUIS
BRADFORD
COUNTRY
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
SWEDEN
U.S.A.
U.K.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.K.
Moreover, the figures indicate more participation from American companies than 
from their British counterparts. The reluctance of the latter to disclose information on 
their transfer pricing policies has grown over time whereas the American surveys have 
most often secured relatively high response rates. Such chronological comparison is not 
viable for the rest of the countries considered due to the scarcity of published empirical 
research.
The present comparative study examines a total of 47 surveys on transfer pricing 
and related subjects. Twenty eight of them dealt with domestic transfer pricing practices; 
twelve examined the multinational aspects of the problem; and seven looked at both 
dimensions.
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Tables 4.4 to 4.7 depict the details of questionnaire samples and response rates by 
country, year and author. Tables 4.8 to 4.11 summarise the pricing policies of respondents. 
Two graphs are also included in Appendix F2, They represent the progress of empirical 
research and the distribution of this research by year and decade since 1956.
TABLE 4.4 AMERICAN QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED SURVEYS
YEAR
1967
1968
1970
1971
1972
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1980
1982
1982
1982
1984
1985
1987
AUTHOR OR SPONSOR
NICE
MAUTZ
GREENE and DUERR
BURSK ET AL.
ARPAN
MILBURN
VANCIL
WU and SHARP
TANG
LAMBERT
KIM and MILLER
BURNS
YUNKER
SCAPENS et al.
CZECHOWICZ et al.
PRICE W ATERHOUSE
SOLOMON and TSAY
ABDULLAH
TOTAL 
SAMPLE
NG*
2700
NG
98
145
22
684
500
300
200
342
210
358
497
300
148
NG
200
1 RESPONDENTS
| TOTAL
NG
412
NG
41
60
13
313
NG
154
84
52
114
77
247
88
74
185
187
%
NG
15.25
NG
41.83
41.38
59.09
45.76
NG
51.33
42.00
15.20
54.28
21.50
49.70
29.33
50.00
NG
48.00
USABLE
190
412
130
34
60
13
291
209
145
61
34
62
52
205
88
74
185
83
%
NG
15.25
NG
34.69
41.38
59.09
42.54
41.80
48.33
30.50
9.94
29.52
14.52
41.25
29.33
50.00
NG
41.50
(*) NG = Not Given.
2 at the end of the thesis on page 342
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TABLE 4.5: BRITISH QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED SURVEYS
YEAR
1967
1969
1971
1972
1973
1977
1978
1981
1982
1982
1984
AUTHOR OR
SPONSOR
LIVESEY
PIPER
ROOK
MBS
TOMKINS
EMMANUEL
FINNIE
TANG
SCAPENS Ct al.
MOSTAFA
WHITING & GEE
TOTAL
SAMPLE
400
66
NG
NG
200
600
NG
290
734
250
330
RESPONDENTS
TOTAL
NG*
55
293
44
65
104
44
95
331
181
NG
%
NG
83.33
NG
NG
32.50
17.33
NG
32.75
45.09
72.40
NG
USABLE
232
44
193
44
44
92
42
80
211
46
57
%
58.00
66.66
NG
NG
22.00
15.33
NG
27.58
28.74
18.40
17.27
(*) NG = Not Given
TABLE 4.6: CANADIAN QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED SURVEYS
YEAR
1978
1979
1981
AUTHOR OR
SPONSOR
MILBURN
DRURY & BATES
TANG
TOTAL
SAMPLE
41
129
400
RESPONDENTS
TOTAL
20
101
257
%
48.78
78.29
64.25
USABLE
20
95
192
%
48.78
73.64
48.00
TABLE 4.7: OTHER QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED SURVEYS
YEAR 
AND 
COUNTRY
SWEDEN 
1971
GERMANY 
1972
JAPAN
1979
AUSTRALIA 
1979
INDIA
1983
AUTHOR OR 
SPONSOR
ARVIDSSON
DRUMM
TANG
CHENHALL
GOVINDARAJAN 
& 
RAMAMURTHY
TOTAL 
SAMPLE
343
NG*
369
252
71
RESPONDENTS
TOTAL
235
24
112
218
42
%
68.15
NG
30.35
86.50
59.15
USABLE
220
24
102
173
41
%
64.14
NG
27.64
68.65
57.74
(*) NG = Not Given
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4.1 DOMESTIC TRANSFER PRICING 
4.1.1 AMERICAN SURVEYS
4.1.1.1 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS (NAA, 1956)
The NAA's Accounting for Intracompany Transfers is the first empirical study of 
transfer pricing practice known and the only one published in the 1950s. A larger scale 
study was undertaken by Stone (1957) as part of a doctoral research of which the only 
thing published was an uninformative abstract in the Accounting Review (October 1959).
Prior to their survey, the predecessor body of the NAA had debated the transfer 
pricing issue at two International Cost Conferences in 1925 and 1930 (Eccles, 1985). 
This provides some evidence to support the claim that transfer pricing became a practical 
issue when American companies adopted the divisionalised structure (Johnson, 1978; 
Kaplan, 1984, Eccles, 1985 and Johnson and Kaplan, 1987).
The NAA study involved 40 companies but details of their individual practices were 
not reported. Nonetheless, the results were interesting as they coincided with Cook's 
(1955) advocacy of market prices, Dean's (1955) recommendation of negotiated 
competitive prices and most importantly with Hirshleifer's (1956) marginal analysis.
The majority of the surveyed companies used transfer prices which exceeded cost. 
A profit mark-up was calculated to yield a desired rate of return on sales or investment. 
Transfer prices were centrally fixed and the objectives of the cost-plus pricing policies 
were: decentralisation of management, control of return on invested capital and 
minimisation of taxes. Organisational units were, in most cases, set up as quasi profit 
centres whereby competition was sought as an incentive to profit consciousness. Transfers 
at cost would not foster this aim which is better served by competitive market price as 
advocated by Cook (1955) and Dean (1955). Thus, Hirshleifer's marginal cost pricing 
does not find support even from the earliest empirical data.
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Internal transfers were accounted for at established inter-unit prices so that income 
statements for the profit centres could be prepared directly from the accounting records. 
Unrealised profits generated by transfer prices were eliminated periodically when 
financial statements were prepared.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the above summary. First, transfer pricing in 
the mid-fifties was not only a concern for academics alone but also a serious subject in 
practice. Second, the non-disclosure of detailed company policies indicates the secrecy 
and uncertainty surrounding the problem. Third, central management control of the 
pricing decision implies that decentralisation was not a sudden organisational change but 
a cautious and evolving process. Fourth, divisional performance was judged in terms of 
overall corporate profits. The participating companies generally stressed coordination of 
divisional actions in the interest of the company as a whole. This objective is realised by 
centrally established and administered policies, for instance, central determination and 
control of transfer prices. Fifth, marginal cost pricing was yet to be proven acceptable 
for profit centre responsibility. Finally, different purposes called for different bases of 
pricing inter-unit transfers.
4.1.1.2 WHINSTON (1964)
Whinston reported on field work undertaken in two American companies as part of 
a doctoral research on price guides in decentralised institutions. Transfer goods were 
classified in three different groups, Gl, G2 and G3:
Gl - items for which competitive prices were not available and could not be reliably 
approximated by comparative analysis.
G2 - split items, or items purchased from both outside supplies and company sources.
G3 - items other than split items for which competitive prices were available or could 
be reliably approximated by comparative analysis.
G2 and G3 were the least difficult as goods were transferred at the same price paid 
to the outside supplier with possible adjustments for differences in specification, volume
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engineering, services, royalties, freight, etc. For Gl, where no competitive prices were 
available, goods were priced at cost plus mark-up. The lack of outside prices implied 
some arbitrariness and, therefore, disputes. Company policy stipulated a 30-day time limit 
for settling disagreements, otherwise central management was empowered to intervene 
and take the cut-off decision.
Internal conflict arose because of a) dissimilarities between the internal division 
and the competitive producer, and b) because of judging managers on variables beyond 
their control. Requests by divisions for altering the pricing system were usually rejected 
by central management. Moreover, divisional managers were obliged to buy from inside 
sources whenever the company had facilities available. Capital expenditure or new 
investment decisions were also subject to central staff review and approval.
Given the limited number of participants "the results can hardly be regarded as 
providing a representative picture of the [then] current state of corporate practices or 
problems" (Whinston, 1964, p. 407).
4.1.1.3 SOLOMONS (1965)
Since it first appeared in 1965, Solomons' book Divisional Performance 
Measurement and Control has become an indispensable reference on the subject and has 
attracted world-wide readership. This has prompted two recent reprints of the book in 
1983 and 1985.
Solomons investigated the financial relations existing between central and divisional 
management in American companies. Inter-divisional relationships and transfer pricing 
represent an integral part of the investigation which covered 25 industrial corporations. 
Strong emphasis was placed on two objectives of the transfer pricing system: performance 
evaluation and goal congruence.
Similar to the results of the NAA's study (1956), Solomons found that, in most 
cases, transfers were made at market or market price less the savings in selling costs. 
Marginal cost was used only by one company as a supplementary method to market price.
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In other words, Hirshleifer's (1956) marginal cost rule was once again absent in practice. 
In the light of the above two objectives, Solomons formulated a set of prescriptions 
depending on different sets of general circumstances (Chapter 2, Table 2.5).
4.1.1.4 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD (NICE, 1967)
This study is similar to the NAA's (1956) and Solomons' studies of American 
companies and reported on the widespread use of market-based prices. However, it differs 
from its predecessors as it covered a larger number of companies and was limited to 
transfers of goods among divisions.
As the study was primarily concerned with transfer pricing methods, the results 
showed that it was common practice among companies to use more than one transfer 
pricing base. Cost-based methods were used solely or in combination with market-based 
prices by two thirds of the 190 surveyed firms. Market-based prices were used by more 
than half the companies, whether alone or in combination with some form of cost-based 
transfer price. Given that most of the responsibility centres were profit centres, cost-based 
prices always included a profit margin. Beside that, most companies allowed outside 
sourcing for intermediate goods.
4.1.1.5 MAUTZ (1968)
Like Solomons (1965), Mautz (1968) dealt with transfer pricing as part of a larger 
project on financial reporting by diversified companies. The report is based on the 
responses of 412 companies (i.e. 16 times the sample of Solomons) of which 341 
companies (84%) had transfer pricing policies. Nearly half these companies (166) used 
only one pricing method, whereas only 23% used two transfer prices. The remaining 28% 
used more than two methods. In total 51% of the companies used more than one pricing 
policy.
The variety of pricing policies included full cost (19.8%), full cost plus a mark-up 
(21.1%), negotiated price (23.6%) and market price (26.7%). Other non-specified
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methods were used by 9% of the respondents. Thus, the cost-based and market based 
prices were equally used by companies. This multitude of policies is in accordance with 
the theoretical stance that there is no one best pricing method for all situations.
4.1.1.6 LARSON (1974)
This is one of the few studies where data were collected by interviews only. Eight 
American firms representing wood products, industrial equipment, petroleum and 
electronic products, banking, beverages and clothing industries were involved. The 
interviewees were nine divisional controllers or assistant controllers and eight top-level 
managers. The subjects investigated included transfer pricing methods and policies 
regarding outside trading.
The results indicated that all eight companies advocated market price as the best 
pricing basis but none of them used it. Instead it was found that transfer pricing methods 
were largely arbitrary and established by top management. Beside that, the freedom to 
trade with the outside market was very restricted. Approval to buy externally could be 
obtained from top management only when the producing division lacked capacity to meet 
demand. Obviously it would be expected that divisional managers would not be satisfied 
with very restrictive transfer pricing systems that would only lead to conflict. In fact 
Larson (p. 32) concluded that "the problem of conflict resolution that surrounds transfer 
pricing and decentralisation is of such a complex nature that it is doubtful that any present 
method of transfer pricing would be successful.
Such a pessimistic conclusion cannot be taken at face value given the size of the 
sample chosen for the study and the results of other more comprehensive studies in the 
present analysis (for instance NAA, 1956; Solomons, 1965; NICE, 1967; Wu and Sharp, 
1978; Lambert, 1979; Benke and Edwards, 1980; Price Waterhouse, 1984; Eccles, 1985 
and the findings of the present study of British transfer pricing presented later in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7.
101
4.1.1.7 VANCIL (1978)
Vancil's report is as important as Solomons' (1965) for researchers on 
decentralisation and transfer pricing. The report presents a detailed analysis of divisional 
interdependence and transfer pricing practices of U.S. firms. Three types of transfers were 
identified: 1) transfer of goods from one profit centre to another (85% of firms), 2) joint 
use of common facilities (71 % of firms), and 3) transfer of services between profit centres 
(55% of firms).
Only in 27% of the 249 companies with internal trade did transfers exceed 15% of 
total company sales. In the majority of companies the level of internal trade between was 
between 1% to 15% of total sales. The pricing practices are summarised in Table 4.8 
above.
The results indicated a statistically significant relationship between firm size and 
extent of internal transfers in that larger firms had a greater percentage of internal transfers. 
However, there was a negative relationship between diversification and internal transfers, 
with single business companies more involved in transfer pricing than more diversified 
companies. On the other hand, profit margins ROI and EPS were positively related to the 
level of internal transfers.
Transfers of goods were treated as a purchase and sale transaction in 68% of cases 
and thus a profit margin was included in the transfer price. This latter was market-based 
in 40% of companies and negotiated in one third of them. Full manufacturing cost was 
used in 70% of the companies that transferred goods at cost. Transfer services were priced 
on actual usage whereas the costs of common facilities were assigned on the basis of 
square foot capacity.
Vancil (and his collaborateurs) concluded that "we have not been successful in our 
attempt to explain why a particular manufacturing firm makes use of a particular method 
for transfer pricing. An answer to this question would be quite useful to practitioners
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involved in transfer pricing issues, and hence this topic offers much potential for further 
research" (Vancil, 1978, p. 176). One step in this direction has been made by Eccles 
(1985) and the research project that comprises the present thesis.
4.1.1.8 MEDNICK (1979)
Transfer pricing disclosures were only part of Mednick's analysis of the annual 
reports of 250 US companies. The main purpose of the analysis was to find out the 
implications of Statement 14 of the Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) on 
segment financial reporting.
Issued in December 1976, FASB 14 called for new disclosures about a company's 
operations in different industries and foreign countries in its financial statements. FASB 
14 required that inter-segment transfers be accounted for on the basis used by the enterprise 
to price the transactions, and that accounting basis for transfers be disclosed. The pricing 
basis should be consistent with the objective of determining - in a realistic and practicable 
manner - the industry segment's profit or loss contribution. In other words, some form 
of market price.
More than half the companies reported either no inter-segment sales or a negligible 
amount. Of the 100 or so companies that had relatively significant inter-segment transfers, 
75% priced at an equivalent of fair market price. The remaining 25% priced at either cost, 
cost plus mark-up, market less a discount or negotiated rates. It is, however, questionable 
whether information supplied by a company annual report is reliable and sufficient enough 
for a fair and complete analysis of the complexities of the transfer pricing problem.
4.1.1.9 LAMBERT (1979)
Lambert studied a fundamental obstacle encountered in the design and 
administration of transfer prices: internal conflict. As seen earlier, Larson (1974) did not 
see any pricing method suitable for tackling the problem. The very fact that divisions are 
treated as profit centres where unit performance is judged in terms of divisional profits 
leads to disputes whenever there is interdependence and transfer prices.
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The transfer pricing policies of the 61 respondent companies are shown in Table 
4.7 and the results of their responses are summarised as follows:
the main source of conflict is divisional profits. If the profits of one division 
are enhanced by transfer pricing this was perceived as detrimental by the 
other division.
the second main factor affecting the level of conflict is the freedom of 
sourcing. When the customer division is not permitted to buy from the outside 
market items available from another division, the level of conflict is higher.
there is less conflict with market price than with full cost or negotiated prices.
Negotiation is supposed to lead to settling internal disputes, not to aggravate them. 
The degree of conflict observed with negotiated prices could be explained by the lack of 
freedom over external sourcing and the desire and keenness of divisional managers to 
maximise their units' profits against which performance is measured.
4.1.1.10 BENKE AND EDWARDS (1980)
Twenty four years after initiating the first ever empirical study on transfer pricing, 
the NAA published its second report on the subject. It would have been more interesting 
if the NAA had sponsored research between 1956- 1980,as this would have enabled a 
chronological examination of an evolving problem. Fortunately this time gap was, to a 
certain extent, filled by the efforts of others.
Interviews were conducted with corporate staffs in 19 US companies in 10 different 
industries. The study results in suggesting the two part tariff transfer price rule which 
consists of the standard variable cost (S VC) and a lost contribution margin (LCM). The 
application of this rule depends on the particular situation and, thus, the transfer price is 
not uniform for all cases and companies. The rule ends up in applying different transfer 
prices to different situations. The primary techniques used are represented in Table 4.8. 
The report examined the relationship of transfer pricing to the management control
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process, in terms of goal congruence (taken as profit maximisation) and performance 
evaluation. Most of the transfer pricing techniques used by the companies were 
profit-centre techniques particularly market-based prices.
4.1.1.11 PRICE WATERHOUSE (1984)
This is one of the recent surveys in the continuous research on transfer pricing in 
the USA. The response rate of 50% (74 companies) shows the interest of American 
managers in understanding the complexities of the problem, especially its managerial 
implications. Fifty one companies had transfer pricing policies.
One innovation of the study is the introduction of the phrase "value added transfer 
pricing" to designate transfer pricing at a mark-up. This technique was used by 69% of 
the 74 responding companies and included both market-based and cost plus prices. The 
popularity of market-based prices is represented by the high percentage of companies 
(82.4%) using them. This supports the findings of previous studies (Solomons, 1965 and 
NICE, 1967).
Companies were found to use their transfer pricing systems primarily for 
performance evaluation. Managerial motivation was also an important objective. This 
may be explained by the wide use of value added transfer pricing as divisional performance 
cannot be judged on costs only in profit centres. Moreover, in the majority of companies 
the buyer and the seller negotiated transfer prices even though external market prices 
were available. Despite all the disadvantages that this might incur, it could be that 
negotiation was aimed at stimulating managers by giving them more initiative. However, 
it seemed that the above objectives were geared towards maximising corporate profits as 
transfer prices were influenced by central management in almost every company.
Companies used two methods for eliminating intra-company (or pseudo) profit 
generated by transfer prices: 1) a two-record method and 2) a percentage method. The 
former segregates each single intra-company profit whereas the latter proceeds by 
estimating margin percents to bring items back to cost.
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Overall this study followed the same pattern as its predecessors in examining the 
technical and mechanical aspects of transfer pricing. No attempt was made for finding 
why particular prices were used or their behavioural implications. This particular issue 
is one of the focal points around which the remaining chapters of the present thesis revolve.
4.1.1.12 ECCLES (1985)
This study has already been reviewed in the previous chapter but it will be recalled 
thatEccles' work is a stepping stone for the organisational study of transfer pricing. Spicer 
(1988) followed with a more comprehensive framework which will be applied later in 
Chapter 8 and 9 to the results of the present investigation of British transfer pricing 
practice.
4.1.1.13 SOLOMON AND TSAY (1985)
This survey undertaken in the USA and published in Canada provides a basis for 
comparison with Drury and Bates' survey (1979) of EDP charge-back systems in 
Canadian organisations. Solomon and Tsay received 185 replies to a questionnaire sent 
to US companies listed in Fortune 500. Forty percent of the responses were from 
manufacturing companies. The rest of the replies came from a variety of businesses, 
including insurance (14%), utilities (10%) and commercial banks (9%).
The majority of firms either charged-back all costs to end-users or no costs at all. 
Some respondents charged for only part of the costs. The charge-back schemes were 
mostly used by highly decentralised businesses where significant decisions were made 
at divisional levels. Further observation of the pricing practices indicated that goal 
congruence and performance evaluation were the major areas of concern for which 
companies experienced problems. It appeared that in 58% of the cases, companies said 
that their pricing practices culminated in decisions that were in the best interests of the 
divisions but not necessarily in the best interests of the firm as a whole. For, Solomon 
and Tsay (1985, p. 6) argued that "the need for charge-back schemes arises from the 
necessity to measure performance of profit and investment centres".
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These results are identical to those reported by Drury and Bates. However, the 
pricing schemes of the US companies showed that 77% of the respondents used full cost 
pricing without a provision for profit. In fact, 91% of data centre managers in companies 
with charge-back systems were not held responsible for profit but were only expected to 
break even. The motives for such a policy were not given but this explains the relatively 
low utilisation of market prices. Contrary to the findings of Drury and Bates, full cost 
plus a profit margin was the practice of only 2.8% of the respondents.
Solomon and Tsay asserted that transfer pricing requires the integration of 
accounting, management, economics, and behavioural skills and theories. This view is 
held by many specialists of the problem and consolidates the approach adopted for the 
present investigation and described in Chapter 1.
Solomon and Tsay's conclusion also reflects the methodological deficiency that 
characterises almost all of the studies reviewed above and those described below.
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4.1.2 BRITISH SURVEYS 
4.1.2.1 LIVESEY (1967)
This is the first concrete treatment of transfer pricing in the U.K. and is interesting 
for its coverage and results. The determination of transfer prices and the extent of 
divisional freedom were the core issues focussed upon. A questionnaire was sent to 400 
companies in the Manchester area. One fourth of these companies had inter-divisional 
pricing.
As shown in Table 4.8, 77% of the respondents used cost-based transfer prices, 
predominantly full cost and full cost plus a mark-up. The mark-up was fixed arbitrarily 
because of the difficulty in allocating capital employed in the making of the various 
products.
Livesey identified a set of five objectives for the transfer pricing systems:
- fostering of a commercial attitude (earning profits),
- encouraging divisional cooperation,
- facilitating control by central management,
- maximising company profits over a short period of time,
- optimising the allocation of the company's resources.
Is there a pricing policy that would further these objectives? This depends on how 
much freedom divisional managers have in decision-making, an issue not included in 
Livesey's questionnaire because "great reliance could not be placed on the answers to 
this particular question" (Livesey, p. 101). Even the answers secured through interviews 
showed that whenever there was some claimed freedom it was limited and conditional. 
It is therefore evident that there is incompatibility among the above objectives. An 
organisational study of transfer pricing would yield better explanations than a simple 
pricing methods- objectives approach.
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4.1.2.2 PIPER (1969)
This study followed the same lines drawn by Livesey (1967). The purpose of Piper's 
questionnaire survey was to discover the bases of internal pricing between the units of 
an organisation, particularly when these units were operating as autonomous profit 
centres.
Contrary to Livesey's results, Piper found that the majority of companies (85%) 
valued transfers at full market price or market price adjusted for transport, quantity 
discounts, quality or similar factors (Table 4.8). In most cases there were no fixed rules 
for determining or enforcing transfer prices. Rather it was reported that a large number 
of firms allowed their divisions to negotiate a transfer price though the bargaining was 
only concerned with establishing a market-based price. Nevertheless, this freedom of 
action implied that autonomy and competition were encouraged. In other words, profit 
responsibility was not pseudo or artificial. Moreover, it was found that there was great 
"company spirit" in that divisional managers were motivated towards goal congruence 
sometimes by sacrificing their own results for the overall benefit.
Piper also noted that companies were not interested in using different prices for 
different purposes. Profits were split between divisions on the basis of the internal price, 
i.e., the market price. No evidence was found regarding the use of mathematical 
programming techniques much recommended in theory. Finally, Piper argued that 
knowledge of total variable and fixed costs and overall margins was necessary. Hence, 
he suggested pricing transfers in two instalments: standard variable cost per unit plus a 
fixed charge based upon estimated annual trade to cover fixed costs and profit. This 
two-part tariff method had already been suggested by Solomons (1965).
4.1.2.3 ROOK (1971)
Of the 293 respondents to Rook's survey, 193 companies representing 20 industries 
had a system of inter-unit trading. This study which was sponsored by the British Institute 
of Management focused on the same issues treated by Livesey (1967) and Piper (1969) 
namely: decentralisation, divisional autonomy, and transfer price setting and objectives.
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Internal trading accounted for less than 10% of total annual sales in just over half the 193 
companies, ranged between 10-25% for 34% of them and was relatively negligible beyond 
25%.
Two thirds of the companies had only one internal pricing method while the rest, 
particularly the largest ones, used more than two methods. This means that the more 
complex the organisation, the more the need for multiple pricing. Table 4.8 shows that 
market price was a predominant pricing basis beside full cost price. Once again 
Hirshleifer's marginal cost pricing was not supported by practice as no company used 
this method nor did companies use mathematically derived transfer prices.
As to the objectives served by the transfer pricing system, companies were concerned 
with the motivation of managers' performance and the legal requirements where the units 
were owned by different companies or were in different countries.
Findings on the extent of divisional autonomy were quite revealing. It was reported 
that despite the claim of high degree of decentralisation, central management exercised 
close control over external buying of goods. This was the case in nearly 100 companies. 
For 25 companies, the decision to buy externally always had to be approved by central 
management. The same applied to the setting and changing of inter-unit prices as, in most 
cases, central management had the first and final word on these policies. This is contrary 
to the philosophy of decentralisation. In her conclusion Rook emphasised the need for 
careful planning and co-ordination among divisions in order to prevent problems before 
they arise. Sound inter-unit trading policies which are flexible (i.e., where divisional 
freedom is guaranteed and preserved) are much needed for a real decentralised structure 
to exist.
4.1.2.4 MANCHESTER BUSINESS SCHOOL (MBS, 1972)
The MBS (in association with the Centre for Business Research) undertook a series 
of management control projects on performance measurement, objective setting, planning 
and reporting systems, and transfer pricing. The project on transfer pricing aimed at
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studying the problem of managing interdependence between decentralised organisational 
units. Unlike previous studies (e.g. Livesey, 1967, Piper, 1969 and Rook, 1971) the MBS 
survey dealt also with the pricing of internal flows of services.
Interdependence was measured by the ratio of internal transfers to external sales. 
Main operating units as opposed to the company was the main focus of attention. The 
ratio was below 10% in 19 (43%) of the 44 respondents, 10 to 25% in 14 (32%) companies 
and over 25% in the rest. These results are comparable to those found by Rook (1971). 
The objectives or functions served by the TPS reported in the study were identical to 
those identified by Livesey (1967). The most important functions were to a) foster 
awareness of profit implications of decisions, and b) to identify the contribution of each 
main operating unit to total company performance. The importance of an objective 
depended on the degree of divisional interdependence. Companies with a high degree of 
interdependence considered objective (b) to be more important than (a) and vice versa. 
As to sourcing policies, it was found that no firm constrained trade internally when an 
external market existed and that in 20% of the firms, unit managers had freedom over 
external relationships. Nonetheless, this freedom was not given to main operating units 
for all products and services. Beside that the locus of the transfer pricing decision was 
usually at corporate levels. It is interesting to note that for the first time, there was some 
evidence on the use of shadow prices (2 firms) and marginal cost pricing (2 firms). Some 
companies reported that they had significant amounts of international inter-divisional 
transfers and most of them used pricing bases different from domestic ones. The main 
environmental variables considered in international transfer pricing were compliance with 
tax laws, customs requirements, transportation costs and profitability of both parties to 
the transfer price.
4.1.2.5 CHANNON (1973)
Channon's examination of British transfer pricing practice was part of aPh.D project 
reminiscent of Chandler's (1966) Strategy and Structure study of American companies. 
Chapter 7 of Channon's report summarises the findings of structured interviews on the
112
internal characteristics of a stratified sample of 25 companies chosen from the largest 
100 population.
Among the set of items investigated were 1) the degree of product integration and 
methods of internal pricing, 2) performance measures and 3) reward systems. Companies 
were grouped according to their diversification strategy into single, dominant, related 
and unrelated product companies. The single and unrelated product firms were excluded 
from the analysis as they either were not divisionalised or did not have inter-divisional 
activity. The findings of the remaining companies (9 dominant and 13 related product) 
are presented below.
The product flow between divisions was high (over 40%) in 4 of the dominant 
product companies and in 5 of the related product companies. The high levels of internal 
trade in these firms was found to be associated with the pattern of diversification and 
vertical integration. In most of these cases the transfer prices were centrally imposed. In 
companies with little inter-divisional product flow transfer prices were market-based or 
negotiated
Divisional performance was predominantly measured by return on investment in 
most companies, with differences on the divisional investment base. Some companies 
use additional measures like return on sales, costs, and market share.
Performance was rewarded indirectly via promotional prospects in the 9 dominant 
product companies and executive salaries were not tied to performance. The 13 related 
product companies also had similar reward policies except that two of them introduced 
a stock option scheme based on overall corporate performance.
On the whole executives considered profit related pay unfair and inappropriate and 
preferred straight salaries, often coupled with employment stability.
4.1.2.6 TOMKINS (1973)
This is one of the few comprehensive studies conducted in Britain on the subject of 
planning and control of activities in divisionalised corporations. Of the 200 companies 
approached, only 65 (32.5%) replied to the mail questionnaire. Information on transfer
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pricing procedures was obtained from 44 (22%) respondents. The transfer pricing schemes 
adopted by these companies are presented in Table 4.8. As in previous studies there was 
a variety of transfer prices. Twelve companies used more than one pricing method. Over 
70% of the respondents had market-based prices, compared to 45% using cost. Cost plus 
profit mark-up was reported in 8 companies (18%) and negotiated prices in 14 (32%). 
The use of cost plus was to approximate arm's length price. Current market price was the 
practice in 50% of the companies. There was no indication that opportunity cost, marginal 
cost pricing or mathematical programming methods being used. In 31 companies (70%) 
the ratio of internal trade to turnover was less than 10%. No obvious relationship was 
found between the volume of goods transferred internally and transfer pricing policies.
Another important result came from some MNCs covered by the survey. None of 
them reported any constraints imposed by tax authorities in making transfers across 
national boundaries. Moreover, none referred to profit maximisation as a major 
determinant of transfer pricing policy.
The above results compare with those found by Piper (1969), Rook (1971) and the 
MBS (1972).
4.1.2.7 EMMANUEL (1977)
The aims of Emmanuel's doctoral research were to 1) provide an initial insight of 
transfer pricing objectives within a corporate environment, 2) find out why particular 
forms of transfer pricing were used, and 3) to determine the factors influencing the choice 
of transfer prices. Data were collected from 104 companies responding to pilot interviews 
and questionnaires sent to a total of 600 large U.K. companies. Details about transfer 
prices used were obtained from 92 respondents.
Market-oriented and cost-based prices were used by 44% and 37% of the companies 
respectively. The remaining used negotiated prices, (Emmanuel and Otley, 1985). Cost- 
based prices were less used if an external market existed. On the other hand, no one firm 
used mathematical programming or marginal cost for setting transfer prices.
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Divisional performance evaluation was found to be related to the transfer pricing 
policies. Companies using market-oriented and negotiated prices appraised divisional 
performance in terms of profit or contribution margin while those using cost-based transfer 
prices evaluated performance in terms of cost. It appears that market-based and negotiated 
prices were more compatible with decentralisation into profit centres. Nevertheless, 
Emmanuel noted that market-oriented transfer pricing could lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour. Only 25% of companies expressed satisfaction with the market-oriented 
transfer prices and this is because the amounts traded internally were relatively small. 
However, 40% of the respondents were dissatisfied with their transfer pricing system. 
This is to say that no single method could be advocated as the "best way" to set adequate 
transfer prices.
The decision to trade externally had to be approved by central management in 69% 
of the cases but transfer prices were dictated in 18 companies only. Thus, the internal 
pricing policy was distinguished from the divisions access to external intermediate 
markets. The constriction of the latter shows the priority given by companies to overall 
profitability.
Like Vancil (1978) Emmanuel concluded that "the inability to explain the reasons 
for various transfer pricing practices may eventually be overcome by adopting more 
clinical and longitudinal research techniques" (Emmanuel and Otley, 1985, p. 204)
4.1.2.8 FINNIE (1978)
Finnic reported on a survey of transfer pricing practices undertaken by the U.K. 
branches of the former Institute of Cost and Management Accountants. The survey 
intentionally concentrated on the transfer pricing of products and materials rather than 
on the allocation of central services.
The transfer pricing system was found to serve a set of objectives similar to those 
identified by Livesey (1967) and the MBS (1972). Priority was given to profit 
consciousness and performance measurement and control. Table 4.8 gives the frequency 
and percentage usage of the pricing procedures, namely, full cost plus mark-up, negotiated
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and centrally fixed. No mention was made of market price but Finnic indicated that 
negotiation was based on list price less discounts. Negotiation was, however, subject to 
central supervision. Such a policy might be explained by the lengthy disagreements on 
prices and the tendency of unit managers to promote selfish rather than global interests. 
On the other hand, central office interference is more obvious in price setting as transfer 
prices were centrally fixed in nearly half the companies. Moreover, central management 
exercised control on most decisions. This is reflected in the limited number of respondents 
where divisions had some discretion in choosing customers and suppliers.
In summary, the survey revealed "considerable diversity of practice but with the 
majority of instances stressing control and preservation of corporate interest above 
motivation and unit autonomy and with optimisation, whether of tax or resource 
allocation, a very low priority" (Finnic, p. 497). Stated otherwise, the results do not 
substantiate the existence of decentralised profit responsibility.
4.1.2.9 WHITING AND GEE (1984)
The paper presented by Whiting and Gee at the Seventh Annual Congress of the 
European Accounting Association in Switzerland is one of the most recent comprehensive 
studies on cost allocations under decentralised management with divisional 
interdependence. Although only 57 companies (from 330) completed the detailed mail 
questionnaire, the response rate (17%) can be considered as acceptable compared to 
previous studies (see Table 4.5 for response rates in the U.K.). The findings on cost 
allocation showed that respondents strongly favoured charging on the basis of service or 
budget costs rather than upon external market prices for equivalent services.
The study of the extent of decentralisation revolved around one important 
dimension: divisional autonomy. This included autonomy with respect to 1) carrying out 
purchasing, 2) setting selling prices, 3) advertising, 4) personnel policies, 5) brand names, 
and 6) reporting the financial consequences of the first five functions. It was found that 
divisions had full purchasing authority in 32 (56%) companies and needed consultation
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with central management in eight (14%) of companies. Similarly full authority in setting 
selling prices was reported in 42 (74%) companies and consultation with head office was 
required in another 10 (17%) firms.
These findings have implications on transfer pricing policies as it can be seen from 
Table 4.9. More than 60% of companies with significant internal trade used market-based 
prices and another 18% negotiated their transfer prices. Centrally fixed prices were 
reported in only two (3%) companies. No mention was made of marginal cost pricing or 
shadow prices but some practices were reported as "a variety of methods" without further 
specification.
The interdependence between divisions that generated the need for transfer prices 
was caused by six major factors: 1) vertical integration, 2) common customers, 3) common 
markets, 4) common materials, 5) using the same site, and 6) heavy usage of group 
services. The study reported no conflict of interests between the divisions and central 
management and between the divisions themselves. This may be explained by the freedom 
of action or autonomy that divisional managers have on the crucial operating functions 
of buying and selling. Moreover, as prices are negotiated in seven companies and there 
are no centrally imposed prices, it could be concluded that when there is real profit 
responsibility there is less or no conflict over transfer prices as managers would behave 
in a goal congruent manner.
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4.1.3 DOMESTIC TRANSFER PRICING IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In comparison to the American and British cases there have been a number of 
sporadic investigations on domestic transfer pricing practice in other countries. A total 
of six studies could be traced and these are presented below. Table 4.10 summarises 
companies' practices.
4.1.3.1 SWEDEN: ARVIDSSON (1971)
Arvidsson's study was originally published in Swedish. A summary in English is 
found in Appendix 5 (pp. 167-187) of his book [Internal Transfer Negotiations (1973)]. 
The survey was part of a doctoral thesis submitted at the Stockholm School of Economics.
A total of 343 companies were approached by postal questionnaire yielding 235 
responses of which 220 contained information on transfer pricing. Details of the pricing 
methods were received from 194 firms and these are summarised in Table 4.10. Two-thirds 
of the companies used more than one method simultaneously. This implies that there is 
no one best method as is often suggested in the literature.
Arvidsson substantiates this comment with a number of cases drawn from the replies 
of the Swedish companies. Specific problems concerning transfer pricing were illustrated 
through those cases. For instance, in the metal and machine industries it was found that 
a variety of transfer pricing policies were adopted. If the selling unit was a profit centre, 
it was common to transfer at a market-oriented price or at cost plus. If it was a cost centre, 
the transaction was priced at the production cost. These prices were centrally fixed in 
some cases and negotiated in others.
The multi-transfer price system also applied to international transfers. The latter are 
much more complicated than domestic ones as many additional elements have to be taken 
into account. These include taxes, duties, currency fluctuation, specific competitive 
situations and differing business practices. As mentioned above, companies had central 
instructions regulating internal transfers. These regulations covered also the settlement 
of disputes through mediation or arbitration.
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It would have been more useful if a full English translation of Arvidsson's report 
was available. The results of the study seem very interesting but their summary in English 
appears not to contain most of the important details.
4.1.3.2 WEST GERMANY: DRUMM (1972)
This survey was originally published in German and only a brief English-language 
summary of the results can be found in Forrester (1977). The original publication as well 
as details in English were obtained through personal communication with Professor 
Drumm.
The purpose of the study was to discover the objectives and modes of transfer pricing 
in large German companies. Managers in 24 such companies were approached by 
questionnaires and interviews. Most divisions had decentralised powers of production 
planning and were profit centres responsible for results. One firm had centralised planning, 
and yet divisional results reporting. Another firm delegated neither the responsibility nor 
the decision making powers.
In 13 of the 24 companies the ways of price setting were similar. The transfer pricing 
practices are shown in Table 4.10. In all companies the main aim of the transfer pricing 
system was long-term profit maximisation. Other aims included optimisation of period 
results and resource use, apportionment of costs to responsible divisions, divisional 
responsibility control and minimisation of tax.
The long-term profit objective explains the limited use of marginal costs (only 2 
firms) as the latter serve short-term decisions. Full cost is much more popular (8 firms) 
and is often supplemented with a mark-up for cost of capital or profit. Three reasons were 
given for full cost pricing:
internal recipients should bear their full share of cost as though they had 
produced the transferred goods themselves - notional interest is applied to 
the capital employed in the production of the transferred goods,
full cost is necessary for long term investment decisions.
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The results of this survey could have more significance if other studies of German 
practice were available for comparison. The international aspects of the problem would 
be more interesting as some evidence was provided by Arpan (1972). Unfortunately, 
according to the personal message received from Professor Drumm, German literature 
has yet to produce such studies.
4.1.3.4 AUSTRALIA: CHENHALL (1979)
Little reference is made in the literature to Chenhall's important and very informative 
study may be because it was not published in one of the customarily referred to accounting 
journals. Whether the choice of the journal (the Australian Journal of Management) was 
unfortunate or not, it demonstrates that the subject of profit centres and transfer pricing 
is beyond the scope of the one discipline. In fact, the cross-disciplinary nature of the 
problem is well reflected in the areas investigated in the 173 responding divisionalised 
Australian companies, namely: 1) the strategy of diversification, 2) the basis of 
divisionalisation, 3) divisional autonomy and transfer pricing, and 4) financial methods 
of divisional performance evaluation.
The first striking result is the overall response rate of 87% (218 firms) secured 
through mail questionnaires and telephone interviews. Among all the 36 
questionnaire-based surveys summarised in Tables 4.4 to4.7, onlyDrury andBates (1979) 
could secure a similar high rate of 73%. The latter were, however, concerned with the 
pricing of computer services in Canadian organisations, not internal transfers of goods 
and materials. Both response rates may be explained by the cultural factor and its impact 
on the respondents' behaviour.
The second important finding is that decentralisation into profit centres (or 
divisionalisation) has come through a long and evolutionary process through which the 
Australian companies gradually delegated authority and decision- making responsibility 
to unit-managers. Beside this, most companies divisionalised on product and geographical 
bases, and nearly half of them used multiple bases to set up their divisions. It was observed 
that there was a more significant relationship between the bases of divisionalisation and
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the industrial classification and pattern of diversification, than with the size of the firm. 
Similarly there was no apparent association between size and the extent of internal 
transfers whereas the relationship existed with the type of industry and pattern of 
diversification.
Of the 173 divisionalised companies, 69 had negligible internal transfers. The 
transfer pricing policies of the remaining 104 are reproduced in Table 4.10. The figures 
include both single and multiple pricing schemes. Only 17% of the companies had multiple 
schemes, i.e., used more than one pricing method at the same time. It can also be seen 
that market price is the predominant basis, followed by full cost pricing; negotiated prices 
were reported by only a total of 11 companies.
This pattern of pricing is explained by many factors. The dominance of market price 
is related to the existence of external markets for internally transferred commodities in 
118 (68%) companies. More importantly it is due to the high degrees of discretion given 
to divisional managers over key operating policies such as determining output quantity, 
selling prices, setting advertising, marketing and purchasing policies.
The autonomy enjoyed by divisional managers may further explain the low 
proportion of respondents using negotiation to determine transfer prices. It seems that 
the more freedom given to managers (together with the existence of accessible external 
markets), the less the amount of internal conflict. In other words, the less the disputes, 
the less the need for negotiation and less time is wasted in internal bargaining. The question 
of conflict was however not raised by Chenhall. The omission of this sensitive issue might 
also have stimulated the high response rate of 87%.
The discretion granted to managers over some operating decisions is offset by a 
tight central management control over other important decisions such as forecasting 
economic conditions and short and long-term borrowing. Moreover, 73% of the 
participants indicated that they used budgets for co-ordination and close control of 
divisional plans and performance. This raises questions on the appropriateness of 
divisional profits for performance measurement given the "budget constrained style" of 
evaluation (Hopwood, 1974). Performance measurement was divided into managers'
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performance and performance of the division (or economic viability). Net profit was used 
to evaluate both in 166 and 133 companies respectively. This was followed by multiple 
profit indexes and return on investment. Controllable profit scored less than the above 
measures. This implies that managers were held responsible for variables over which they 
did not have control.
In conclusion, it is essential to note that Chenhall's study is the only one available 
on decentralisation in Australian companies. However, no attempt was made to find out 
why particular transfer pricing methods were used.
The focus of this study was on transfer pricing of electronic data processing (EDP) 
services or EDP charge-back systems. Three objectives were set for the study: 1) to 
determine which firms used charge-back systems to control their EDP costs and which 
did not, 2) to determine the factors within the organisation which lead to these alternatives, 
and 3) to find out the conditions which determine where each scheme is most effective.
To investigate the above issues, Drury and Bates collected data by means of 
questionnaires and interviews from Canadian organisations. A total of 101 responses were 
secured, of which 95 were usable. The results indicated that the majority of firms either 
charged back to end-users all costs or none at all. Some organisations only charged back 
part of the costs.
The most important factor in determining the use (or non-use) of charge-back 
systems was the issue of centralisation versus decentralisation of decision-making in the 
organisation whereby divisional autonomy, compatibility of goals and performance 
evaluation were a major concern. Hence the need for "integrative devices such as 
charge-back systems which assist in goal congruence throughout the organisation, permit 
the charging of costs to maintain autonomy, and finally as a common base for performance 
evaluation, lead to the merits of charge-back systems" (Drury and Bates, p. 105). This 
statement is in line with Section 5 of the guide-lines set forth by the former Institute of 
Cost and Management Accountants in the U.K. for charging for computer services (1982).
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The pricing practices reported are not compatible with a profit centre structure as 
62% of the respondents used cost plus direct overhead (i.e. full cost) charge-back method. 
Only 14% used full cost plus a profit margin. The rest used variable cost or market prices.
4.1.3.6 INDIA: GOVINDARAJAN AND RAMAMURTHY (1983)
This is the only empirical study found so far about transfer pricing practices in a 
developing country. A previous study of Indian practice was reported by Chakraborty 
(1977) without, however, giving details of survey methodology and results. It is interesting 
to note that the subject was treated in a series of articles in various Indian journals (Prasad, 
1970; Chandra, 1973; Zahir, 1973; Langrana, 1977; Sastry, 1978; Battacharyya et al, 
1979; Aggarwal, 1980; Govindarajan and Ramamurthy, 1981; and Joshi, 1984).
The collection of data for the present study was conducted in three phases. During 
phase one 71 companies were carefully selected as potential respondents to a mail 
questionnaire despatched in the second phase. Forty one usable answers were received 
and 24 of the respondents were chosen for field interviews in the last phase.
The results of the study are as follows:
the larger the companies the greater the number of profit centres,
product diversity is a more crucial determinant of the number of profit centres than 
the type of ownership,
the number of profit centres and the ownership type did not have a significant impact 
on transfer pricing,
product interdependence affected the significance of internal transfers, 
market price-based transfers are the most popular among companies,
only 17% of the companies gave unit managers freedom to sell externally whereas 
freedom to buy from outside sources was practised in 52% of the companies,
44% of the companies using a cost-based transfer price did so on actual costs.
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The present study was limited to investigating the pricing methods used. The authors 
testified that they were not successful in explaining "why a particular firm uses a 
particular transfer price19 (Govindarajan and Ramamurthy, p. 301). In other words, like 
many of the occidental studies, this investigation lacked the organisational and 
behavioural insights into the problem of internal transfers in Indian companies.
4.1.3.7 YUGOSLAVIA: SACKS (1983)
Sacks reported on Yugoslav transfer pricing practice as part of a study of 
divisionalisation under market socialism and worker self-management. The study covered 
37 large companies of which 24 were visited. Divisionalisation was found to result from 
the need to weaken central control so as to achieve self management through more worker 
participation. This is in sharp contrast to motives of divisionalisation in Western countries 
where the M-form structure was adopted to improve central control in the large diversified 
company.
Another major finding is that divisions in the Yugoslav company have very 
substantial autonomy, especially on trading in the external market. Internal buying and 
selling of goods and services are valued at approximated market prices, mostly negotiated 
between the divisions. The third finding is that workers' incomes "depend largely on 
their divisions performance". An income sharing arrangement exists in companies and 
income distribution is largely determined by the market-based transfer prices.
This study is important as it is the only one found on divisionalisation and transfer 
pricing in non-capitalist countries.
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4.2 MULTINATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING1
The need for an organisational and behavioural study of transfer pricing which was 
stressed through the exposition of previous domestic studies equally applies to surveys 
of transfer pricing across national frontiers. No one study was found to address these 
critical issues and yet the cultural differences between countries have great influence on 
managers' behaviour. All the studies below are American. Other surveys on 
multinationals are later included in the hybrid and comparative studies in Section 4.3. 
Table 4.11 reproduces companies' practices reported by eight studies.
4.2.1 BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (BIC, 1965)
This is the earliest published study of transfer pricing in international markets. 
Transfer pricing practices of 30 U.S. were studied. Pricing between domestic factories 
and export divisions were a major preoccupation in most MNCs. The companies were 
examined in the light of a set of environmental factors which include anti-dumping 
legislation, interests of local joint venture partners, tax and customs duties considerations. 
No single pricing system seemed capable of meeting all possible situations and this has 
led to the use of multiple systems by most firms.
There were four pricing orientations: 1) arm's length or established market prices, 
2) negotiated prices, 3) local manufacturing cost plus a standard mark-up, and 4) local 
manufacturing cost of the most efficient corporate unit plus a standard mark-up.
Many MNCs reported a distinct preference for single formula pricing because of 
the administrative complexity of multiple systems and the importance paid by the tax 
authorities to transfer prices. The most popular pricing method was production cost plus 
a fixed percentage mark-up as exports to subsidiaries were considered as "plus" 
transactions. Such a policy was meant to place all units on the same profit basis when 
they sold to related divisions. However, this does not provide any incentive to reduce 
cost and the final selling division is likely to be left with too slim a profit margin.
1 not included in this review is the latest study by Al-Eryani et al. (1990) published in the Journal of 
International Business Studies, V. 21, N. 3, pp. 409-425.
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4.2.2 SHULMAN (1969)
Only eight large U.S. companies were involved in this interview-based study which 
investigated the relationships between a number of environmental variables and transfer 
pricing. The variables with a potential influence included: taxes, import duties, currency 
fluctuation, economic restrictions, unstable governments, competitive advantages, 
foreign partners, and public relations. Not all of these variables were taken into account 
in the transfer pricing decisions of the participating companies.
Cost-oriented transfer prices were found predominant and only few companies used 
negotiated prices or incremental cost plus a mark-up. Shulman observed that transfer 
pricing was a serious problem that affected the financial control system. Hence, a 
successful transfer pricing system should serve the control system to measure, evaluate 
and motivate divisional management. Highly directive transfer prices were found to cause 
disproportionate shares of income. Therefore the resulting poor performance is not due 
to management failure. To counter this problem two companies maintained two sets of 
books: one for external reporting and another for internal measurement and evaluation.
4.2.3 GREENE and DUERR (1970)
This is the second study sponsored by the National Industrial Conference Board. 
The first study (1967) reviewed earlier dealt only with domestic aspects of transfer pricing. 
The study is based on the views of senior executives of 130 US MNCs about their policies 
regarding transactions with foreign affiliates.
Corporate policies on international transfer pricing were found to be influenced by 
constant pressures from internal and external factors. These were mainly tax and customs 
considerations and the desires of domestic divisional executives and of local managers 
of foreign subsidiaries. The results also showed that, depending on the availability of an 
intermediate product market, transfers were valued either on a cost-plus basis or by 
negotiation. When the goods could be purchased externally, the transfer price was subject 
to negotiation between the involved parties. Negotiated transfer prices were claimed to 
be based on some concept of a competitive price resting between minimum supplying
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and maximum purchasing price. In the absence of an external market, the rule was to 
price at cost plus a profit mark-up. Furthermore, to ensure that responsible management 
was maintained, the transfer pricing system had to be related to budget or profit attainment 
in each subsidiary.
4.2.4 BURSK et al. (1971)
This research was sponsored by the F.E.R.F. the same body that sponsored a few 
years earlier Solomons's study (1965). While the latter study was conducted by one 
person, the former was shared by four leading academics on management control. The 
complexities of the multinational world require rigorous and more careful attention than 
the domestic scene.
The report looked at the financial control of multinational companies from the point 
of view of the chief financial officers. Data were collected by means of questionnaires 
and interviews. The findings from the responses of 34 MNCs and 53 subsidiaries are as 
follows:
almost all respondents had inter-subsidiary transactions,
over 50% of transfers were priced at cost plus profit,
32% of transfers were valued at market or estimated market price.
8% of transfers were valued at variable cost,
in 50% of the cases, the transfer price is fixed by the parent company,
in 44% of the cases prices are set by arm's bargaining.
The use of market-based and cost plus profit imply that the most important objectives 
were profit optimisation and subsidiary profit performance evaluation. Thirty two of the 
34 companies (94%) placed primary emphasis upon the profit performances of their 
foreign subsidiaries. Actual profits versus budgeted profits was the principal measure of 
performance. In fact, the importance of subsidiary profit is evidenced by the
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reward-sanction system. In nearly 40% of the cases bonuses for the executives were based 
directly on profit performance and were influenced by the same factor in another 35% of 
the firms. They were unaffected by profit performance in only 8% of cases.
The authors noted many problems with cost plus and market based transfer prices 
for international operations, particularly marketing decisions. They acknowledged that 
there was no perfect solution to the transfer price problem but suggested the two-part 
tariff formula as a better alternative. This latter would consist of an amount per unit equal 
to the standard variable cost and a total monthly amount equal to the fixed cost plus a 
return on investment. This proposal was earlier suggested by Solomons (1965), Livesey 
(1967), Benke and Edwards (1980), and modified by Emmanuel (1977).
4.2.5 ARPAN (1972)
Arpan examined the multinational dimensions of transfer pricing in 60 wholly 
owned U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms from in ten countries. The purpose of the survey 
was to identify non-American transfer pricing systems and compare them with American 
ones. The results showed that all non-American parent companies had a policy of 
centralised prices and these prices were mostly market-oriented. The popularity of 
market-based prices was due to the business environment in the U.S.A. which was 
characterised by a high degree of competition, tight legal restrictions, decentralisation 
and the large size of subsidiaries. In fact, all of the foreign subsidiaries had a high degree 
of autonomy except for transfer price setting.
The setting of transfer prices was the absolute prerogative of parent company 
executives regardless of firm nationality. Arpan noted that English and German owned 
subsidiaries were not as independent as the French, Dutch, Canadian and Belgian ones, 
and that the most independent of all were the Italian and Scandinavian owned subsidiaries. 
These varying degrees of autonomy were explained in terms of differences of culture as 
some companies were more conservative and control-oriented (e.g. English and German) 
than others. Italian managers were described as free-wheeling.
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The wide use of market-oriented prices implied that non- US transfer pricing systems 
were less complex as they did not require sophisticated cost data. There were, however, 
national differences in the variables considered for the formulation of transfer price 
guidelines. Hence "the French prefer non-market oriented systems because they can 
thus minimise world tax payments. The English also prefer a cost-orientation but their 
goal was to achieve their target return on investment rates. The Italians used 
market-oriented systems to minimise their tax liability. Canadians also employ 
market-oriented and a desire to maintain good relations with other governments. The 
Scandinavian firms view good relations with other governments as paramount, and 
consequently, they are the biggest supporters and users of market-oriented prices. The 
Germans are the least concerned about transfer pricing, do not seem to prefer any given 
orientation and do not exhibit any dominant pattern" (Arpan, 1972, p. 105). Stated 
otherwise, the above findings imply that a universally optimal system of intracorporate 
pricing does not exist.
4.2.6 KIM and MILLER (1979)
Kirn and Miller noted that previous research on international transfer pricing defined 
the problem in terms of short-term objectives (namely taxes) and was restricted to the 
problems of the more advanced countries. To overcome these limitations, they conducted 
a survey that focused on long term financial decision-making policy of American MNCs 
with at least one subsidiary in two of eight specified developing countries (Korea, 
Malaysia, Phillipines, Taiwan, Brazil, Colombia. Mexico and Peru). Responses to a mail 
questionnaire were received from 52 MNCs of which 34 were usable. Further information 
was collected through interviews with several partners of five accounting firms and 
controllers of three big US parent companies.
Companies were asked to rank on a scale of one to four the importance of nine 
factors with regard to their impact on the transfer pricing decision. Contrary to Greene 
and Duerr (1970), it was found that income tax liabilities were not the most significant 
factor that affected cross-border transfer pricing as they ranked fifth and sixth among the
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nine factors. Instead, the results indicated that the most important factors were profit 
repatriation restrictions, exchange controls and joint venture constraints within the host 
country.
These findings imply that international transfer pricing policies are more likely 
shaped by long-term considerations relating to the firm's profitability objectives rather 
than short-term factors such as taxes and tariffs. It is therefore a matter of long-term 
corporate planning.
4.2.7 BURNS (1980)
Burns investigated the effects of 14 variables on transfer pricing decisions of 
American multinationals. Questionnaires were sent to 210 companies and usable answers 
were received from 62 respondents. The list of variables considered is similar to those 
used by previous surveys (such as Kim and Miller, 1979).
Respondents believed that intra-company prices for exports were influenced by 10 
of the variables. The most influential variable was "market conditions in the foreign 
country", followed by "competition in the foreign country" and "reasonable profit for 
foreign affiliate". The least important factors were "floating exchange rates", 
"management of cash flows" and "other US federal taxes".
Similar to the findings of Kim and Miller (1979), "income tax liabilities" were not 
the major factor that affected transfer pricing decisions. The US Treasury regulations on 
transfer pricing contained in Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) stipulate 
that intracompany transfer prices must be fixed at arm's length determined by one of four 
methods to be used in the following order: 1) comparable uncontrolled price (CUP), 2) 
resale price (RSP), 3) cost plus (CP) and 4) reasonable profit split test (PS), (Casey, 1985). 
Companies' views on these regulations were not uniform as only 43% of the respondents 
believed that CUP was reasonable for their transfers; 30% believed that RSP was 
reasonable, and 64% preferred CP. Only 5% showed no preference for any of these prices 
for most of their intracompany export sales.
132
In general, as is evidenced by previous studies, there are a number of intervening 
variables that affect the international pricing decision. These variables have varying 
degrees of importance. It seems that market conditions, profitability and subsidiary 
performance evaluation are given priority by most MNCs.
4.2.8 BAVISHI and WYMAN (1980)
This study is broader in scope but similar in some respects to that reported by 
Mednick (1979). Both were concerned with the implications of FASB 14 on financial 
reporting and had a common database: the annual reports of large US companies. Bavishi 
and Wyman reviewed 296 such reports and found that 66% of the firms had intra-firm 
transfers. These transfers were mostly priced at market (35%) or cost plus (15%).
The break-down of information by industry showed a heavy reliance on market 
price by the oil industry (68% of 19 firms) whereas most of the offices products companies 
(55% of 11 firms) relied on cost plus. Some negotiated prices were also used by these 
two industries. The food, chemicals and pharmaceutical industries used both market and 
cost plus pricing in a balanced way.
The results indicated that companies were trying to comply with the transfer pricing 
provisions of FASB 14. The question, however, is whether a database provided by 
company reports is reliable enough for generalising the conclusions, especially when 
outside the context of organisational control.
4.2.9 YUNKER (1982)
The purpose of this study was to find out the relationship within and among three 
aspects of corporate policy of US MNCs: subsidiary autonomy, transfer pricing and 
performance evaluation. A total of 358 MNCs were approached by questionnaires of 
which 52 were completed and returned. The important findings of the study are:
profit centre structure was predominant for both domestic and foreign subsidiaries,
long-run profit was the leading current business orientation (71%), followed by new 
product development (63%), growth in sales (40%) and increase in market share 
(35%),
the most important determinants of international transfer pricing included 
government regulations, raw material and labour costs, overall demand for 
commodities produced, and level of competition.
market price was the most important single pricing method, followed by standard 
unit full cost plus fixed mark-up,
there was little use of marginal cost, opportunity cost and mathematical 
programming optimal price.
divisional autonomy was associated with high utilisation utilisation of market 
oriented transfer pricing,
there was positive correlation between profit oriented performance evaluation 
criteria and market-oriented prices. It was observed that both transfer pricing and 
performance evaluation policies were influenced by a set of exogenous factors, 
mainly world sales, foreign sales ratio and environmental variability.
The comparison of Yunker's study to previous ones on American multinational 
transfer pricing shows that there is a variety of practices and policies and that there is no 
uniform transfer pricing system to cater for the needs of all companies. These needs vary 
according to the location of subsidiaries and the environmental conditions in the host 
countries.
4.2.10 CZECHOWICZ et al. (1982)
Czechowicz et al. reported on performance evaluation of foreign units of US and 
non-US multinational companies. The data base for the study consists of 88 completed 
mail questionnaires, personal and telephone interviews with financial executives in 30 
firms, and three round-table discussions involving 50 US-based MNCs. The responding 
companies operated in 12 different industries.
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Similar to previous studies on MNCs, a set of factors that affect cross-border 
performance evaluation were examined. These include organisational characteristics, 
financial and non-financial criteria, foreign exchange considerations, inflation, 
inter-company allocations and transfer pricing.
The findings on transfer pricing practice indicated that US companies most 
frequently used cost plus mark-up, followed by market or a variant of market price. This 
is similar to the results of most of the studies on US MNCs reviewed in the present 
comparative analysis. To the contrary, non-US MNCs employed market price (or a 
variant) and less frequently cost-oriented price. This difference of policy is explained by 
the fact that 88% of non-US MNCs allowed their foreign operations a substantial degree 
of local autonomy, compared with 72% of American MNCs. Moreover, in the majority 
of non-US firms (63%) prices are negotiated by unit managers whereas in the US MNCs 
prices are split between central determination (41%) and negotiation (38%).
Other results indicated that the vast majority of respondents (83% US and 88% 
non-US) used the same pricing basis for both internal reporting (performance evaluation) 
and external reporting (tax authorities). Beside that, 78% of US and 92% non-US 
companies reported the same pricing method for foreign as well as comparable domestic 
operations. The results also showed that most companies claimed fairness for their transfer 
pricing system as they felt it was representative of arm's length price. However, if this 
assertion might be accepted for the non-US MNCs because of their decentralised 
decision-making and the market- price preference, it is difficult to accept that in 83% of 
the US firms the transfer price does not distort the evaluation of overseas operations. 
Transfer prices are based on cost and centrally fixed and US subsidiaries do not enjoy 
the freedom of action their non-US counterparts have. Furthermore, most companies 
evaluated the unit and the manager on the same financial basis. This should be so only 
when the unit is treated totally at arm's length, i.e., when the manager has control over 
the criteria on which he is judged. Therefore to assert that in most cases the transfer price 
represents an arm's length price and is performance evaluation compatible implies that 
possible bias cannot be ruled out from the information disclosed by the US respondents.
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4.2.11 HOSHOWER and MANDEL (1986)
The aim of this study was to test whether highly diversified multinational firms 
followed Eccles' (1983 and 1985) transfer pricing suggestions. Data were obtained 
through a questionnaire mailed to the corporate treasurers of the 37 largest diversified 
MNCs listed in Forbes (1983). Information was requested about:
- the amount of inter-divisional transfers,
- the locus of the decision-making,
- the general basis for setting transfer prices.
Only 25 companies responded and their answers indicated that the diversified MNCs 
have a relatively lower level of transfer activity than the general population of large firms. 
Only 8 companies reported transfers between 1 and 10% whereas the majority (17) had 
less than 1% transfer activity. Transfer prices were market-based in 15 companies and 
cost-based in the remaining ten. The transfer pricing decision was made at the divisional 
level in 20 companies.
The results show consistency with decentralised profit responsibility and Eccles' 
normative framework. However, the study is very limited in scope. The problem is more 
complex than the three items listed above, particularly in vertically integrated companies.
4.2.12 ABDULLAH (1987)
This survey was concerned with international cash management and fund 
positioning strategies of multinational companies. Usable answers to questionnaires were 
received from 83 US companies, a response rate of 41.5%. The following issues are 
among the areas covered by the study:
- the degree of centralisation of international cash management,
- the techniques used in the cash management system,
- the extent of the use of the transfer pricing mechanism,
- the factors considered in making the transfer pricing decision.
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The majority of the respondents (72%) indicated that they had centralised cash 
management structures. Hence, most of the MNCs (around 70%) reported no or very 
seldom use of the transfer pricing mechanism to facilitate the transfer of funds among 
affiliates and from affiliates to parent. Only 8% of the respondents used it frequently.
The primary motive for transfer pricing was tax considerations (21 companies), 
followed by cash flow and fund positioning considerations. The priority given to tax 
considerations is supported by the findings of Greene and Duerr (1970), and discredited 
by Kirn and Miller (1979), Tang (1979) and Burns (1980).
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4.3 HYBRID AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES
The studies included in this section either examine both the domestic and 
multinational dimensions of transfer pricing or cover more than one country at the 
same time.
4.3.1 GRANICK (1975): USA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE
This study is another major development in the research on transfer pricing. 
Although it reported on data collected in the mid 1960s, it has highlighted the relationship 
and impact of national differences in Britain, France and the United States on transfer 
pricing policies. Intensive interviews were conducted in a total of 13 firms of which 6 
were British, 7 French and 2 American.
British practice showed that 5 companies set transfer prices at their best estimate 
of market prices. There was little interference from company headquarters in inter-unit 
bargaining but freedom of sourcing was found in one firm only.
French practice was much different as only 2 firms used market prices whereas 2 
of the remaining 5 had systems described as anomalous and which corresponded neither 
to open market nor to marginal cost pricing rules. The other three approximated marginal 
cost.
One of the American companies had market prices and the other used marginal cost.
The national differences in transfer pricing practice was explained in terms of 
managerial career patterns. The British pattern was described as "open promotion" and 
the French as "closed promotion" (Granick, 1972, p. 362). In Britain the criteria used 
for managerial selection and promotion seemed to depend upon job performance, not on 
class or education. Managers were found to have typically moved upward through a single 
job function within a single narrow product group. Promotion was based on the success 
in the present position. Thus, those who reached top divisional or corporate levels had 
little experience in handling decisions in the new positions. Consequently, they adopted 
a policy of withdrawal and little interference with lower managers as headquarters seemed 
to act as holding companies rather than as coordinating units. Market prices were found
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to suit such a situation. Moreover, the widespread use of open-market prices is explained 
by the fact that middle and upper management receive bonuses depending upon the 
profitability of their particular divisions rather than in accord with the results of the 
company as a whole.
In France the situation was quite the opposite as education was the principal criterion 
for managerial selection and promotion. Most of the chief executives graduated from one 
of the three leading educational institutions in France. Career advancement is relatively 
indepen-dent of their performance after entering the firm. Hence, the reliance upon 
marginal cost transfer pricing as large industrial firms had little need for evaluating the 
performance of lower level managers. This implies that the French system is not 
reward-based, i.e. no system of bonuses exists.
In the American case there was enough internal circulation of information between 
company headquarters and divisions, and top management played an active role in transfer 
price setting. American firms were also found having an "open promotion" system but 
with a speedy rotation of managers through very frequent transfers. Promotion is therefore 
determined on subjective rather objective grounds and so are financial rewards (Granick, 
1972, pp. 363 and 368).
The size of the samples and the outdated information reported raise the question of 
whether the results and conclusions are at all representative. It remains, however, that 
Granick's survey is the only one available on the French experience.
4.3.2 WU and SHARP (1978): U.S. DOMESTIC and MULTINATIONAL 
PRACTICES
The importance of this study lies in the issues raised on both the domestic and the 
international markets for over 200 large American companies. Wu and Sharp investigated 
whether:
the organisational mode affected a firm's transfer pricing policy, 
the organisational mode affected a firm's pricing decision,
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the domestic transfer pricing practice differed from the international transfer pricing 
practice,
the generally recognised pricing criteria affected the pricing decisions of business 
firms.
It is clear from the above that a distinction was made between the pricing policy 
and the pricing decision. The former meant the level of authority on the pricing of internal 
transfers while the latter implied the selection of the pricing policy to be adopted. Five 
major findings resulted from the data analysis:
1 - a firm's intra-company pricing policy is significantly affected by its organisation 
mode depending on whether the organisation was centralised, decentralised or 
somewhere in between (termed "neutralised"). It is interesting to note that even in 
decentralised organisations, transfer pricing is centralised in a large number of 
companies.
2 - a firm's pricing decision is not significantly influenced by its organisational mode 
regardless of whether the transfers were domestic or international and whether a 
market price was or was not available. However, when a market price was available, 
it was the predominant basis for valuing transfers. Otherwise full cost plus a profit 
margin was the predominant basis.
3 - the traditional objectives (autonomy, profit maximisation, performance evaluation 
and financial reporting) so often claimed for a transfer pricing system did not 
necessarily dictate the pricing decision.
4 - whether market prices were or were not available, negotiation prevailed in most 
companies. Further analysis indicated that negotiation was the most favoured way 
of settling disputes over transfer pricing.
5 - mathematical programming transfer prices and marginal cost pricing were largely 
unpopular.
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In summary this study has opened two issues for further research: first, the 
organisational aspects of transfer pricing and second, the adequacy and importance of 
negotiation in settling disputes and setting the right transfer prices.
4.3.3 MILBURN (1978): U.S. AND CANADIAN MULTINATIONAL 
PRACTICES
Milburn's survey was concerned with the measurement of transactions between 
controlled affiliates of multinational companies. Data were obtained by questionnaires 
and interviews from 13 American and 20 Canadian partners from major accounting firms. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the external user of national segment financial data.
Three sets of factors were proposed for the determination of international transfer 
prices:
the accounting measurement and disclosure rules prevailing in the nations of the 
parent company and trading affiliates,
certain third party forces and their pricing preferences, 
corporate management's international pricing preferences.
Three types of transfers were considered: a) regular goods; b) head office services; 
and c) special assets. Respondents were also asked to rank four transfer pricing methods: 
arm's length equivalent, full cost, full cost plus mark-up, and marginal cost. None of 
these four methods was preferred by almost all the American respondents whereas the 
Canadian participants showed preference for arm's length equivalent with respect to 
special asset transfers. The Canadians also ranked the pricing methods for regular goods 
transfers in this order: 1) arm's length equivalent, 2) full cost plus mark-up, 3) full cost, 
and 4) marginal cost. Once again empirical evidence revealed the unpopularity of marginal 
cost pricing.
On the other hand, most respondents agreed that financial statements should include 
information on transfer pricing practices of subsidiaries and affiliates.
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In general, one can say that international transfer pricing is far more complex than 
domestic pricing. This is reflected in the three sets of rules laid down by the author. If 
each set is considered on its own this will lead to the analysis of a multitude of issues that 
affect multinational transfer pricing like taxes and tariffs, anti-dumping regulations and 
profit repatriation. In other words, "0 multinational company must consider the 
interrelated economic conditions and laws of host countries in framing a transfer pricing 
policy" (Cowen et al. 1979, p. 18). Therefore the problem is more of an economic and 
management decision than a simple accounting exercise.
4.3.4 TANG (1979): U.S. AND JAPANESE PRACTICES
This is a comparative study of domestic and international transfer pricing practice 
in the United States (145 firms) and Japan (102 firms).
Tables 4.8 and 4.10 in Appendix show that on the domestic level American transfer 
prices were more cost oriented than Japanese ones. In both cases, however, it was found 
that the dominant pricing bases were full production cost, full cost plus, market price, 
adjusted market price and negotiated price. Market-based prices accounted for 52% and 
54% in the US and Japanese firms respectively.
On the international scene transfer prices were less cost oriented except for full 
production cost plus for which there was a significantly greater use. Further investigation 
revealed that the use of non-cost oriented transfer prices in Japan was related to the size 
of the firm. The larger the firm the less the use of cost-based prices. This relationship did 
not hold for the American counterparts.
The maximisation of consolidated profits was a key objective (beside performance 
evaluation) of the transfer pricing system in both countries. This variable received the 
highest ranking (among 20 variables) as a determinant of international transfer pricing.
The results of this study resemble those found by Kirn and Miller (1979) and are of 
interest for research on US-Japanese trade relationships. It would also be of great 
significance if the impact of culture was introduced in the explanation of differences 
between the practices of these developed countries.
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4.3.5 TANG (1981): BRITISH AND CANADIAN PRACTICES
This is the second comparative study by Tang. It complements the previous survey 
in 1979 of American and Japanese transfer pricing practices. Comparison of both surveys 
is made possible as the author collected the data using the same questionnaire. For 
multinational pricing companies were asked to judge the degree of importance of the 
same 20 variables listed in the 1979 survey. Usable responses were obtained from 80 
(28%) British and 192 (48%) Canadian companies representing more than 18 industries. 
More than half the responding companies had inter-divisional transfers of 10% or less of 
their total revenue and more than one fourth had transfers that amounted to more than 
20% of total revenues.
The domestic transfer pricing practices in both countries are presented in Tables 
4.9 and 4.10 where it is explicit that cost-based, market-based and negotiated prices are 
the dominant methods. Full cost plus and current market prices are widely used by both 
British and Canadian firms. Similar to the findings of the 1979 survey, the "overallprofit 
of the company" is the variable that received the highest rating by the respondents with 
regard to inter-divisional transfer pricing. In fact the results indicated that the 
maximisation of consolidated profits after tax was one of two most important objectives 
(beside performance evaluation) of the transfer pricing system. There were, however, 
noticeable differences between the two countries for some of the remaining 19 variables. 
"Rates of customs duties" was the second important variable in Canada whereas it was 
ranked at llth by British respondents. The "performance evaluation of foreign 
subsidiaries" was ranked seventh and third in Canada and Britain respectively. The 
"interests of local partners" was given twice as much importance by British companies 
than by Canadian ones.
By and large there were no big differences between the practices reported in the 
1979 and this study. The wide use of market-based prices in all four countries strengthens 
their recommendation in theory. The four countries studied (U.S.A., U.K., Japan and 
Canada) are all developed countries and are each other's trade partners (to varying
143
degrees) and their transfer pricing schemes have two common objectives: profit 
maximisation and performance evaluation. To understand the differences in some 
practices, a cross cultural explanation seems to be necessary.
4.3.6 MOSTAFA (1982): BRITISH DOMESTIC and MULTINATIONAL 
PRACTICE
This is the third survey of British transfer pricing practice conducted by a doctoral 
candidate. Unlike its predecessors (Channon, 1973 and Emmanuel, 1977), it covered both 
domestic and international markets. The objectives of the study were:
to investigate the current state of transfer pricing practice,
to identify the major determinants of transfer pricing policy, and their statistical 
significance,
to discover the underlying relationship between these determinants,
to evaluate quantitatively the relationship between the determinants and the 
pricing methods.
A questionnaire containing details on the above issues was sent to 250 companies 
from all over the U.K. Usable answers were received from only 46 respondents. The 
major findings are:
the majority of companies used one transfer pricing method,
most companies indicated that divisional managers were responsible for setting 
transfer prices,
Table 4.9 shows that domestic market-based prices were predominant, followed by 
cost-based and negotiated prices. There was difficulty of acquiring information 
about true market price,
there was very limited use of mathematical programming techniques, 
marginal cost pricing was not found in any company,
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current market price is the most popular for domestic transfers compared to 
manufacturing cost plus for international transfers,
the most important determinants for the domestic market are: divisional autonomy, 
performance evaluation, divisional and corporate profits, and the preparation of 
financial statements. Beside these determinants, international pricing was 
influenced by foreign tax and tariffs regulations.
Further statistical analysis revealed that UK companies considered decentralisation 
as the most important factor in domestic transfers, whereas government regulations were 
given priority for international transfers.
4.3.7 SCAPENS etal. (1982): U.S. and U.K. PRACTICES
Scapens et al. reported on the preliminary findings of a large scale study on financial 
control in divisionalised companies in both the U.K. and the U.S.A. Similar studies have 
already been mentioned in the U.S.A. by Solomons (1965), Mautz (1968) and Vancil 
(1978) and in the U.K. by Tomkins (1973). Divisional autonomy and divisional 
inter-relationships form a major section of the report.
Inter-divisional transfers of finished and semi-finished products counted as one of 
the most widely acknowledged interdependencies in 91.7% and 85.6% of the U.K. and 
U.S. respondents respectively. The use of group services is also an important factor, with 
response rates of 75.2% in the U.K. and 83.1% in the U.S.A. The ratio of inter-divisional 
transfers to sales is, however, generally small. Only 14.5% British and 17.7% American 
respondents have internal trade over 20% of external sales. The majority of 
inter-divisional transfers represent between 5% to 19% of sales.
No details of specific pricing policies were reported as the survey was primarily 
concerned with the degree of autonomy over transfer pricing policies. The results 
indicated that transfer prices were centrally fixed in 15% of the U.K. responding firms, 
compared to 29.8% U.S. firms. However, in the majority of companies transfer prices 
are negotiated between divisional managers. In most cases (68.6% in the U.K. and 50.9% 
in the U.S.A.) negotiation is guided by available market prices but the transfer price is
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not necessarily a negotiated market price. When a compromise cannot be reached, external 
sourcing might be permitted. If divisions are not allowed to trade externally or no external 
intermediate market exists, prices are determined by central arbitration.
It was also observed that the majority of companies gave divisional managers 
responsibility for day-to-day purchases, or for external purchases up to a certain amount. 
Therefore, there was limited freedom for trading externally items available internally, 
and more freedom for other daily operating activity. As the authors put it "divisional 
managers have autonomy within guidelines" or "controlled autonomy" (Scapens et al., 
1982, p. 42).
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The foregoing presentation of the 47 surveys has provided some insight into the 
various aspects of transfer pricing. Although some samples are too small for their 
conclusions to be generalised, it remains that the complexities of the problem are well 
reflected in the variety of practices reported by participating companies and the 
environmental variables influencing international transfer pricing.
There is no best pricing method for all situations whether on the domestic or 
international level. Taxes represent the touchstone in multinational transfer pricing. As 
different countries have varied taxation systems there have been instances of MNCs using 
transfer pricing to maximise profit in low-tax rate countries (or tax havens) at the expense 
of profit in high-tax countries. This has caused potential losses of tax revenues for some 
governments. These latter have, however, become more aware of the dangers of transfer 
price manipulation and have reacted by tight legislation on cross-border trade between 
affiliates. For example, in May 1979 the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs issued a 
report proposing the adoption of the arm's-length principle for establishing taxable profits. 
Similarly, Section 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code, Section 485 of the ICTA 
(corporation tax) and the 1975 Finance Act in the U.K. empowered tax authorities to 
scrutinize cross-border transfer pricing more closely. This has resulted in some instances 
in tax reevaluation and led to prosecutions. Many such cases are reported by Choi and
146
Mueller (1978), Mason (1979), Eiteman and Stonehill (1979), Reekie and Weber (1979), 
Stopford et al. (1980), Flory (1984), Moore and Strefeler (1984), Globerman (1986) and 
Sargent (1987). The case reported by Choi and Mueller (1978), Reekie and Weber (1979), 
Stopford et al. (1980) and Sargent (1987) involved the Swiss pharmaceutical firm 
Hoffman-LaRoche which was fined £ 1.85 billions in back taxes by the British 
government. Globerman (1986) mentions a similar case in Canada where the Amway 
company was made to pay the huge sum of £ 25 million for tax evasion through transfer 
pricing abuse. These few cases indicate that the OECD guidelines have been endorsed in 
many countries. In the U.K. they are found to be compatible with the jurisdiction of the 
Inland Revenue (Sargent, 1987).
A close examination of survey methodologies has revealed that only a few studies 
have adopted a comprehensive approach. Most of the studies were limited to exposing 
companies' practices but fell short of finding out why particular policies were used. It is 
only recently that the organisational aspects of transfer pricing have become the focus of 
analytical (Swieringa and Waterhouse, 1982, Grabski, 1985 and Spicer, 1988) and 
empirical (Chenhall, 1979 and Eccles, 1985) research. Stone (1959) drew the attention 
to this point when he stated that "the role of transfer pricing depends largely on the 
organisational structure. Management demands upon transfer pricing have increased 
over the past 20 years - [over 50 years now] - and it is likely that its role will assume 
increasing importance as a control device in the future" (pp. 631-32).
An organisational approach is, however, hampered - at least for the time being - by 
some obstacles including the secretive nature of transfer pricing, the sensitivity of detailed 
questionnaires and the wide gap between the academic and business circles. This makes 
relevant information not readily available because companies are "tight-lipped and do 
not readily divulge the criteria which underly their pricing policies, both on sales to 
outside customers and for intra-group purposes" (Plasschaert, 1983, p. 439). Therefore 
what the problem requires is an investigation from within the companies concerned, i.e. 
research stimulated by people who have access to vital and well protected information. 
Unless companies are encouraged to sponsor such initiatives, theory and practice will
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always grow in a parallel rather than a converging pattern. Consequently, the tremendous 
differences and controversies observed over the last three decades (1956-1987) will only 
persist and the problem will remain a puzzle.
The next chapter describes the questionnaire and interview based survey conducted 
on a sample of large decentralised companies in the U.K. as part of the present 
organisational and behavioural insight into the transfer pricing problem.
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CHAPTER 5: THE PRESENT STUDY
5.1 SCOPE AND SURVEY OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of the survey is to depart from the traditional descriptive 
approach of companies' practices as discussed in the previous chapter, to an organisational 
and behavioural approach of the transfer pricing problem.
More particularly, the questionnaire and interview survey conducted for this study 
focuses on the managerial aspects of transfer pricing in a decentralised, profit 
responsibility set-up in order to find explanations as to why companies adopt particular 
pricing policies. While the technical side of the problem is not ignored, most attention 
however is given to the internal and external factors that affect the internal transaction 
and the implications of the latter on the business organisation and the people it employs. 
These factors have been summarised in the framework suggested in Chapter 1, Section 
1.4.2.2. It should be stressed again that, insofar as empirical studies are concerned, there 
is a noticeable lack of emphasis on the reciprocal relationship between transfer pricing 
systems and human behaviour. As the results of any enterprise reflect the efforts of the 
person(s) managing it, it becomes obvious that the neglect of the human factor in the 
study of business phenomena means the neglect of the driving force behind the success 
or failure of the organisation.
The study purposely targeted large decentralised companies organised on a 
divisional basis. The predominance of the large company in the U.K. economic, social 
and political scenes makes the study of transfer pricing more complicated and hence more 
interesting. With high levels of market concentration (few large competitors), product 
diversification, vertical integration and technological interdependence, more market 
transactions are "internalised." For instance, eight of the companies participating in this 
survey reported high volumes of internal transfers. Of particular importance are an 
aluminium company and a tobacco company which reported the respective figures of 
80% and 90% internal trade, i.e sales to third parties represent only a small fraction of
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the total volume of transactions. This means that the 80% and 90% internalised 
transactions are not governed by the market but are subjected to the transfer pricing 
systems of these two companies which operate in different industries and have different 
organisational structures and cultures as it will be seen from their individual case studies 
in Chapter 8. In these and similar cases, it would obviously be wrong to just enquire 
about what transfer prices are used and ignore the interwoven relationships and 
implications that surround the internal pricing policy. Accounting data are therefore not 
sufficient for a full analysis of the problem. There is need for explanations from other 
disciplines like the economics of the firm, organisational behaviour, contingency theory 
and agency theory. The present survey has been designed with these requirements in mind 
in order to find out why companies adopt particular transfer pricing policies.
As the data to be generated are for testing the validity of the five hypotheses 
formulated in the introductory chapter, the following objectives have been assigned to 
the present survey:
1 - to investigate the degree of decentralisation in British companies by 
examining:
the organisational structure and business strategy,
the degree of divisional autonomy over various aspects of 
decision-making especially those affecting divisional performance.
2 - to examine current British transfer pricing practices by looking at: 
the different pricing policies of companies, 
the locus of the transfer pricing decision, 
the determinants affecting the particular transfer pricing policies,
the relationships between transfer pricing and companies characteristics 
such as size, industry and base of divisionalisation,
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the problems related to the transfer pricing practices or the degree of 
satisfaction with these practices.
3 - to explore the relationships between the organisational structure, the transfer 
pricing policy and the human factor by finding out:
the companies performance measurement and evaluation policies of both 
divisions and their managers,
the nature of the information used in the performance evaluation process,
the principal-agent relationship through looking at the managerial 
incentives and compensation schemes in British management,
the causes and resolution procedures of internal conflict over transfer 
pricing.
4 - to be able to infer from the data satisfactory explanations as to why companies 
adopt particular policies and highlight the areas where corrective action may 
need to be taken.
5.2 SURVEY DESIGN
5.2.1 THE COMPANIES STUDIED
The subjects of this study were large decentralised public companies from 20 
industrial sectors. They were randomly drawn from the Times 1000 and the KBE (Key 
British Enterprise) in terms of their turnovers and number of employees. Except for a few 
companies in the service sectors, most respondents are manufacturing companies.
5.2.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
In order to obtain a sufficient usable amount of data, the following methodology 
was adopted:
1) designing, testing and administering a suitable mail questionnaire to a sizable 
number of companies,
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2) field and telephone interviews,
3) review of published annual reports and accounts of participating companies,
4) get access to other useful (internal) documents from companies,
5) review books, periodicals and newspapers for possible case studies to be 
developed on selected companies.
5.2.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE
After reviewing the literature (and especially the previous empirical studies in 
Chapter 4), defining the objectives and formulating the six-factor framework and the 
hypotheses, it was necessary to draw up a mail questionnaire that would satisfy the 
following requirements:
1) to be comprehensive enough to provide sufficient and relevant information,
2) to be as simple and clear as possible in order not to confuse the respondent
3) not to be lengthy and cumbersome as this would discourage participation.
Several drafts were necessary before an acceptable version entitled "Questionnaire 
on domestic transfer pricing in decentralised U.K. companies" was tested in two pilot 
surveys. The questionnaire which is reproduced in Appendix G1 is comprised of seven 
sections. Each section consists of a series of open-ended and/or closed questions, 
check-lists and rating scales depending on the type of information required. As the 
emphasis is on the organisational and behavioural contexts of transfer pricing in 
decentralised companies, only a few numerical questions were asked. Most items queried 
lend themselves to multiple choice judgement on their relative importance in corporate 
strategy or company operations. Hence the extensive use of open-ended questions, 
check-lists and rating scales. Moreover, given the sensitive nature of the subject, the
1 at the end of the thesis on page 343
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questions were arranged in a sequence that should stimulate the respondent's interest and 
confidence in the study and consequently make likely the obtaining of the relevant data 
needed.
The first section of the questionnaire requested general information on the company 
in order to facilitate classification of participants. Information was also sought on the 
company's organisational and business strategies.
Section B on "decision making responsibility" aimed at providing an insight into 
the extent of decentralisation and divisional autonomy in British companies.
Section C contained eight questions on transfer pricing. The first question focused 
on the locus of the transfer pricing decision. Questions two, three and four asked for 
details about the dominant pricing basis, the particular pricing methods and how 
frequently they were used. Question five and six aimed at finding whether companies 
had different internal pricing policies for like transfers and the reasons for such policies. 
The pricing policies are then assessed in terms of dominance criteria and objectives in 
two rating scales in the last two questions.
In Section D six questions are asked on performance measurement, evaluation and 
reward. A distinction is made between division's and manager's performance in order to 
find out whether non-controllable factors are taken into account when evaluating and 
compensating managers. The previous sections, and particularly Sections B and D, are 
complemented with Section E on causes and remedies of conflict.
Section F examined the causes, frequency and consequences of reviews and 
adjustments to the transfer pricing systems.
To increase the reliability of answers to the above sections, nine cross-checking 
open-ended questions were added in the final section called "general observations".
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5.2.4 QUESTIONNAIRE PACKAGE
The questionnaire package mailed to each company consisted of the following items 
which are reproduced in Appendix G:
1 - a cover letter explaining the objectives of the study,
2 - a letter of introduction with project title, addresses and qualifications of both 
the researcher and his supervisors.
3 - explanatory notes for completing the survey forms,
4 - the 8-page questionnaire,
5 - a prepaid return envelope.
This package was personally addressed to the finance directors whose names were 
obtained from the KBE and the companies' published reports. If the name was not listed, 
the package was simply addressed to the Finance Director. The questionnaire survey was 
divided into two pilot and one full scale studies backed by follow-up letters and telephone 
enquiries.
5.3 THE PILOT STUDIES 
5.3.1 SAMPLES AND RESPONSE
Two pilot studies were conducted during the Summer and Autumn 1987. The first 
pilot study consisted of 15 of the largest companies from the top 100 list of the Times 
1000 (1987) to which the original questionnaire was mailed. Only four companies 
completed the forms and one company offered a 30-minute interview instead but declined 
to provide any useful information. After a preliminary analysis of the answers a similar 
pilot survey was conducted with smaller size companies from the bottom of the Times 
1000 list. Fifteen firms were sent the questionnaire but only one responded positively 
after a follow-up contact. By the end of October 1987 a total of 5 positive replies was 
received from both samples.
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5.3.2 PRELIMINARY RESULTS
1) transfer pricing is a very sensitive issue and surveys need to be carefully designed 
to guarantee a good response rate,
2) the pilot surveys produced a 17 % response rate,
3) all sections of the questionnaire were completed, except for question QE1 on causes 
of conflict, as the words OVERT and LATENT were found ambiguous by three of 
the respondents. Telephone conversations with the rest of the participants confirmed 
this ambiguity which had to be corrected for the full scale survey.
4) all five companies had relatively small amounts of internal trade (from 2.5 % to 
6%),
5) the volume of internal transactions did not depend on the size of the company as 
the first four respondents were among the largest companies but with little internal 
trade,
6) the not-very-large company (second pilot study) was more cautious about disclosing 
information on its transfer policies than the very large one (first pilot study),
7) the response rate and the completion rate indicated that a full scale study was feasible 
after slight modifications to the questionnaire.
5.4 QUESTIONNAIRE REFINEMENT
Prior to starting the full scale survey the following amendments were made to the 
questionnaire package on the basis of written and verbal comments made by some of the 
respondents from the pilot studies:
1) the words OVERT and LATENT in question QE1 on conflict were changed 
to FREQUENT and INFREQUENT. The wording of the rest of the 
questionnaire as well as its original format remained the same, thus preserving 
consistency of answers,
2) the cover letter was redrafted to improve participation (Appendix I),
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3) the colour of the paper was also changed from white to golden. 
5.5 THE FULL SCALE STUDY
5.5.1 THE SAMPLE
The improved package was then despatched in February 1988 to 120 companies 
chosen at random from the Times 1000 and the KBE. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
issues raised and the length of the questionnaire, no specific deadline was set for returning 
the questionnaire, as a time constraint would only prompt quick excuses for non- 
participation as well as non-elaborate answers, if any. Nonetheless the closing date for 
questionnaire collection was informally fixed to the end of June 1988.
5.5.2 THE RESPONSE
By the end of March 1988, eight companies had completed the questionnaire, 25 
refused to participate and 87 abstained from replying. A follow-up letter (Appendix G) 
was then sent in the first week of April to these latter. This produced a further five usable 
and four negative replies. Given the slow response, it was then decided to contact the 
remaining 78 companies by telephone. Eleven of them were not accessible by phone and 
20 others were not willing to participate. The remaining 47 asked for another copy of the 
questionnaire (noting that 11 of them gave new addresses different from those listed by 
the Times 1000 or the KBE). By the end of June, another 15 completed questionnaires 
were received, 12 companies gave excuses for not being able to help and 20 abstained 
from replying. Thus the full scale survey yielded 28 completed forms. The five 
questionnaires from the pilot surveys were then reviewed and updated through telephone 
conversations with the respondents. This leaves a total number of responses of 33 (22%) 
a fairly acceptable result compared to previous questionnaire-based studies discussed in 
Chapter 4, (Table 4.4).
5.6 FIELD AND TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS
A total of six companies were visited at different stages of the questionnaire survey. 
The first interview was the initiative - during pilot phase one - of a multinational tobacco 
company as an alternative to completing the 8-page questionnaire. However, no useful
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information could be obtained as the interviewee preferred to focus in the 30 minutes 
allocated on cross-border transfer pricing problems, issues not covered by the present 
study. It was concluded from this first encounter that future interviews would have to be 
anticipated and solicited only from those companies that satisfied the following criteria:
1) the company had fully completed and returned the questionnaire,
2) the company had a substantial amount of internal trade (no company from 
either pilot study had more than 6%),
3) at least one hour would be allocated for the interview. Eight companies - all 
respondents to the main survey - reported volumes of transfers between 33% 
and 90% of total company sales. Each of these companies was first contacted 
by telephone and access was obtained to five of them (Table 5.1).
TABLE 5.1: PERSONAL VISITS TO COMPANIES
COMPANY
A
B
C
D
E
INDUSTRY
ALUMINIUM
PHARMACEUTICALS
TOBACCO
ELECTRONICS
ELECTRONICS
DATE
04-10-88
03-11-88
08-01-89
27-02-89
09-08-89
TIME
3HRS
2 MRS
2HRS
1HR
1 HR
PERSON INTERVIEWED
FINANCIAL ANALYST, 
GROUP ACCOUNTANT AND 
PLANNING MANAGER
GROUP BUDGET MANAGER
FINANCIAL DIRECTOR
GROUP FINANCIAL 
CONTROLLER
STRATEGIC PLANNING 
MANAGER *
(*) not the person that completed the questionnaire.
Except for one company located outside London, the interviews were conducted in 
the companies headquarters office in the London area with the person who had completed 
the questionnaire and/or some other person in the control and planning functions (Table 
5.1 above). An interview agenda based on the completed questionnaire was prepared for 
each case, although the actual meetings were open ended. Copies of the companies' annual 
report and accounts and organisational chart were provided in each case. Further written
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information was obtained on request from the pharmaceuticals company, the tobacco 
company, the aluminium company and one of the electronics companies. A number of 
small telephone interviews were also conducted with some of the respondents to clarify 
some of their answers or to obtain further information.
5.7 QUESTIONNAIRE CODING AND STATISTICAL METHODS USED 
FOR INFERENCE IN THE STUDY
5.7.1 QUESTIONNAIRE CODING
To facilitate the analysis of the answers, the questionnaire entries (or variables) have 
been abbreviated in acronym forms (Appendix H2). Moreover, every main question is 
assigned a code that refers to its sequence in the questionnaire. For example QA2 is 
question 2 (Basis of Divisionalisation) in section A (Organisational Characteristics). This 
numbering sequence is particularly used to designate tables that aggregate the 
questionnaire data. For example Table 5.5 (QA2) refers to the fifth table in Chapter 5 
that summarises responses to Question QA2.
5.7.2 STATISTICAL METHODS USED
Although the overall response rate of 22% is acceptable for a sensitive issue like 
transfer pricing, the limited number of participating firms is a restriction on the level of 
statistical analysis. Nonetheless, the following statistical techniques were used wherever 
appropriate to analyse the data and provide some ground for testing the research 
hypotheses:
1 - numerical coding of responses,
2 - use of mean response and standard deviation of response as descriptive 
statistics,
3 - Chi-square contingency tables,
4 - correlation analysis.
2 at the end of the thesis on page 356
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The Chi-square statistic (symbolized by X2) is applied to computations of 
frequencies classified according to two factors in order to discover whether the factors 
are related and how strong the association is. The X2 test of independence applied here 
departs from the null hypothesis that the two criteria of classification are statistically 
independent, i.e there is no association between them. The X2 distribution is linked to the 
measurement of deviations between observed and expected frequencies, the latter being 
the frequencies that would be expected if the null hypothesis was true. The X2 distribution 
expresses sample size in terms of degrees of freedom (df) which reflect the amount of 
usable information in sample and are related to the sample size. In the contingency table 
the df are determined by the number of rows and columns. For example in a 4x5 table, 
the df = (4-l)(5-l) = 12 df, that is once the twelve cells are freely specified in the table, 
the remaining eight cells are predetermined or conveniently calculated by difference since 
the row and column totals are known. The decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis 
of non-association if the computed value X2 is > to the probable or critical value in the
X table. The significance level is the probability of deciding for the alternative hypothesis 
when the null hypothesis is true, i.e. the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis, 
or what is called a Type I error.
Correlation is a measure of linear association (or the strength of the relationship) 
and not necessarily indicative of cause-effect relationships. As each check-list and rating 
scale in the questionnaire consists of more than two variables, multiple correlation is 
applied where appropriate and the results are reproduced in correlation matrices in Chapter 
5 and 6. Significance levels up to 5% are designated by () and those between 5% and 
10% are marked with (°). The statistical analysis was limited to the above because of the 
difficulty involved in applying statistical methods to cross-tabulated data. The statistical 
calculus was performed using the STATGRAPHICS software package (version 1987 by 
Statistical Graphics Corporation, U.S.A.), a powerful PC package that integrates a wide 
variety of statistical functions with high resolution colour graphics.
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5.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS.
5.8.1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE.
Altogether 150 companies from twenty industries were contacted, producing 108 
(72%) replies (73 non-participating and 35 questionnaires). Two of the 35 questionnaires 
were only partially completed and all attempts to obtain further information failed. This 
leaves a total of 75 (50%) non- participating companies and 33 (22%) usable responses. 
Forty two companies (28%) abstained from replying to either the mail or telephone 
correspondence. Table 5.2 below gives the industrial classification of the whole sample. 
The 75 companies that did not wish to participate in the survey gave four major reasons 
(Table 5.4):
a) it is company policy not to participate in non-statutory surveys (24%),
b) the time required cannot be spared (17%),
c) the issues raised by the questionnaire are commercially sensitive and cannot 
be disclosed (19%), and
d) the survey is not relevant to the activities of the company (40%), i.e. not 
concerned with transfer pricing.
However, after consulting the published annual reports of the 30 companies that 
claimed no transfer pricing, it was found that 18 (60%) had internal transactions but 
eliminate them from the group turnover figure. Only three of these companies indicated 
in their annual reports the amount of internal trade and their pricing policies. Thus it may 
be assumed that these 18 companies - as well as the 42 non- responding - did not want 
to participate in the survey due to its sensitivity.
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TABLE 5.2: INDUSTRIAL GROUPING OF ALL COMPANIES *
INDUSTRY
1) AEROSPACE
2) AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
3) BUILDING MATERIALS
4) CHEMICALS AND PHARMACEUTICALS
5) CONSTRUCTION AND CIVIL
ENGINEERING
6) DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES
7) ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND
ELECTRONICS
8) FOOD, DRINK AND TOBACCO
9) GLASS
10) INFORMATION SYSTEMS
11) INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING
12) MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
13) METAL GOODS
14) MINING AND METAL MANUFACTURE
15) MOTOR VEHICLES
16) OIL AND GAS
17) OTHER MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
18) PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
19) TEXTILES
20) TIMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS
TOTAL
%
TOTAL
4
6
7
19
5
2
17
19
2
4
11
7
3
7
5
5
8
8
8
3
150
100%
00f.
  *»
-0
ii
Iff
2
1
-
4
1
2
1
4
1
-
6
3
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
1
42
28%
RESPONDING FIRMS
NON-
USABLE
2**
3
5
9
1
-
12**
10
-
3
3
4
-
4
1
3
2
5
3
2
75
50%
USABLE
_
2
2
6
3
-
4
5
1
1
2
-
1
1
1
-
-
1
3
-
33***
22%
(*) Classification adopted from Huggett and Meyer (1981, pp. 4-5) in conformity with the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC, 1980). Companies are classified according to their
major industrial activity. 
(**) One of these companies returned the questionnaire incomplete and all attempts to obtain
further information from the company were not successful. 
(***) The responding companies represent 14 industries. The companies representing the remaining
six industrial sectors did not wish to participate in the survey.
It was also learnt from some companies that they refuse to participate in 
non-statutory surveys because they most often do not receive feed-back reports from the 
researcher. This may also be a motive for the 42 companies that abstained from replying. 
Finally, as the questionnaire was addressed to the Finance Directors, usually busy 
executives, the time factor may have been the major reason for no reply from these 42 
companies.
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TABLE 5.3: COMPANIES RESPONDING BUT 
NOT PARTICIPATING.
REASON FOR NOT 
PARTICIPATING
COMPANY POLICY
TIME
SENSITIVITY
RELEVANCE
TOTAL
NO.
18
13
14
30*
75
%
24%
17%
19%
40%
100%
(*) included are the two companies that 
returned the questionnaire incomplete.
5.8.2 POSITION OF PERSON FILLING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Although the questionnaires were addressed to the Financial Directors only 10 were 
completed by them, but altogether 29 (85%) of the 33 usable replies were from senior 
corporate finance and accounting staff (Table 5.4). The remaining four questionnaires 
were filled in by non-accounting and finance staff. This indicates that transfer pricing is 
a pervasive subject that concerns all functions of the divisionalised company and not just 
an accounting exercise.
162
TABLE 5.4: (QA1) CORPORATE POSITION OF PERSON
COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
POSITION
A) FINANCE:
1) FINANCE DIRECTOR
2) FINANCIAL CONTROLLER
3) FINANCIAL ANALYST
B) ACCOUNTING:
1) GROUP CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
2) GROUP MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANT
C) VARIOUS:
1) GROUP BUDGET MANAGER *
2) MANAGER, CORPORATE
DEVELOPMENT
3) GROUP ASSISTANT SECRETARY
4) TAXATION SPECIALIST
TOTAL
NO.
23
10
11
2
6
5
1
4
1
1
1
1
33
%
70%
18%
12%
100%
(*) chartered accountant by training.
5.8.3 LEGAL STATUS OF THE PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
Although all questionnaires were sent to companies' headquarters, five of them 
were returned from subsidiaries incorporated in the U.K. as private companies. Moreover, 
thirteen of the participants were listed in the Stock Exchange Year Book as holding 
companies and the remaining fifteen as public companies.
5.8.4 INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
The following table gives an industrial classification of the participating companies. 
A high proportion of companies represented industrial sectors 3, 5 and 6. The combined 
positive replies from these groups amount to 15, almost half the total number of 
participants. Seven of the eight companies with the highest volumes of transfers come 
from these three sectors (electrical/electronics, chemicals/pharmaceuticals, and food 
stuffs). The rest of the participants are evenly spread among 11 industrial sectors.
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TABLE 5.5: INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE 
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
INDUSTRY
1) AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
2) BUILDING MATERIALS
3) CHEMICALS AND PHARMACEUTICALS
4) CONSTRUCTION AND CIVIL
ENGINEERING
5) ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS
6) FOOD, DRINK AND TOBACCO
7) GLASS
8) INFORMATION SYSTEMS
9) INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING
10) METAL GOODS
11) MINING AND METAL MANUFACTURE
12) MOTOR VEHICLES
13) PAPER, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
14) TEXTILES
TOTAL
TOTAL
2
2
6
3
4
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
33
%
6%
6%
18%
9%
12%
15%
3%
3%
6%
3%
3%
3%
3%
9%
100%
(*) percentage may not add up to totals because of rounding.
5.8.5 PROFILE OF THE PARTICIPATING COMPANIES 
5.8.5.1 COMPANY SIZE
According to the criteria set by the 1985 Companies Act, none of the participants 
can be considered as small or medium company. Section 248 (2) of the Act limits the 
balance sheet total (or capital employed) of a medium company to £ 2.8 million, its 
turnover to £ 5.75 million and its average number of employees to 250. The smallest 
company in the sample has a market value of £ 45 million, a turnover of £ 96 million and 
almost 2000 employees as is depicted in the two tables below. This implies that, with 
respect to size in absolute terms, the companies studied form a homogenous group.
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TABLE 5.6: COMPANY SIZE: TURNOVER AND CAPITAL 
EMPLOYED (1988)
RANGE
(£ million)
Less than £ 100m
£ 100m- £ 250m
£ 250m- £ 500m
£ 500m- £ 1,000m
£ 1,000m- £ 2,000m
£ 2,000m- £ 4,000m
Over £ 4,000m
TOTAL
TURNOVER *
No.
1
6
3
8
8
5
2
33
%
3%
18%
15%
24%
24%
15%
6%
100%
CAPITAL **
EMPLOYED
No.
8
4
5
6
8
1
1
33
%
24%
12%
15%
18%
24%
3%
3%
100%
(*) from £ 96 million to £ 12 billion. (**) from £ 45 million
to £ 6 billion.
TABLE 5.7: COMPANY SIZE: NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES (1988*)
RANGE
Less than 2,000
2,000 to 5,000
5,000 to 10,000
10,000 to 20,000
20,000 to 40,000
40,000 to 80,000
Over 80,000
TOTAL
NO.
1
6
2
10
8
4
2
33
%
3%
18%
6%
30%
24%
12%
12%
100%
(*) includes overseas employment. 
5.8.5.2 TIMES 1000 RANKING
Fifteen of the 33 responding companies are ranked among the top 100 by the Times 
1000 (1988/89) both in terms of annual turnover and market capitalisation (Table 5.8). 
In aggregate more than 90% of the participating companies come from the top 500 of the 
Times 1000 whether in terms of turnover or capital employed as shown in the table below.
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TABLE 5.8: TIMES 1000 (1988/1989) RANKING
RANK RANGE
TOP 100
100- 200
200- 300
300- 400
400- 500
500- 600
600- 700
700 - 1000
TURNOVER
No.
15
7
2
5
1
2
0
1
%
46%
21%
9%
15%
3%
6%
0%
3%
CAPITAL
EMPLOYED
No.
15
6
2
5
3
1
1
0
%
46%
18%
6%
15%
9%
3%
3%
0%
5.8.6 DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY AND DIVISIONALISATION STRUCTURE OF 
THE PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
5.8.6.1 DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY
Using the information contained in company annual reports and EXTEL cards the 
following diversification pattern was adopted from Rumelt's (1974) categorization:
1) Low diversification:
a) Single business: companies committed to a single product line which 
represents at least 95% of total revenues.
b) Dominant business: companies that have diversified to some extent but 
obtain at least 70% but not more than 95% of their revenues from a single 
business. If the company is vertically integrated it is referred to as Vertical 
Dominant (VD).
2) Medium diversification: companies that diversified into businesses related 
to the original product line whereby no one product line accounts for more 
than 70% of total revenues. Related Constrained (RC) designates companies 
in which each business activity is related to almost all of the other business 
activities. Related Linked (RL) companies are those diversified into widely 
disparate businesses which are related only by some already possessed skill 
or strength.
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3) High diversification: companies that diversified by more than 30% of sales 
into businesses unrelated to the original product-market. These are mostly 
conglomerates.
Some of the companies in the present survey have already been classified by 
Channon (1973) and re-classified by Luffman and Reed (1984). Whenever there was 
doubt about how to classify a company, the firm was contacted by telephone to get a 
better judgement of its diversity and adjustments were made to the Luffman and Reed's 
pattern when necessary. Telephone conversations with Professors Channon, Pickering 
and Luffman were also very helpful in this respect. Overall, the result indicates that even 
among this relatively small number of companies, diversification - especially the 
dominant and related markets types - is predominant.
TABLE 5.9: DIVERSIFICATION PATTERN OF THE 
RESPONDING COMPANIES
DEGREE OF DIVERSIFICATION
LOW DIVERSIFICATION
S - single business 
D - dominant market
VD- vertical dominant *
MEDIUM DIVERSIFICATION
RC- related constrained
RL- related linked
HIGH DIVERSIFICATION
U - unrelated businesses
TOTAL
No.
14
5 
6
3
17
10
7
2
33
%
42%
52%
6%
100%
(*) only one of these is fully vertically integrated.
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Among the three vertical dominant (VD) companies only one (aluminium company 
with 80% transfers) is fully vertically integrated. The other two (a textile company and 
a building materials company with 10% and 8% transfers respectively) have partial 
integration in one of their businesses. This tends to imply that the trend towards 
diversification by large companies and the Government's programme for small business 
enterprise is resulting in gradual dissolution of vertical integration.
TABLE 5.10 DIVERSITY BY INDUSTRY GROUPING
INDUSTRY GROUP
CAPITAL GOODS:
BUILDING MATERIALS
GLASS
PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT
CHEMICAL- INDUSTRIAL
ENGINEERING- metal
ENGINEERING- heavy 
ENGINEERING- light
TOTAL
CONSUMER DURABLES
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURE
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS
CHEMICAL - consumer
TOTAL
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES
FOOD STUFFS
TEXTBLES
PAPER/PACKING/PUBLISHING
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
DEGREE OF DIVERSITY
LOW
1
1
2
2
1*
1
8
1
3
-
4
1
1
-
2
14
MEDIUM
1
-
1
1
_
1 
1
5
1
2
2
5
4
2
1
7
17
HIGH
_
-
-
1
-
1
2
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
2
TOTAL
2
1
3
4
1
1 
3
15
2
5
2
9
5
3
1
9
33
(*) fully integrated (VD) aluminium company.
168
The relationship between diversity and industrial sector is drawn in Table 5.10 where 
it is apparent that the consumer non-durables companies are more diversified than the 
consumer durables and capital goods companies. Low diversification is most common 
in the capital goods group.
5.8.6.2 DIVISIONALISATION STRUCTURE
Among the 33 respondents, 21 (64%) used single bases for setting their divisions, 
compared to 12 (36%) with multiple bases (Table 5.11). No distinction could be made 
between holding and non-holding companies with regard to divisionalisation. The 13 
holding companies (HC) in the sample have the same bases of divisionalisation as non- 
holding companies. The existence of the transfer price mechanism in the HC is contrary 
to what is believed in theory that in these companies the executive board does not attempt 
to devise an overall enterprise strategy and there is no formal inter-divisional 
co-ordination- (Channon, 1982 and Johnson, 1985). However, the M-form company may 
act as HC because of "a lack of detailed planning control by the headquarters 
organisation" (Johnson, 1985), i.e. when the centre is not fulfilling its role of resource 
allocation between the divisions. The holding company structure of these companies may 
be viewed as a transition to full divisional structure (Channon, 1973 and Hannah, 1976).
TABLE 5.11 (QA2): DIVISIONALISATION STRUCTURE
OF COMPANIES
BASES *
DIVB1
DIVB2
DFVB3
DIVB4
TOTALS
ALL
**
27
4
8
12
51
SINGLE
BASE
15
1
1
4
21
MULTIPLE
BASE
MB1=B1+B3
MB2=B1+B4
MB3=B1+B2+B3
MB4=B1+B2+B4
MB5=B1+B3+B4
MB6=B1+B2+B3+B4
3
4
1
1
2
1
12
(*) Bi=product/service; B2=production process
B3=region; B4=market 
(**) Number of times base is mentioned.
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Table 5.11 reveals that the dominant divisionalisation base is product/service 
(DIVB1) used as a sole base in 15 (45%) companies or as part of a blend of bases in 
another 12 (36%) companies. The predominance of DIVB1 confirms the findings of an 
earlier study by Hill and Picketing (1986).
The remaining bases, especially production process (DIVB2) and region (DIVB3) 
are mostly used in combination with other bases. The two exceptions are an aluminium 
and a construction company which divisionalised on the single basis of production process 
and region respectively. The combination of (DFVB3) with other bases indicates that 
geographical dispersal - especially beyond national frontiers - complicates the 
co-ordination problem. Hence the search for a global strategy through a matrix or 
multi-base structure which combines both product and regional co-ordination (Channon, 
1982). This results in functional and divisional decentralisation. This is the case of the 
three construction companies whose property development programmes are entrusted to 
area project managers.
It is also found that DIVB1 predominates in all companies regardless of their level 
of diversification. Table 5.12 shows that the two highly diversified companies prefer the 
single product/service base for their unrelated businesses. This base is also dominant in 
the low and diversified companies. Multiple bases are found only in companies with 
single (S), dominant (D) and related constrained (RC) businesses.
TABLE 5.12: DIVERSIFICATION PATTERN VS. 
DIVISIONALISATION BASE
DIVERSITY
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
TOTAL
DIVISION BASE
SINGLE
8*
11**
2 *##
21
MULTIPLE
6
6
-
12
TOTAL
14
17
2
33
(*) 5 with DIVB1; (**) 8 with DIVB1 
(***) both with DIVB1.
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The single-base companies represent altogether 12 of the 14 industrial sectors (Table 
5.13). Only two companies (glass and information systems) do not divisionalise on a 
single base. On the other hand the multiple-base companies represent 8 industries and 7 
of these companies have a two-base divisional strategy (MB1 + MB2). Table 5.13 shows 
that industrial sectors 2 and 9 to 13 are represented solely by single-base companies. 
Previous studies on strategy and structure summarised by Hill (1984) concluded that 
diversity entails organisational changes in that companies move from functional structures 
to decentralised ones, namely multi-division structures.
Divisions are usually further split into business units which in turn consist of a 
number of profit centres. Consequently, responsibility is pushed down from the centre 
to divisional, business unit or profit centre levels.
All the participating companies consider their operating divisions as profit centres. 
Only two companies mentioned investment centres and both these companies have 
multiple-base divisions. Since investment centres are profit centres with additional 
responsibility for investments, it may be assumed that the "profit centre" concept is 
conveniently used by companies to designate investment centres. Anthony (1988) 
contends that this is common practice. Moreover, The widespread use of return on capital 
employed as a measure of divisional performance provides sufficient evidence to support 
this belief. This provides further evidence to refute Goetz' (1967 and 1969) and Wells' 
(1968) treatment of profit centres as fictions and mystical inventions. Moreover all 33 
companies consider both short-run and long-run profit targets as high priority objectives.
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5.8.7 CORPORATE PRIORITY OF OBJECTIVES
Two major objectives were given top priority (a "Very High" tick) by the 
respondents (Table 5.14). These are long- run profit (CHPM2, 75%) and customer 
relationship (CHPM6, 61%). Second in importance (a "High" tick) were technological 
modernisation (CHPM7,61%), short-run profit (CHPM1,55%), increase in market share 
(CHPM4, 52%), new product development (CHPM5, 52%) and employment stability 
and welfare (CHPM8, 42%). This shows that, on the whole, the responding companies 
are essentially preoccupied with gaining competitive strength. The noticeable relationship 
in Table 5.15 between sales growth (CHPM3) and increase in market share (CHPM4) 
highlights this.
The absence of significant correlations between many of the objectives - and 
especially short-run profit - points to the possibility of conflict between them. Knowing 
that these are the "current high priority" objectives, it is probable that the lack of 
association between them results from a not very well defined pattern of priorities. 
Nonetheless, the observed pattern may be justified in the sense that, to remain profitable 
in the long term (CHPM2), the responding companies know well that a policy of 
continuous renewal (CHPM5, CHPM7) is critical. Therefore, the importance of 
profitability as a top priority objective lies in the ability of management to foresee future 
events and establish long-term objectives. Similarly, profitability is considered the 
fundamental priority because it conditions long-term objectives. New investments 
(CHPM5, CHPM7) depend on the financial flows that can be produced by satisfactory 
economic results.
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5.8.8 DECISION-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Divisional managers were reported to have substantial decision-making 
responsibility over most of the decision items listed in the questionnaire (Table 5.16). A 
combined "very high" and "high" scores show that on average 80% of the companies 
claimed a high level of decision-making delegation to division managers. In particular, 
divisional managers were reported to be highly involved in budget setting (DMRS4) by 
all companies, and have high discretion (97%) on advertising and marketing (DMRS10) 
and recruiting or dismissing personnel (DMRS12). Divisional managers also play an 
important role on setting divisional objectives (DMRS1, 76%), investment decisions 
(DMRS2,76%), make or buy decisions (DMRS5,82%), setting transfer prices (DMRS7, 
64%), external sourcing (DMRS9, 64%), bargaining (DMRS11, 67%) and paying staff. 
(DMRS13,73%). Only 16 companies (48%) indicated that divisional managers have high 
discretion on setting divisional performance evaluation measures (DMRS3). This appears 
to contradict DMRS 1 and the obvious explanation for the high score of DMRS 1 are the 
reported high levels of participation in budget setting (DMRS4). However, the correlation 
analysis suggests that there is no significant association between DMRS1 and DMRS4 
(Table 5.17). Therefore, it can be deduced that divisional managers have more discretion 
(or rather, influence) on decisions that are not directly related to their economic 
achievement. The more the decision directly affects the performance, the less discretion 
divisional managers have on the decision making process. Therefore the decision-making 
authority is more centralised when it relates directly to the performance measurement 
and reward system. As Table 5.16 reveals, the least divisional influence is on setting 
performance measures (DMRS3), transfer prices (DMRS7), joint-cost allocations 
(DMRS6) and altering transfer pricing policies (DMRS8).
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5.8.9 INTER-DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS AND PRICING POLICIES
The magnitude of internal transfers for the typical trade differed from one company 
to another from as low as 2.5% to as high as 90% of total volume sales.
In 20 companies (61%) transfer prices are determined between divisions and in 8 
cases (24%) consultation with top management is necessary. Companies reported a variety 
of pricing practices but it is noticed that market-based transfer prices are predominant. 
In most cases (70%), the dominant (market-oriented) transfer price was always used.
The dominance of a particular transfer pricing policy is mostly dictated by six 
criteria: pin-pointing divisional responsibility (CDTP5, 82%), performance evaluation 
(CDTP6, 82%), achievement of corporate goals (CDTP2, 79%), fairness and conflict 
resolution (CDTP4, 79%), maximisation of divisional autonomy (CDTP3, 67%), effects 
on economic decisions (CDTP8, 61%), better knowledge of market conditions (CDTP9, 
52%) and simplicity and ease of implementation (CDTP1,49%). The importance of these 
criteria is substantiated by the objectives assigned to the transfer pricing system in general. 
Companies reported high scores on performance evaluation (OBTP1, 76% and OBTP2, 
70%), profit maximisation (OBTP3, 67%), divisional autonomy (OBTP4, 64%), 
managerial motivation (OBTP5, 67%) and market-drive (OBTP7, 55%).
The frequency of transfer pricing review varies between companies but in 23 (70%) 
of them the review is done on a periodical basis: monthly (FTRP1,6%), quarterly (FTRP2, 
15%), semi-annually (FTRP3, 18%) and annually (FTRP4, 30%). The remaining 
companies have casual revisions. The reasons given for reviewing transfer prices spread 
from "very high" to "very low" for all the 14 factors listed in the questionnaire (QF2). 
There was no particular high influence by any factor on the decision to review/adjust 
transfer prices. This section will be detailed in the next chapter.
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5.8.10 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND REWARD
Twenty seven companies (82%) measure and evaluate both the division's and the 
manager's performance on the same bases. Only 6 companies (18%) take into account 
noncontrollable factors that affect the performance of the divisional manager. Among the 
12 measures listed in question QD3, five were reported predominant for the measurement 
of both divisions' results and managers' performance. These are absolute profits (PERM 1, 
70% and 67% respectively), adherence to budgets (PERMS, 70% and 67%), ratio of 
profits to total assets (PERM3, 61%), ratio of profits to sales (PERM4, 61% and 58%) 
and cash flow (PERM6, 55% and 45%). Managers' reactions to financial measures - as 
perceived by top management - vary from total satisfaction to different levels of manifest 
dissatisfaction.
Satisfactory performance is rewarded with bonuses (PRWD3) in 29 (88%) 
companies, by promotion (PRWD1) in 18 (55%) companies and by pay increase 
(PRWD2) in 16 companies (48%). Depending on the severity of unsatisfactory 
performance the divisional manager could be dismissed (PSCN1, 55%), transferred 
(PSCN2, 61%), advised/trained (PSCN3, 58%) or helped to overcome weaknesses and 
improve performance (PSCN4, 55%). More discussion of these points will follow in 
Chapter 7.
5.8.11 CONFLICT CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS
All companies reported low levels of conflict and, apart from the importance of the 
internal transaction to the division (measured in volumes of transfers), no other factor 
seemed to have any causal relationship with internal conflict on transfer prices. As to 
conflict resolution, companies appear to favour negotiation and compromise to settle 
differences. Only in 9 (27%) companies is conflict resolved by corporate management 
alone. Full analysis of the crucial issue of conflict is covered in the next chapter.
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5.8.12 GENERAL OBSERVATION
All the companies that replied favourably to the survey showed keen interest in 
getting a feed-back report on the results of this research project. Some of the companies 
were also much concerned with the multinational aspects of transfer pricing; hence the 
opportunity for future research.
The five companies visited during and after the main survey provided further 
information, sometimes of a very confidential nature and expressed their readiness to 
assist whenever requested to do so. The information gathered before, during and after the 
interviews in presented in the form of case studies in Chapter 8.
The organisational analysis of the transfer pricing processes of the participating 
companies is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSFER PRICING IN THE BRITISH
CONTEXT
This chapter describes and discusses British transfer pricing practice as reported by 
the participating companies. An interactive approach is adopted to establish the 
relationships between the transfer pricing system and company characteristics. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the behavioural dimensions of transfer pricing by examining the 
divisional manager's role in the transfer pricing process; and conflict potential and 
resolution in situations of joint responsibility.
All the 33 participating companies reported having inter-divisional transfers and 
internal pricing systems (TPS) to account for these transfers. The existence of transfers 
indicates that there is joint economic and financial responsibility in the British M-form 
company and that this responsibility is an essential element in the control systems. 
Similarly, the existence of TPS indicates that there is formal co-ordination of decentralised 
but interdependent responsibility centres and reflects the need for integration between 
organisational areas in a highly concentrated economy.
6.1 MAGNITUDE OF INTER-DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS
The magnitude of internal trade as used in this chapter is measured in terms of both 
its importance - in volume terms - to the company as a whole and to the transferor and 
transferee divisions. The data are summarised from answers to sections QAl and QB5 
of the questionnaire.
6.1.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFERS TO COMPANY
The volume of internal transfers varied from below 5% of total annual sales to 90% 
for the whole company. More than half of the respondents have transfers exceeding 10% 
of total company sales but less than a third have transfers over 20% (Table 6.1). This 
finding substantiates the results of the studies by Channon (1982), Luffman and Reed 
(1984) and Goold and Campbell (1987) that British companies are more and more
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diversifying into unrelated markets. This considerably reduces the effects of vertical 
integration and hence, the small number of companies reporting significant levels of 
internal trade. High volumes of transfers are usually associated with high levels of vertical 
integration and particular industrial sectors as it will be seen in Sections 6.1.4, 6.1.5 and 
6.1.6.
TABLE 6.1 (QA1): MAGNITUDE OF INTER-DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS 
(AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPANY VOLUME SALES)
RANGE
Under 5%
Between 5% to 10%
Between 10% to 25%
Between 25% to 50%
Over 50%
No.
6
12
7
6
2
%
18%
36%
21%
18%
6%
CUMULATIVE
No.
6
18
25
31
33
%
18%
54%
75%
93%
100 %*
(*) percentage may not add up to totals because of rounding.
6.1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFERS TO DIVISIONS
A global look at Table 6.2 shows that internal transactions for the typical trade have 
similar significance to either the transferor or transferee division. Again it is only in highly 
vertically integrated companies, technologically sensitive companies and companies with 
speciality products with no intermediate market that the transfer accounts for more than 
50% for the division.
TABLE 62 (QB5): SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL TRADE TO DIVISIONS
DIVISION
TRANSFEROR
TRANSFEREE
% TRANSFERS
<5%
8
7
5% 
to 
10%
8
11
10% 
to
25%
7
4
25% 
to 
50%
5
6
>50%
5
5
TOTAL
33
33
Chi-square test of homogeneity: X2= 1.45 with 4 degrees of freedom 
and is not significant at the 5% to 10% levels.
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6.1.3 COMPANY SIZE AND MAGNITUDE OF INTERNAL TRANSFERS
Despite the fact that the majority of companies are quite large, 18 companies (46%) 
have transfers of 10% or less and only 8 have more than 25 % (Table 6.1 above). This 
implies that there is no apparent association between the size of companies and the extent 
of internal trade. This is clear from the two contingency tables below.
SIZE RANGE 
(TURNOVER)
Less than £ 100m 
£100m- £250m 
£250m- £500m 
£500m- £ 1000m 
£ 1000m - £ 2000m 
£ 2000m - £ 4000m 
over £ 4000m
TOTAL
% TRANSFERS
<5%
1 
1
2 
2
6
5% 
to 
10%
2 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1
12
10% 
to
25%
1
2 
2 
1 
1
7
25% 
to 
50%
2 
1
2 
1
6
>50%
1
1
2
TOTAL
1
6
3 
8 
8 
5 
2
33
For transfers less than 10% and more than 10% and size range less 
than £ 1000m and more than £ 1000m, X2 = 0.23 (with Yates 
correction) with one degree of freedom and is not significant at 
levels up to 10%.
The largest responding company (a multinational chemical company with over 
127,000 employees world-wide and £ 12 billion turnover) had only 10% internal trade. 
The highest volumes of transfers of 80% and 90% were reported by an aluminium 
company and a tobacco company which employ 10,000 and 3000 people each and have 
respective turnovers of £ 700 and £ 500 million. The chemical company consists of highly 
decentralised subsidiaries whereas the aluminium company is highly vertically integrated 
such that the manufactured product flows downstream with each division adding value 
right from the mining of the raw material (bauxite) through to the distribution of the final 
products. Moreover, the aluminium company is a subsidiary of a foreign multinational 
which is one of the few that exercise complete monopoly on the aluminium market. The
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TABLE 6.4: INTERNAL TRADE VS. SIZE (CAPITAL EMPLOYED)
SIZE RANGE 
(CAPITAL EMPLOYED)
Less than £ 100m 
£100m- £250m 
£250m- £500m 
£500m- £ 1000m 
£ 1000m - £ 2000m 
£ 2000m - £ 4000m 
over £ 4000m
TOTAL
% TRANSFERS
5%
2
3 
1
6
5% 
to 
10%
2 
4 
3
2
1
12
10% 
to
25%
1
1 
1 
3
1
7
25% 
to 
50%
3
2 
1
6
>50%
1 
1
2
TOTAL
8 
4 
5 
6 
8 
1 
1
33
For transfers less than 10% and more than 10% and size range less 
than £ 1000m and more than £ 1000m, X2 = 0.53 (with Yates 
correction) with one degree of freedom and is not significant at 
levels up to 10%.
tobacco company - which has the highest level of internal trade of 90% in the sample - 
operates in a single product market and specialises in luxury consumer products which 
account for 38% of its annual turnover for which there is no intermediate market.
Finding 1: Transfer pricing is more a question of organisation, strategy, 
business orientation and market position than of size.
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6.1.4 INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY AND INTERNAL TRADE
Table 6.5 below shows that the highest volumes of transfers (over 25%) were 
reported by eight companies representing five industries. Five of these companies are 
chemicals-pharmaceuticals and electrical-electronics companies. All the other companies 
have less than 25 % transfers and represent a total of 12 industries.
TABLE 6.5: VOLUME OF INTERNAL TRADE BY INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY
1) AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
2) BUILDING MATERIALS
3) CHEMICALS AND
PHARMACEUTICALS
4) CONSTRUCTION & CIVIL
ENGINEERING
5) ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
AND ELECTRONICS
6) FOOD, DRINK & TOBACCO
7) GLASS
8) INFORMATION SYSTEMS
9) INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING
10) METAL GOODS
11) MINING & METAL
MANUFACTURE
12) MOTOR VEHICLES
13) PAPER, PRINTING AND
PUBLISHING
14) TEXTILES
TOTAL
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS BY VOLUME
OF TRANSFERS
5%
_
-
2
-
1
2
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
6
5%
to
10%
_
2
1
2
-
2
-
-
2
-
-
-
1
2
12
10%
to
25%
2
-
1
1
-
-
1
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
7
25%
to
50%
_
-
2
-
3
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
6
>50%
_
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
2
TOTAL
2
2
6
3
4
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
33
Some of the information contained in Table 6.5 should be treated with some 
reservation for possible bias. In particular it is surprising that the food companies reported 
very low levels of internal trade. Normally it should be expected that companies in this 
sector have high levels of vertical integration due to the nature of their business (easily 
perishable products) which requires continuous processing until the final product.
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A similar case is the motor company with less than 5% transfers. This is, however, 
an exception to the rule due to a policy of minimum (lateral) vertical integration in this 
capital-intensive sector and reliance instead on the external market for the supply of 
vehicle components as this is customary in the British motor industry (Alien, 1970; 
Picketing, 1974; and Rhys, 1988). This was confirmed on the phone by the financial
TABLE 6.6: INTERNAL TRANSFERS BY INDUSTRY GROUPING
INDUSTRY GROUP
CAPITAL GOODS:
BUILDING MATERIALS
GLASS
PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT
CHEMICAL - INDUSTRIAL
ENGINEERING - metal
manufacture
ENGINEERING - heavy 
ENGINEERING - light
TOTAL
CONSUMER DURABLES:
AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURE
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS *
CHEMICAL - consumer
TOTAL
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES:
FOOD STUFFS
TEXTILES
PAPER/PACKING/PUBLISHING
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
<5%
 
-
-
2
_
-
2
1
1
-
2
2
-
-
2
6
5%
to
10%
2
-
2
1
_
2
7
_
-
-
-
2
2
1
5
12
10%
to
25%
_
1
1
1
_
1 
1
5
1
-
-
1
-
1
1
7
25%
to
50%
-
-
-
_
-
-
 
4
2
6
-
-
-
-
6
>50%
 
-
-
-
1
-
1
_
-
-
-
1
-
-
1
2
TOTAL
2
1
3
4
1
1 
3
15
2
5
2
9
5
3
1
9
33
(*) including information systems. X2 = 5.93 with 2 degrees of freedom 
and is significant at 0.10 level for transfers less than 10% and more than 
10% for the three industry groups above.
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controller who completed the questionnaire. Hence the use of negotiated adjusted market 
price by this car company for valuing the reported 4% typical internal trade which is 
likely to consist of speciality components. Nonetheless it should not be ruled out that the 
reliance on independent suppliers is a policy of survival because of a declining product 
life cycle in a fiercely competitive and vulnerable market dominated by foreign cars.
The relationship between industry and internal trade is further highlighted in the 
Table below where companies are classified into three industry groups: a) capital goods, 
b) consumer durables, and c) consumer non durables.
It is noteworthy that 13 of the 15 companies with transfers in excess of 10 % are 
from the capital goods and consumer durables groups. Moreover, 7 of the 8 companies 
with the highest volumes of transfers (over 25 %) are from these two groups as well; they 
are mainly the electrical/electronics and chemicals sectors. It is also interesting to note 
that, except for one, the companies in the electrical and electronics group have similar 
amounts of high internal trade (Table 6.7).
TABLE 6.7: HIGHEST VOLUMES OF TRANSFERS
COMPANY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
INDUSTRY
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS
ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS
CHEMICALS
PHARMACEUTICALS
ALUMINIUM
TOBACCO
% transfers
33%
40%
40%
40%
40%
50%
80%
90%
The high volumes of transfers observed above relate to high vertical integration 
only in the aluminium company. In the other companies - which also have some vertical 
integration or lateral integration - the high level of transfers results either from a
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protectionist policy because of technological and volume intelligence (e.g. electrical and 
electronic companies) or because of speciality products with no intermediate markets 
(e.g. pharmaceuticals and tobacco companies).
The remaining 18 respondents have relatively low internal product flow (less than 
10%) and, as can be seen from Table 6.6 above, most of these companies fall into the 
capital goods (construction and light industries) and consumer non-durables categories.
Finding 2: the magnitude of internal transfers tends to depend on the 
type of industry or the business activity.
A further explanation to the above conclusion can be gleaned from the pattern of 
diversification and divisionalisation structure of the companies.
6.1.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND INTERNAL TRADE
The table below illustrates the association between the pattern of diversification and 
the extent of internal trade.
TABLE 6.8: INTERNAL TRANSFERS* BY DEGREE OF DIVERSITY
DIVERSIFICATION
CATEGORY
LOW:
S -single business 
D -dominant market
VD-vertical dominant
TOTAL
MEDIUM:
RC- related constrained
RL- related linked
TOTAL
HIGH:
U -unrelated businesses
GRAND TOTAL
5%
2 
1
-
3
2
-
2
1
6
5%
to
10%
2
2
4
4
3
7
1
12
10%
to
25%
1 
2
-
3
3
1
4
-
7
25%
to
50%
1 
1
-
2
1
3
4
-
6
>50%
1
1
2
_
-
-
-
2
TOTAL
5 
6
3
14
10
7
17
2
33
(*) in volume terms for the company as a whole.
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The data above indicate that high volumes of transfers are associated with low and 
moderate diversity. The two companies with unrelated businesses have the least volumes 
of internal product/service transfers and this further shows that the more diversified the 
company the less the interdependence between its divisions. This implies that, if the actual 
diversification trend in British companies continues as is suggested in the literature 
(Channon, 1982, Luffman and Reed, 1984 and Goold and Campbell, 1987), this will 
result in a drastic reduction in the volume of inter-divisional trade as companies would 
move from the M-form to the conglomerate structure with disparate and autonomous 
activities.
6.1.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVISIONALISATION STRUCTURE ON 
MAGNITUDE OF INTERNAL TRADE
All the consumer durable companies described above set up their divisions either 
on product/service, markets served or a matrix of bases. However, the noticeable 
predominance of the product/service base (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.6) does not necessarily 
imply high levels of inter-divisional trade. Table 6.9 shows that half of the 12 companies 
with market-based divisions have transfers exceeding 25 % of total sales compared to 
only 19% of the 27 companies with product/service divisions.
Companies divisionalised on production process have technological 
interdependence between their divisions and this dictates the downstream flow to 
divisions as the product develops from one phase to another. This is particularly true if 
the production process is the sole base of divisionalisation as in the case of the aluminium 
company with 80% internal trade. The production process base suits the sequential 
processing of the raw material (bauxite) from the mining stage through to the finished 
aluminium products. In the three companies where the production process is used in 
combination with other bases, the volume of transfers is also significant.
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TABLE 6.9: (QA1 & QA2) DIVISIONALISATION BASE VS. INTERNAL TRADE
(AS % OF TOTAL COMPANY VOLUME SALES)
DIVISIONAL BASE
DIVB 1 -PRODUCT/SERVICE
DIVB2- PRODUCTION PROCESS
DIVB3- REGION
DIVB4- MARKETS
TOTAL
<5%
5
-
1
2
8
5%
to
10%
10
-
2
2
14
10%
to
25%
7
2
3
2
14
25%
to
50%
4
1
1
5
11
>50%
1
1
1
1
4
TOTAL
27
4
9
12
51*
(*) number of times base mentioned.
In contrast, most companies with region-based (or geographical) divisions have less 
than 25% transfers (Table 6.10).
The differences observed above derive from the effect of the divisionalisation 
structure in the large company on the pattern of information channelling which in turn 
affects the decision-making and problem-solving processes. For example, in a 
geographically decentralised company each plant reports to a regional office and solutions 
to problems are sought within the region of responsibility and not on an inter-regional 
basis (Gibson, 1973 and Watts, 1980). This explains the minimum internal flows of 
products and services between region-based divisions observed above. Moreover, 
management accounting systems also depend on the way the company is divisionalised. 
For example, job-order costing may identify more with DIVB 1, DIVB3 and DIVB4 than 
with DIVB2 where process costing is more appropriate.
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TABLE 6.10: (QA1 & QA2) INTERNAL TRADE (AS % OF TOTAL 
COMPANY SALES) VS. SINGLE AND MULTIPLE BASES OF 
DIVISIONALISATION
SINGLE BASE
DIVB1
DIVB2
DIVB3
DIVB4
TOTAL
MULTIPLE BASE
MB1B1+B3
MB2B1+B4
MB3B1+B2+B3
MB4B1+B2+B4
MB5B1+B3+B4
MB6B1+B2+B3+B4
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
<5%
3
-
-
1
4
1
1
-
-
-
-
2
6
5%
to
10%
8
-
1
1
10
1
1
-
-
-
-
2
12
10%
to
25%
3
-
_
-
3
1
-
1
1
1
-
4
7
25%
to
50%
1
-
_
2
3
_
2
-
-
-
1
3
6
>50%
_
1
_
-
1
_
-
-
-
1
-
1
2
TOTAL
15
1
1
4
21
3
4
1
1
2
1
12
33
For-single base firms and multiple-base firms with transfers 
less than 10% and more than 10%, X2=2.21 (withYates 
correction) with one degree of freedom and is significant at 
0.14 level (or at 0.06 level without correction).
Finding 3: the degree of divisional interdependence, and thus the level 
of internal trade, depends on the degree of diversification 
and the divisionalisation structure of the company.
6.2 TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES
6.2.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE TRANSFER PRICING SYSTEM
Companies were asked to rank eight possible objectives for their transfer pricing 
systems. The frequency distribution of the responses together with the ranked mean ratings 
are summarised in Table 6.11. The sample correlation coefficients among the eight 
objectives are reproduced in Table 6.12.
The priority given by companies to profit maximisation (OBTP3) substantiates the 
earlier finding (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.7) that long-run profit is the most important 
corporate objective pursued by the responding companies. This observation is logical 
given that transfer pricing in itself has been introduced to further the objectives of 
divisionalisation. It is therefore not surprising to find that the second major objective is 
performance evaluation (OBTP1) of divisions or the economic entities that comprise the 
divisionalised company.
Not less important a factor are the divisional managers whose motivation (OBTP5) 
determines their efficiency (OBTP2) but that is to the extent they have authority (or 
influence) on resources and decisions (OBTP4) that affect their performance. Table 6.12 
shows that all the significant correlation coefficients are positive. Particularly strong 
relationships are found between OBTP1 (performance evaluation of divisions) and 
OBTP2 (performance evaluation of managers); OBTP4 (divisional autonomy) and 
OBTP5 (managerial autonomy); andOBTP6 (price-driven) andOBTP? (market-driven).
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6.2.2 COMPANIES' TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES
Companies' transfer pricing practices are summarised in Table 6.13 which shows 
the predominance of market-based pricing. This confirms the results of previous studies 
(Chapter 4, Table 4.9). Therefore the participating companies can be classified according 
to their pricing policies into two groups:
1 - those encouraging competition between their divisions through the 
market-based transfer price and free access to the external market for the 
internal trade,
2 - those encouraging collaboration through negotiated prices and mandated cost 
prices.
TABLE 6.13: (QC2 & QC3) TRANSFER PRICING METHODS
METHOD
MARKET-BASED:
CURRENT MARKET PRICE
ADJUSTED MARKET PRICE
NEGOTIATED MARKET PRICE
COST-BASED:
STANDARD VARIABLE COST PLUS
STANDARD FULL COST
STANDARD FULL COST PLUS
NEGOTIATED COST PRICES
TOTAL
NO.
26
9
6
11
15
25*
5
3
41**
% = N/33
78.8
27.3
18.2
33.3
45.4
6.1
15.1
15.1
9.1
-
(*) all from the group of 8 companies with the highest
levels of transfers (Table 6.5) 
(**) six companies use more than one method and thus,
in relative terms, the total exceeds 100%.
The predominance of market prices, together with the few cases of full cost plus 
profit margin and the negotiated cost prices, indicate that the transfers of goods and 
services are treated as purchase and sale transactions in many companies. Therefore, for 
many of the reported transfer prices it can be said that they are not "pseudo" transfer
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prices that would serve for cost allocations only. Consequently, the profit centre concept 
is a practical issue in the British company, not a fictitious or mystical invention as was 
claimed by Goetz (1967 and 1969) and Wells (1968). Moreover, the use of a cost-based 
transfer price does not necessarily mean that a market price does not exist. Evidence will 
be provided later in Section 6.4.3 that the market price existed for some of the companies 
that reported cost-based transfer prices and recently reverted to market-based pricing.
In addition to this is the large number of companies (27 or 82%) which use single 
transfer prices. In 19 (57%) of these the transferprice is market-based. Only six companies 
reported multiple transfer prices. These companies did not specify whether the multiple 
prices relate to a single transfer or are different prices for different internal transactions. 
However, three of these companies indicated that they used to operate single cost pricing 
which they later found either difficult to administer or lacking the necessary motivational 
effect on divisional managers. Now they either supplemented the cost price with market 
price or changed to multiple market pricing. One of the six companies introduced 
negotiation in its existing multiple-cost pricing to cater for market conditions and to stop 
the transferor division manipulating the transferee division.
No company reported the use of marginal costing, dual pricing, two-part tariff price 
or mathematical programming techniques to derive optimal transfer prices. The 
preference of simplicity over sophistication was confirmed in the five field interviews 
conducted. The simplicity resides mostly in the availability of the market price for many 
of the companies and the availability of the internal cost data.
Finding 4: British transfer pricing is profit conscious, market- oriented, 
and simplicity is preferred in determining the specific 
transfer prices.
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6.2.3 NEGOTIATED TRANSFER PRICES
Similar to the results of previous studies (Chapter 4) is the large proportion (34%) 
of negotiated transfer prices (Table 6.14). From answers to question QBl divisions seem 
to enjoy moderate levels of freedom on bargaining with each other. In all but one case 
negotiation is based on the available market price.
TABLE 6.14: NEGOTIATED TRANSFER PRICES (QA1 & QC2)
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
INDUSTRY
FOOD
FOOD
FOOD
CHEMICALS
TEXTILE
GLASS
INSTRUMENT
ENGINEERING
CONSTRUCTION
BUILDING
MATERIALS
MOTOR VEHICLES
METAL GOODS
AUTOMOTIVE
VOLUME OF 
INTERNAL 
TRADE
2.5%
< 5.0%
6.0%
10.0%
15.0%
12.0%
10.0%
5.4%
5.0%
4.0%
20.0%
20.0%
PRICING 
BASE
MARKET
COST
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
The one exception is a food company which uses three cost pricing methods. The 
company - one of the largest in the U.K. - introduced negotiation to stop the transferor 
division manipulating the transfer price to boost its financial performance to the detriment 
of the buying division.
The more important finding here is that negotiation takes place only in companies 
with not more than 20% total internal trade. Negotiation is not mentioned in the eight 
companies with the highest volumes of transfers described earlier (Section 6.1.4, Table 
6.7).
Finding 5: transfer prices are negotiated ONLY in companies where the 
internal transaction is not very important.
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No apparent relationship was found between divisionalisation strategy and 
negotiation as half the twelve companies with negotiated prices have single-base divisions 
and the other half multiple-base divisions. The relationship between negotiation and other 
variables will be further highlighted in due course.
6.2.4 TRANSFER PRICE VARIATION
The transfer price is the same for the same commodity when sold to different internal 
buyers in 18 companies and different in the remaining fifteen. The reasons given by the 
responding companies for such policies are summarised below in Table 6.15. For the 
companies that varied their pricing, market consciousness (RSTP3) was the major reason 
for doing so. The companies that had a uniform pricing policy were mainly concerned 
with encouraging internal trade (RSTP2) and consistency and comparability of the 
performance (RSTP4).
TABLE 6.15: (QC5 AND QC6) REASONS FOR SAME OR VARIED PRICING 
FOR SAME TRANSFER TO DIFFERENT INTERNAL BUYERS
REASONS
RSTPi - because of additional costs
RSTP2 - to encourage internal trade 
RSTP3 - depends on type of customer 
RSTP4 - consistence & comparability
TOTAL
%
PRICING
SAME
5
7 
6
18
54.5
NO
5
10
15
45.5
TOTAL
10
7 
10 
6
33
100%
It is also observed that in the 10 companies that varied their pricing policy depending 
"on the type of customer" (RSTP3) the transfer price is based on market and in nine of 
these it is negotiated as is evident in the Table below.
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TABLE 6.16: (QC2 & QC6) TRANSFER PRICE 
VARIATION VS. PRICING BASE
PRICE
SAME 
DIFFERENT 
TOTAL
TRANSFER PRICING BASE
MARKET
10 10* 
20
COST
8 
2 
10
BOTH
3 
3
TOTAL
18 
15 
33
(*) price is negotiated in 9 of these and the major 
motive for transfer price differentiation is 
market consciousness (RSTP3).
Except in two companies, when the transfer price is based purely on cost the same 
price for the same transfer commodity is charged to different internal buyers. The incurring 
of additional costs for selling to different internal buyers is the reason for transfer price 
variation in the two exceptions. Negotiation is mentioned in only two of the 18 companies 
with uniform pricing policies.
Finding 6: the evidence from Tables 6.15 and 6.16 suggests that the 
transfer price for the same commodity when sold to different 
transferees is varied only in companies where the internal 
transaction is not important (i.e. the companies with 
negotiated market transfer prices).
6.2.5 PREVALENCE OF PARTICULAR TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES
6.2.5.1 FREQUENCY OF USING DOMINANT TRANSFER PRICING BASE.
Replying to an open-ended question (QG2) on whether they considered their present 
transfer pricing systems efficient and satisfactory, 31 companies replied in the affirmative 
and the remaining two did not give any comment. This overall high level of apparent 
(corporate) satisfaction may explain the noticeable stability of the transfer pricing policies 
in operation as is detailed below.
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The dominant transfer pricing base is very frequently used (FTPB1 & FTPB2) in 
30 (91%) companies and in 19 of these the transfer price is market-based. It is evident 
that market-based prices have a longer term usage than cost-based prices. Only 3 
companies reported using the transfer price as long as there was an external market (Table 
6.17).
TABLE 6.17: (QC2 AND QC4)
TRANSFER PRICING BASE VS USAGE FREQUENCY
FREQUENCY
FTPBl-Always 
FTPB2-Often
FTPB3-when external
market exists
TOTAL
PRICING BASE
MARKET
16 
1
3
20
COST
6
4
-
10
BOTH
1
2
_
3
TOTAL
23 
7
3
33
Finding 7: It may therefore be deduced that the existence (or 
non-existence) of an external intermediate market affects 
the transfer price stability.
6.2.5.2 CRITERIA FOR THE PREVALENCE OF PARTICULAR TRANSFER 
PRICING POLICIES
Companies were asked to rate nine criteria or determinants for the dominance of a 
particular transfer pricing policy (Table 6.18). All nine elements were found important 
but priority was given to five criteria: 1) evaluation of divisional performance (CDTP6), 
2) pin-pointing divisional responsibility (CDTP5), 3) fairness and conflict resolution 
(CDTP4), 4) achievement of corporate goals (CDTP2), and 5) maximising divisional 
autonomy (CDTP3). Some significant correlations were also found between some of these 
criteria (Table 6.19). Simplicity and ease of implementation of the system was not an 
important criterion as no company reported the use of complicated pricing formulae. The
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priority of these criteria perfectly overlaps with the most important objectives assigned 
to the transfer pricing systems (Section 6.2.1.). It also adds substance to the fourth finding 
above that British transfer pricing is profit conscious and market oriented.
The dominance of market-based prices, their long-term stability and the 
predominance of the above five criteria reinforce the much acclaimed advantages of 
market-based pricing as reviewed in Chapter 2.
Finding 8: when available, market prices seem ideal for decentralised 
profit responsibility and the acceptability of the transfer 
pricing system.
6.3 LOCUS OF TRANSFER-PRICING DECISION-MAKING 
6.3.1 EXTERNAL SOURCING DECISION
The dominance of market-based transfer prices indicates that, for the majority of 
the companies, external markets exist for the commodities traded internally. However, 
it was previously stated that divisions do not have complete freedom on buying externally 
items available from within their own company (Chapter 5, Table 5.16). Among the 13 
items listed in question QBl, divisional discretion on external procurement was ranked 
nine. Authority on this decision has significant impact on the entire transfer pricing system 
and the fairness of the divisional performance evaluation measures. These causal 
relationships are investigated below.
6.3.1.1 CENTRAL APPROVAL AND TRANSFER PRICING BASE
Approval for trading in the external intermediate market is required in 13 (39%) 
firms. Companies gave no reasons for centralising the sourcing decision. Research, 
however, suggests that the "re-centralisation" of certain functions in the divisional ed 
company results from loss of economies of scale and reduction of synergies" (Ansoff,
204
1984, p. 297). In terms of the Markets and Hierarchies approach (Williamson, 1975) the 
approval requirement in these 13 firms indicates a choice of hierarchies over markets for 
the transfer transactions.
The approval is always (APXS1) needed in 6 of the 13 firms; only when the transfer 
is significant (APXS2) in another six, and when the difference between the transfer price 
and the external price is large (APXS3) in one company. No such approval is needed 
(APXS4) in the other 20 (61%) companies. In 14 of these latter the transfer price is 
market-based (Table 6.20).
TABLE 6.20: (QC2, QB2 & QB3) PRICING BASE VS. APPROVAL FOR
EXTERNAL SOURCING
CENTRAL APPROVAL FOR
EXTERNAL SOURCING IS:
APXSl-always required
APXS2-only if transfer
is significant
APXS3-only if price
difference is big
APXS4-not required
TOTAL
PRICING BASE
MARKET
1
6
-
13
20
COST
5
-
-
5
5
BOTH
-
-
1
2
2
TOTAL
NO.
6
6
1
20
33
%
18%
18%
3%
61%
100%
In addition to this, four companies reported having regulations for the enforcement 
of buy/sell agreements. Three of these were among the 13 which require approval for 
external sourcing. Only one company from the 20 which do not require approval reported 
having arbitration by the main-board on this matter. This company operates in the civil 
engineering and construction sector. Inter-divisional transfers are in the form of 
sub-contract services supplied by one division to another, acting as main contractor.
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Finding 9: it can be concluded from the above analysis that the transfer 
price is generally cost-based when approval for external 
procurement is always required; and market-based when 
no approval is required or when the approval is only 
required if the transaction is important.
6.3.1.2 CENTRAL APPROVAL AND NEGOTIATED PRICES
No approval for external sourcing is required in eight of the 12 companies with 
negotiated transfer prices (Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3). Approval is required in the remaining 
four companies but is always needed (APXSI) in only one of them and if the transaction 
is significant (APXS2) in the other three (Table 6.21). The one company that always 
requires central approval for trading in the intermediate market operates in the instrument 
engineering industry which involves highly sensitive technology.
TABLE 6.21: (QB1, QB2 & QB3): CENTRAL APPROVAL FOR EXTERNAL 
SOURCING IN COMPANIES WITH NEGOTIATED TRANSFER PRICES.
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
INDUSTRY
FOOD
FOOD
FOOD
CHEMICALS *
TEXTILE
GLASS *
INSTRUMENT **
ENGINEERING
CONSTRUCTION
BUILDING
MATERIALS
MOTOR VEHICLES
METAL GOODS
AUTOMOTIVE *
VOLUME OF 
INTERNAL 
TRADE
2.5%
< 5.0%
6.0%
10.0%
15.0%
12.0%
10.0%
5.4%
5.0%
4.0%
20.0%
20.0%
PRICING 
BASE
MARKET
COST
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
MARKET
APPROVAL
YES NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
(*) only if transaction is significant (APXSI) 
(**) approval always required (APXS2)
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6.3.1.3 CENTRAL APPROVAL AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TYPICAL 
INTERNAL TRADE
It is also observed that the internal transaction does not have a high corporate 
significance in most of the 20 companies which do not require approval for external 
sourcing whereas the transfer accounts for more than 10% in 9 (69%) of the 13 companies 
that require central approval (Table 6.22). Thus, the behavioural implications in the latter 
should be expected to be considerable.
TABLE 622 (QA1, QB2 & QB3): SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL TRADE TO 
COMPANY VS. APPROVAL FOR EXTERNAL SOURCING.
APPROVAL
YES
NO
TOTAL
% TRANSFERS
<5%
2
4
6
5% 
to 
10%
2
10
12
10% 
to
25%
4
3
7
25% 
to 
50%
1
2
3
50% 
to
75%
3
-
3
>75%
1
1
2
TOTAL
13*
20
33
(*) 5 of these are among the eight companies which reported the highest
volumes of transfers (Section 6.1.4).
X2= 3.43 (with Yates correction) with 1 degree of freedom and significant 
at 0.063 level for transfers less than 10% and greater than 10%.
The same observation holds true as well for the significance of the typical transfer 
to the transferor divisions as is shown below.
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TABLE 6.23: (QB5, QB2 & QB3) SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL TRADE 
TO TRANSFEROR DIVISION VS. APPROVAL FOR EXTERNAL SOURCING
APPROVAL
YES
NO
TOTAL
% TRANSFERS
<5%
3
5
8
5% 
to 
10%
1
7
8
10% 
to
25%
3
4
7
25% 
to 
50%
2
3
5
50% 
to
75%
1
-
1
>75%
3
1
4
TOTAL
13
20
33
For transfers less than 10% and greater than 10% X2= 1.65 (with 
Yates correction) with 1 degree of freedom and is not significant 
at levels up to 10% (or significant at 0.10 without correction).
For the transferee division, the approval is not required for most high volume 
transfers (Table 6.24).
TABLE 6.24: (QB5, QB2 & QB3) SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL TRADE TO 
TRANSFEREE DIVISION VS. APPROVAL FOR EXTERNAL SOURCING
APPROVAL
YES
NO
TOTAL
% TRANSFERS
<5%
2
5
7
5% 
to 
10%
4
7
11
10% 
to
25%
2
2
4
25% 
to 
50%
3
3
6
50% 
to
75%
-
2
2
>75%
2
1
3
TOTAL
13
20
33
For transfers less than 10% and greater than 10%: X2= 0.18 (with 
Yates correction) with 1 degree of freedom and is not significant 
at levels up to 10%.
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6.3.2 THE TRANSFER PRICING DECISION
Twenty one companies (64%) claimed that transfer prices were determined and 
reviewed by or between the divisions (TPSG3 and TPSG4). The transfer price is entirely 
centrally fixed (TPSG1) or through consultation of divisions (TPSG2) in the remaining 
12 companies. When the transfer price is determined between the divisions (TPSG3) the 
volume of the transfer is always below 25% of total company sales, and it is likely that 
the price is negotiated, especially if it is based on market. Eleven of the 12 negotiation 
cases mentioned earlier (Section 6.2.3) identify with TPSG3 (Table 6.25).
TABLE (QC1 & QC2) PRICING DECISION VS. PRICING BASE
LOCUS OF TRANSFER
PRICING DECISION
TPSGl-Top management 
TPSG2-Top management 
and consultation of
divisions
TPSG3-Between divisions
TPSG4-Selling division
TOTAL
PRICING BASE
MARKET
1
4 *
15 **
20
COST
3 
4
2 * 
1
10
BOTH
-
3*
3
TOTAL
4 
8
20 
1
33
(*) one of these is negotiated transfer price. 
(**) nine of these are negotiated prices.
It was also found that top management intervenes in fixing the transfer price (TPSG1 
and TPSG2) mostly when the volume of internal trade is quite high (over 25% of total 
sales).
Transfer prices are fixed solely by corporate management (TPSG1 or fully 
mandated) in only 4 companies. Three of these companies require approval for external 
sourcing and have cost-based transfer prices (Table 6.26). It may be presumed that central 
management also decides on the optimum amounts of commodities to be transferred in 
these four companies.
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TABLE 6.26: (QB2 & QC1) TRANSFER PRICING DECISION 
VS. APPROVAL FOR EXTERNAL SOURCING
LOCUS OF TRANSFER
PRICING DECISION
TPSGl-Top management 
TPSG2-Top management 
and consultation of
divisions
TPSG3-Between divisions
TPSG4-Selling division
TOTAL
APPROVAL
YES
3 4 *
5**
1
13
NO
1 
4
15***
-
20
TOTAL
4 
8
20
1
33
(*) one of these is negotiated price. (**) three of these are negotiated prices. (***) eight of these are negotiated prices.
It is also worth noting that in the one company (electronics with 40% transfers) 
where the transfer price is decided by the selling division (TPSG4), it is cost-based and 
approval is required for trading in the intermediate market. It was later learnt in a field 
interview conducted in the company that this was a deliberate corporate policy because 
of techonological and volume intelligence in a highly sensitive industrial sector. However, 
the company is now considering arm's length pricing as the imposed cost-pricing system 
and restrictions on external sourcing have led to internal conflict and problems in 
divisional performance evaluation.
In the eight companies where the transfer price is centrally fixed but through 
consultation of divisions (TPSG2), there is only one case of negotiation. It involves the 
glass company which, interestingly, has market-based divisions and transfer prices, and 
requires approval for external sourcing if the transaction is significant. In the remaining 
seven companies the price is cost-based if the trading in the external market was subject 
to central approval. This concerns three of the companies with the highest level of 
transfers. This tends to imply that the consultation of divisional managers over price 
determination in these seven companies is just for information, not for participative 
decision-making. This may be described as a one-way relationship whereby information
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follows a top-down channel for decisions to be made and enforced by top management. 
This does not further the objectives of decentralised profit responsibility. Therefore the 
transfer price can be said to be centrally fixed.
Another point worth making here is that the central determination of the transfer 
price implies that central management has sufficient information about the revenue and 
cost functions of the divisions. This presumes that divisional managers report accurate 
and unbiased information about their operations to central management. Knowing that 
the transfer price affects divisional results - especially if the transfer is very important to 
the division - it is likely that divisional managers retain some information or bias the 
reported information because of the implications on performance evaluation and reward. 
This issue will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.
Finding 10: When the transfer price is purely based on the existing 
market price, divisions are likely to have free access to that 
market, the transfer pricing decision is delegated to 
divisional managers and the transfer price is likely to be 
negotiated.
Finding 11: central intervention and inter-divisional coordination is 
associated with high levels of inter-divisional trade.
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6.4 TRANSFER PRICING CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCES
6.4.1 FREQUENCY OF REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF TRANSFER PRICES.
In 25 companies the transfer price review is done on a periodical basis and in most 
of these it takes place every three to twelve months (Table 6.27).
TABLE 627 (QF1) FREQUENCY OF TRANSFER 
PRICING REVIEW
FREQUENCY
PERIODICAL:
MONTHLY
QUARTERLY
SEMI-ANNUALLY
ANNUALLY
WITH BUDGET
OCCASIONAL:
DIVISIONS' REQUEST
CORPORATE DECISION
FOR EACH CONTRACT
MARKET CHANGES
(FTRP1)
(FTRP2)
(FTRP3)
(FTRP4)
(FTRP6)
(FTRP5)
(FTRP7)
(FTRP8)
(FTRP9)
TOTAL
NO.
25
2
5
6
10
2
8
3
1
2
2
33
(*) civil engineering and construction 
companies
The pattern of transfer pricing change observed above together with the companies' 
various transfer pricing practices (Section 6.2.2.) reinforce the belief that there is no 
generalised formula that can suit every situation.
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6.4.2 FACTORS INLUENCING THE REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF TRANSFER 
PRICES.
There is no consensus among the participants on the effect of the factors listed in 
question QF2 on the need for revising transfer prices. However, a ranking of the mean 
ratings shows that factor FCTR2 (changes in raw materials and labour costs) plays the 
major role on transfer price adjustment (Table 6.28). This is followed by budget cycle 
(FCTR11), structural and strategic changes (FCTR1), new product development 
(FCTR9), rates of inflation (FCTR6) and market changes (FCTR14). The reevaluation 
of standard costs (FCTR3) is considered an important factor only in companies with 
standard cost-based transfer prices. The low rating scored by factor 13 (government 
regulations) is because there is not yet an enforcing transfer pricing legislation on domestic 
transfer pricing in the U.K.
The influence of the above factors on transfer pricing change indicate that just as 
the variables involved in the internal transactions change over time, transfer prices must 
be adapted to changing circumstances. Being a crucial element in the management 
information system (MIS) the transfer pricing system (TPS) needs, to fulfil its managerial 
role, not only the review of the direct factors like FCTR2 but also the internal rules 
governing the transfer pricing process.
What is noticeable, however, are the high positive correlations among the various 
factors that influence the transfer pricing change (Table 6.29).
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6.4.3 AFTERMATH OF TRANSFER PRICING CHANGE
When asked about the resulting outcome of the review and adjustment of their 
transfer pricing policies, companies replies were as follows:
TABLE 6.30 (QF3): RESULTS OF REVIEWING OR 
ADJUSTING TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES
RESULT
RESLl-better efficiency of the 
transfer pricing system 
RESL2-reduced conflict over
transfer prices 
RESL3-better control and
performance evaluation 
RESL4-optimal resource 
allocation
RESLS-improved fairness of the
system 
RESL6-led to goal congruence 
RESL7-increased conflict
RESLS-increased dissatisfaction
RESL9-not applicable *
NO.
10
14
18
6
13
11
-
8
%
30.3 
42.4
54.5
18.2
39.4
33.3
-
24.2
(*) all with market-based transfer prices.
Eight companies claimed that the existing policies have been in operation for a long 
time, and as such, no significant change has taken place. In seven of these companies 
transfer prices are determined between the divisions and are market-based and the internal 
transaction is not significant. All seven companies claimed full satisfaction with their 
present TPS. One company was an exception. It is a subsidiary of a foreign electronics 
MNC; has a high volume of internal trade (33%); a centrally fixed adjusted market price 
and restrictions on external sourcing. This respondent made no comment as to whether 
the present TPS is efficient and satisfactory but hinted at the potential of conflict because 
of the impact of the TPS on divisional performance. Combining these elements suggests
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the possible lack of acceptability of the TPS by the divisions. Therefore changes may be 
needed, for example, removing restrictions on external sourcing and more divisional 
involvement in transfer price setting and review.
For the 25 companies that altered their transfer pricing policies, it appears that they 
were concerned with the impact of the transfer prices on divisional performance (RESL3), 
conflict over transfer prices (RESL2), fairness of the system (RESL5) and compatibility 
of corporate and divisional objectives (RESL6). There is obvious concordance between 
these results and the criteria for the dominance of particular pricing policies (Section 
6.2.5.2). The correlation matrix (Table 6.31) shows very strong relationships between 
many of the results of the transfer pricing change, especially between the reduction of 
conflict (RESL1) and improved performance evaluation (RESL3) and improved fairness 
of the TPS (RESL5)
What can be deduced from the above finding is that prior to review and adjustment, 
the prevailing transfer pricing systems were not adequate for performance evaluation as 
they lacked fairness to the parties involved in the internal transaction and caused 
inter-divisional conflict. Similarly it can be predicted that whenever a company feels that 
its transfer pricing system is not fulfilling these main functions, it will very likely decide 
to alter it. One such case is the electronics company mentioned in Section 6.3.2 which is 
now in the process of changing from cost-based to market-based pricing. The main 
motives for this company's decision are competitive pressures, internal conflict reduction 
and better performance evaluation. The company is also distancing itself from serving 
the Government sector (defence) which usually requires detailed cost information of the 
purchased products. This move will facilitate the switch to market-based transfer prices 
for the consumer electronics and components lines of business that the company wants 
to concentrate on. Other examples are discussed below.
Four companies operating in different industries reported to have changed from 
cost-based to market-based transfer prices. The reasons given by these companies in 
response to question QG1 are reproduced in Table 6.32 (companies F, G, I and L). All 
four companies were concerned with having a transfer price that would reflect market
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realities so that no party to the transfer transaction was put at a disadvantage. On the other 
hand, one company (E) added market-price to its existing cost-plus transfer price because 
of "market pressures in relation to final product". Various other changes were operated 
by the remaining seven companies in Table 6.32. They include the abolition of arbitration 
and introduction of negotiation, the removal of the profit mark-up from the cost-based 
price to stop the transferor accumulating profits to the detriment of the transferee, and 
obsolescence of the transfer pricing system in the face of internal and external changes.
In sum, it can be concluded from Table 6.32 that the companies that have improved 
their transfer pricing policies did so because of either an administrative reason and/or a 
motivational purpose. Either factor plays a fundamental role on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the transfer pricing system. In fact, the twelve companies in Table 6.32 
believe that the changes they have operated on their pricing systems have yielded two 
main results: 1) reduction of conflict over transfer prices (RESL2) and 2) better control 
and performance evaluation (RESL3). This is particularly the case of companies that 
reversed from cost to market-based prices and companies that removed the profit mark-up 
from the cost-based price to stop manipulation.
The reasons and the results of changing or adjusting the TPS in many of the 
companies cited above provide sufficient evidence that these companies were concerned 
with more than mere technicalities. The changes operated reflect the complex and 
interactive nature of transfer pricing. Stated otherwise, given the inextricable factors that 
affect and are affected by the transfer pricing system (TPS), transfer pricing requires 
careful strategic consideration in the divisionalised company.
Finding 12: without constant monitoring to provide for changing 
circumstances transfer pricing systems can always result in 
both overt and dormant problems which affect the 
acceptance of the TPS.
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In the light of all the previous findings it becomes clear that this conclusion is only 
the confirmation of hypothesis five formulated in different words:
Hypothesis Five: Changes in organisational structure and strategy result
in changes (or need for change) in transfer pricing 
policies.
6.4.4 DIVISIONAL ROLE IN TRANSFER PRICING POLICY CHANGE
In Section 6.3.2 it was observed that transfer prices were determined and reviewed 
between divisions without central intervention in 20 (61%) companies. Divisions also 
had a consultative role in price determination and change in another eight companies, but 
this role was more supplying information to the corporate office rather than a sign of 
divisional authority on the transfer pricing decision.
The dichotomy between price fixing and divisional authority is confirmed by an 
earlier result on corporate attitudes towards the decision-making responsibility of 
divisional managers (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.8). On comparing the different levels of 
discretion that divisional managers were reported to have on various decisions it was 
found that they exercised the least authority on the determination of transfer prices and 
much less on their revision and adjustment. This is particularly true in cases where the 
transfer transaction is very important to the company.
Obviously some companies cannot be expected to adhere to the arguments advanced 
in Section 6.3.2 given the sensitivity of the transfer pricing issue. In fact when replying 
to a further question (QG5) on whether divisional managers could re-negotiate transfer 
prices because of significant changes (as in QF2), 26 (79%) companies simply said yes, 
2 companies (with 80% and 90% transfers) insisted on central intervention, and 5 
companies gave no answer. This means that companies claimed that negotiation over 
transfer pricing would more than double its present level of 34% (see Section 6.2.3). This 
also implies that central intervention would decrease drastically. Justification may be
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found for those companies already operating market and negotiated prices and those 
companies that have changed their policies for the better (Table 6.28) but not for all the 
26 companies that responded by the affirmative.
The contingency approach applied so far to the analysis of British transfer pricing 
practice suggests otherwise. The 26 companies above (in QG5) include many of those 
firms with centrally fixed prices and sourcing decisions. Therefore it can be envisaged, 
other things being equal, that corporate attitudes towards divisional authority on transfer 
price changes will, in many companies, follow a different pattern from that outlined by 
the answers to question QG5. Many reasons support this belief. First, the preponderance 
of the profit objective in a highly concentrated economy; second, the low level of 
discretion that divisional managers have on decisions that directly affect their economic 
performance; and third, the centralised transfer price determination and the required 
approval for external sourcing in over one third of the companies. These reasons are 
further highlighted in the discussion of conflict over transfer prices.
6.5 CONFLICT OVER TRANSFER PRICING 
6.5.1 CAUSES OF CONFLICT
In general, companies reported very low levels of conflict over transfer pricing. The 
summarised information contained in Table 6.33 may be interpreted in two quite different 
ways. It is either giving a fair picture of reality or companies deliberately pretended having 
negligible internal conflict. However, in the light of the analysis of the rest of the 
questionnaire sections, it appears that to some extent the first interpretation can be 
subscribed to. Nevertheless, since this critical issue has not yet received enough attention 
in the management control research, it deserves further in-depth investigation, probably 
on a case-study basis involving selected companies.
The reported low levels of conflict seem to be justified as most companies have 
market-based transfers, divisionally fixed prices, do not require approval for external 
sourcing and expressed great satisfaction with their present TPS. This rules out a general
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rejection of the TPS (CSFC1). Therefore, any significant levels of conflict should only 
be present in companies which do not satisfy these requirements, i.e., companies with 
cost-based prices, centrally fixed prices, and those requiring approval for trading in the 
external intermediate market. Surprisingly, however, restrictions on external sourcing 
(CSFC10) are not considered an important cause of conflict. This may be interpreted as 
follows. The restrictions on external sourcing are part of corporate policy as a response 
to market imperfections (quality problems, unreliability of supply, incompleteness of 
price, etc.) or as a protectionist policy in some companies due to sensitivity. In any case, 
the restrictions on external sourcing seem to be accepted at divisional levels. In other 
words, it has become part of company culture, thus the reported low level of conflict.
The "non-existence of an intermediate market" (CSFC9) is almost disregarded as 
a potential source of conflict. Obviously the dominance of market-based transfers imply 
that the existence of markets is taken for granted. Corporate management also discards 
CSFC4 (restricted information flow) as a source of conflict. This may be explained by 
one of the following reasons:
1 - the predominance of the market price and accessibility of market 
information,
2 - the TPS is part of a well designed management information system 
which ensures good communication,
3 - this is only a corporate view that does not rule out information 
asymmetry. The correlation Table shows some strong association 
between CSFC4 and CSFC5 (lack of fairness of the TPS), CSFC8 
(importance of transfer to division) and CSFC9 (non-existence of 
external market).
Most companies agree on three elements as being the prime causes of conflict. These 
are (in ranking order): 1) the importance of the transfer commodity to the division 
(CSFC8), 2) the impact of the transfer pricing system on divisional profits (CSFC7), and 
3) negotiation of transfer prices (CSFC6). Table 6.34 shows an almost perfect positive
225
correlation between CSFC7 and CSFC8. With regard to CSFC6 companies only 
mentioned the existence (or non-existence) of negotiation but not the rules of the 
bargaining process and which of these rules is the major source of disagreement. 
Therefore, negotiation is treated here in general terms as a potential conflict factor. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the above three elements (CSFC6, CSFC7 and CSFC8) 
substantiates the claims advanced in theoretical models about the factors that cause 
organisational conflict (for instance Pondy, 1967 and Walton and Dutton, 1969). Mainly 
interdependence (or mutual task dependence) and goal incompatibility lead to different 
levels of conflict. In other words, the observed potential of conflict of these three factors 
implies that there is more inter-divisional conflict than centre-division conflict. In the 
context of separated ownership and control - which characterises the sample companies 
- this implies that divisional managers seem to pursue their own interests (or expectations) 
to quite a considerable extent when their performance is at stake. This is supported by 
the earlier finding that British transfer pricing is profit conscious and profit is the prime 
corporate objective. Conflict in the M-form company is, therefore, characterised by the 
heterogeneity of goals which leads to heterogeneity of decisions, or what is called by the 
behaviorists as "bounded rationality". Further evidence on this issue is left to the next 
chapter where the conflict potential of the performance evaluation and incentive schemes 
is discussed using agency theory as a framework of analysis.
6.5.2 IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING CHANGE ON LEVEL OF CONFLICT
It was earlier found (Section 6.2.5.2) that fairness and conflict resolution (CDTP4) 
were the third most important factor for the prevalence of particular transfer pricing 
policies. A complementary result was arrived at in Section 6.4.3 as in more than 40% of 
the participating companies the review and adjustment of transfer prices resulted in 
reduced internal conflict (RELS2). Among these latter are eight of the twelve companies 
which disclosed the specific changes operated on their previous TPS and the reasons for 
doing so (Table 6.32). As stated earlier, the reduction of conflict implies that the TPS is 
at present acceptable to the parties involved in the transfer transaction. The linkage 
between transfer price change and conflict resolution implies two things:
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1) the TPS can be both a source of conflict and one of the mechanisms for 
resolving it provided the TPS is well designed to suit the particular 
organisational context and regularly monitored to accommodate changing 
circumstances,
2) conflict is not necessarily dysfunctional as it stimulates the need to change 
for the better and, thus, it is part of a dynamic process. In the foregoing 
examples conflict has led to altering previously inefficient TPS and this has 
resulted in reducing conflict.
The mutual relationship between transfer price change and conflict resolution can 
contribute to equilibrium between incompatible goals in the divisionalised company. This 
desirable effect is well reflected in the cases summarised in Table 6.32 (Section 6.4.3) 
where it is evident that the greater control that divisions now enjoy in some of the 
companies did not lead to more conflict as is traditionally believed in the literature (for 
example March and Simon, 1958). It also refutes the theory that interdepartmental conflict 
is best reduced by reducing the size of task dependence (Pondy, 1967 and Walton and 
Button, 1969).
Finding 13: The examples above show that interdependence can geared 
towards the benefit of the parties involved just by turning 
conflict into a functional element through necessary and 
timely corrective actions.
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6.5.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
Despite the reported low levels of conflict over transfer pricing, conflict resolution 
procedures were found in 28 companies (Table 6.35). This may suggest that in many 
companies conflict is for the moment just felt or perceived but not yet fully manifest and 
many of the resolution procedures reported may be more preventive than curative as these 
companies have experienced conflict in the past.
The rest of the companies claimed the question was irrelevant because 1) of 
insignificant levels of conflict (3 companies); or 2) because there was conflict but disputes 
were discouraged and not allowed (1 company); or 3) no particular formal resolution 
procedure existed (1 company). Only one of these five exceptions has a substantial amount 
of internal trade (40% of total sales). The major causes of conflict in this electronics 
company are the restrictions on trading in the external intermediate market and an imposed 
cost-based uniform transfer price. It was previously mentioned that this particular 
company is reverting to market-based pricing because of the conflict generated by the 
actual system.
TABLE 6.35 (QE2) CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
CFRSl-by corporate management alone
CFRS2-divisions ask for revision
of transfer prices
CFRS3-discuss the differences openly
so as to reach a compromise
CFRS4-disregard the differences and
emphasise common interests
CFRSS-opt for mutual concessions to
settle differences
CFRS6-each division tries to "win"
conflict for itself
CFRST-disputes not allowed at all
CFRS8-no resolution procedures exist
CFRS9-not applicable
TOTAL
*
10
7
14
5
3
2
1
1
3
USED 
SOLELY
6
1
9
2
-
1
-
-
-
(*) number of times procedure is mentioned.
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The above resolution procedures can be classified according to the framework 
suggested by Arnold and Feldman (1986) into: 1) avoidance procedures (CFRS1, CFRS7, 
CFRS8, CFRS9), 2) defusion procedures (CFRS4), 3) containment procedures (CFRS3, 
CFRS5), and 4) confrontation procedures (CFRS2, CFRS6).
Conflict is resolved by means of a single procedure in 19 of the 28 companies and 
by a combination of methods in the remaining 9 companies. In nine (CFRS3) of the 19 
companies with single procedures there is a noticeable emphasis on containing the conflict 
(i.e. encouraging collaboration) whereas in another six conflict is resolved by corporate 
management alone (CFRS1) which reflects a policy of conflict avoidance. In these six 
cases one of the following factors is present: 1) the internal trade is very significant, 2) 
a centrally fixed transfer price, and 3) restrictions on external sourcing. One of these 
factors is also present in 8 of the 9 companies with multiple procedures. The central 
resolution of conflict raises the question as to whether this will not lead to further conflict, 
given the restrictions on divisional autonomy.
In all the companies where the restrictions are eased, the most favoured procedure 
for resolving conflict is, as mentioned above, through dialogue or mutual problem solving 
(CFRS 3). Moreover, in all these companies the transfer price is market-based (13 
companies) and negotiated if it is cost-based (company H in Table 6.32). This result 
complements Conclusion Eight (Section 6.2.5.2) that "when available, market prices 
are ideal for decentralised profit responsibility and the acceptability of the TPS".
A point worth making from the above observations is that no company gave details 
about the elements involved in the resolution procedures in operations. Given the 
importance of the following three factors on conflict: CSFC7 (impact of the transfer 
pricing system on divisional profits), CSFC8 (importance of the transferred commodity 
to the division) and CSFC6 (negotiation of transfer prices), it is surprising that no company 
made any hint at using these factors for conflict resolution. For example, given the critical 
effect of factors CSFC7 and CSFC8 on conflict, a change in the profit sharing ratio and 
a revision of the profit performance measure could play a major role in conflict resolution. 
Future research could shed more light on this. Areas worth investigating are the amount
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of managerial time consumed in resolving conflict, the financial cost and the opportunity 
costs involved, the specific procedure of resolution (for example, changing personnel, 
changing structure, expanding resources, revising transfer prices and so on).
6.6 OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS.
Transfer pricing is part of the management process in the British divisionalised 
company regardless of the level of internal trade. The level of internal trade is not 
dependent on the size of the company but is influenced by the pattern of diversification 
and the divisionalisation structure. High volumes of transfers are also associated with 
certain industry sectors like electronics, aluminium, tobacco and pharmaceuticals.
Companies' transfer pricing practice shows preference for market-oriented pricing 
and simplicity in determining the specific prices. The transfer price is negotiated only in 
companies with not very significant internal transactions. These companies vary their 
transfer prices to different internal buyers for the same commodity. No approval is 
required for external sourcing in most of these companies.
The priority objective assigned to the TPS is profit maximisation which is served 
by two other objectives, performance evaluation and managerial motivation. Similarly, 
the dominance of a particular transfer pricing policy is dictated by five major factors: 1) 
evaluation of divisional performance, 2) pin-pointing divisional responsibility, 3) fairness 
and conflict resolution, 4) achievement of corporate goals and 5) maximising divisional 
autonomy.
Restrictions on external sourcing of the intermediate commodity and mandated 
transfer prices were found associated with high levels of internal trade and sensitive 
technology. On the contrary when the transfer transaction is not very significant, the 
transfer price is negotiated and the transfer pricing decision is delegated to divisional 
managers.
In most companies transfer prices are reviewed on a periodical basis because of 
changes in the cost of raw materials and labour, technological conditions, new product
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development, market changes and structural and strategic changes. This indicates that to 
be efficient, a transfer pricing system should not be static but has to be updated according 
to changing circumstances. The transfer pricing change that took place in some companies 
was reported to have resulted in better control and performance evaluation, reduced 
conflict, and improved fairness.
Although companies reported low levels of conflict, it remains that factors CSFC7 
(the impact of transfer prices on divisional profits) and CSFC8 (the importance of the 
transfer commodity to the division) are the major predictors of conflict over transfer 
pricing. The existence of conflict was not found to be necessarily dysfunctional as it has 
in many cases led to improving existing systems. In general, companies opt for dialogue 
and mutual concessions for resolving conflict. The logical analysis applied to the 
summarised data has so far led to the confirmation of Hypothesis Five that "changes in 
organisational structure and strategy result in changes (or need for change) in transfer 
pricing policies91. Further analysis is provided in the next two chapters to test the validity 
of the remaining four hypotheses. Chapter 7 extends the analysis of the managerial 
implications of the TPS by explicitly focussing on divisional performance evaluation, 
incentive schemes and the agency relationships.
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CHAPTER 7: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT,
EVALUATION AND REWARD, AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIPS AND INTER-DIVISIONAL 
TRANSFERS IN THE DECENTRALISED 
BRITISH COMPANY.
This chapter examines the performance evaluation and reward schemes of the 
responding companies and uses agency theory as a framework of analysis of 
interdependent relationships.
The delegation of authority and responsibility in the decentralised company cannot 
yield the desired levels of efficiency and effectiveness in turning inputs into outputs 
without the monitoring of the delegatee's achievement through the use of a sound 
performance measurement, evaluation and reward system (PMERS). This implies that 
the performance has to be expressed in numeric terms or quantified. Traditionally, the 
quantifier is a monetary measure based on accounting reports. Since the PMERS is 
obviously not cost free, its efficiency depends on its design.
The adequacy of the performance quantifier in the decentralised company - and 
hence, its fairness and acceptability to managers - depends on its consistency with the 
levels of authority and responsibility in the divisions. The control process in the 
divisionalised company - of which the PMERS is an integral part - exists in a human and 
social context because it is the process through which "management channels the 
behaviour and performance of individual managers and sub-units, making certain actions 
desirable and likely, while effectively ruling out other undesirable actions91 (Lebas and 
Weigenstein, 1986, p. 259). This is because the measures of performance comprised in 
the PMERS contain implicit value judgements and assume knowledge of what they 
evaluate, i.e., some desired decision-making behaviour is expected from the decentralised 
manager (Merchant, 1985a, Magee, 1986 and Kaplan and Atkinson, 1989). Therefore, 
the design of an effective PMERS initially requires answers to a number of inter-related 
issues (Caplan, 1971, Pursell, 1980 and Magee, 1986):
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1) what performance measures should be used,
2) how many measures should be used,
3) where should these measures apply: that is what variables to measure, and
4) how does the incentive scheme depend on these variables?
Taking these questions into account a clear distinction was drawn in the 
questionnaire (Section D) between the measurement of the division's performance and 
the manager's performance. This distinction is adapted from the literature on divisional 
control which stresses the need to segregate the influence of non-controllable factors (for 
example, head office expenses, geographical location, difficult circumstances, etc.) on 
managerial performance measurement and reflect the impact of the "human assets" on 
the performance. The rationale for this is that performance evaluation cannot be expected 
to achieve the desired motivational impact on divisional managers if the latter are judged 
on the basis of non-controllable factors, especially if the effect of these factors on 
divisional results is not taken into account when deciding on the reward and punishment 
policies.
For the present sample of 33 companies, profit responsibility was found predominant 
(Chapter 5, Sections 5.8.6 and 5.8.7). As all companies consider their operating divisions 
as profit centres - and therefore, encourage competition between divisions - this defines 
the centre- division authority relationship and the system of performance measurement 
and rewards (or the Management Control System, MCS). This chapter summarises the 
findings on companies performance evaluation and reward schemes and draws the agency 
relationships in the light of the findings in the previous two chapters.
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7.1 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT POLICIES
The following pattern of ex-post monitoring was observed from answers to section 
D of the questionnaire: 1) the use of (formal) multiple performance measures, 2) the 
dominance of profits, cash flows and formula-based financial measures in evaluating 
performance, 3) the exclusion of the cost of capital from the profit measures, 4) a 
budget-related measurement system, and the 5) evaluation of both divisions and managers 
on the same basis (Table 7.1).
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
ACRONYM
ABSOLUTE PROFITS
RATIO OF PROFITS/EQUITY
RATIO OF PROFITS/TOTAL
ASSETS
RATIO OF PROFITS/SALES
RESIDUAL INCOME
COST PERFORMANCE
CASH FLOW
SALES GROWTH RATE
ADHERENCE TO BUDGETS
PRODUCT INNOVATION
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
EARNINGS PER SHARE (E.P.S.)
PRODUCT QUALITY
DEBTORS LEVELS
STOCK TURNOVER
DEPENDS on nature of
business
(PERMl)
(PERM2)
(PERM3)
(PERM4)
(PERMS)
(PERM6)
(PERM?)
(PERMS)
(PERM9)
(PERM10)
(PERMl 1)
(PERM12)
(PERM13)
(PERM14)
(PERMl 5)
(PERM16)
DIVISION
No.
23
9
22
20
-
5
20
8
23
7
8
3
1
1
1
1
%
70%
27%
67%
61%
-
15%
61%
24%
70%
21%
24%
9%
3%
3%
3%
3%
MANAGER
No.
22
9
20
20
-
6
19
7
22
7
8
3
1
1
1
1
%
67%
27%
61%
61%
-
18%
58%
21%
67%
21%
24%
9%
3%
3%
3%
3%
(*) due to length considerations no particular definition was made in the questionnaire 
for any of the listed performance parameters. No question was asked about the asset base 
in PERM3.(**) PERMS, PERM9 & PERM 12 used as single measures by three companies for both 
the division's and the manager's performance. The remaining 30 companies use a 
combination of two to eight measures.
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7.1.1 FORMALITY AND MULTIPLICITY OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES
The sheer size and diversity of the responding companies is indicative of the 
necessity for multiple formal performance standards. Formality is dictated by 
practicability (Merchant, 1984) and multiplicity is necessary because any selected single 
measure in the large company is bound to give an incomplete picture of performance. It 
is virtually impossible for a single financial measure to include all, or most, of the variables 
that affect the success of a division and its manager.
The versatile performance measurement systems summarised in Table 7.1 reflect a 
number of the characteristics of the responding companies described in the two previous 
chapters, namely company size, diversification patterns, priority of objectives and 
multiplicity of transfer pricing policies. Only three companies reported single 
performance measures whereas, on average, 70% of the respondents use a combination 
of three to six profitability measures.
7.1.2 PROFIT AND CASH FLOW PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THE 
SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE.
Divisions are accountable for both their contribution to their companies' net income 
and for the annual returns on their allocated assets. The dominance of the profit measure 
is concordant with the companies' answers to questions QA3 (classification of divisions) 
and QA4 (management priorities or business strategy). It has already been stated that all 
companies consider their divisions as profit centres. Among the eight objectives listed in 
question QA4, long-run profit (CHPM2) scored the highest mean of 4.75 and the lowest 
standard deviation of 0.43 (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.7). Short-term profit was ranked the 
fourth major objective with a mean of 4.15. It was also found that profit maximisation 
was the major objective assigned to the transfer pricing system (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1).
Moreover, it was earlier found (Chapter 6, Table 6.29) that the two major sources 
of conflict over transfer pricing were 1) the impact of the transfer pricing system on 
divisional profits and 2) the importance of the transferred commodity to the division. 
Since the market price is the dominant pricing base and long-term profitability is the
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prime corporate objective, the spirit of competition is encouraged in most companies and 
is assumed to lead to profit maximisation. Hence, the widespread use of absolute profits 
or accounting based income (PERM1), used in conjunction with all the other measures, 
particularly with PERMS, PERM4, PERM? and PERM9. This also indicates that 
performance measurement is mostly expressed in financial terms and, given that the 
Accounting Information System (AIS) is the principal information source, it can be 
concluded that companies' MCS s rely heavily on accounting data for appraising divisional 
performance.
The question that poses itself here is whether the accounting performance measures 
(or APM; Hirst, 1983 and Kren and Liao, 1988) can accurately assess all the contributing 
factors to the firm's (priority) objectives in a decentralised but interdependent 
environment? By the same token, do divisional managers necessarily accept their 
performance to be measured by accounting techniques? Previous research suggests 
otherwise. For instance, Hopwood (1972, pp. 157-158 and 174) noted that
"not all the relevant dimensions of managerial performance are included 
in accounting reports since neither accountants nor managers have 
developed comprehensive measures and standards. The accounting data 
are primarily concerned with representing outcomes, while managerial 
activity is concerned with the detailed process giving rise to the final 
outcomes. If there are factors which constrain the reported efficiency 
of the process despite the quality of the manager's performance, the 
accounting data will be an inadequate reflection of his performance. 
[Thus], although accounting data are often the most important formal 
source of information in an organization... they are usually incomplete 
and even biased indicators of managerial performance".
Similar arguments to Hop wood's about the ineffectiveness of indiscriminate use of 
accounting information as a performance measure were put forth by Solomons (1965), 
Caplan (1971), Parker (1979), Hirst (1981 and 1983),Pratt and Zeckhauser(1985), Parker 
et al. (1986) and Amigoni (1989). These conclusions are indirectly supported by the 
managerial response to financial measures of performance as contained later in Section 
7.2.2.
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Table 7.1 above also reveals the importance attached to four other performance 
indicators (PERMS, PERM4, PERM? and PERM9). While residual income (PERM5) 
does not seem to be popular, return on investment (PERMS) and the profit percentage on 
sales value (PERM4) are calculated by 20 (61%) of the participating companies. The 
importance of these measures to the respondents lessens the disadvantages associated 
with absolute profits as a sole measure of performance. It is also observed that budgets 
(PERM9) play an important role in performance appraisal as two thirds of the companies 
compare divisional achievements to predetermined targets.
The one company that did not specify its performance policy (PERM 16) is a 
construction company whose core business is contract-based and has market-oriented 
transfer prices. A telephone conversation with the respondent revealed that profit ratios 
and cash flow are used as performance parameters depending on the nature of the business. 
For example, if a division "uses a lot of funds" i.e. is capital intensive, an ROI measure 
is applied. Market conditions are also taken into account as some divisions could be 
operating in depressed areas. In fact, most of the profit achievements of this company 
come from the South-East of England.
The use of the profit ratio PERM2 (return on equity) and especially the extensive 
use of PERMS (return on total assets or ROI, return on investment), PERM? (cash flow) 
and PERM9 (budgets) is clear evidence that investment centres exist in practically every 
responding company. The ROI measure which relates profits to the level of divisional 
investment presumes that a) some measure of the division's investment base is possible 
and b) the divisional manager exerts considerable influence on the investment base. This 
supports the conclusion made earlier (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.6.2) that the respondents 
labelled their responsibility centres "profit centres" merely for convenience since 
investment centres are also held accountable for profit.
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7.1.3 RESIDUAL INCOME OR THE EXCLUSION OF THE COST OF CAPITAL
No company reported using residual income (PERM5), much acclaimed in theory 
(for instance Solomons, 1965, Tomkins, 1973, 1975a, 1975b and Mepham, 1980). One 
possible reason for the exclusion of PERM5 is because no definition of the terms 'residual 
income' was given in the questionnaire to make the notion of cost of capital explicit. 
However, companies' answers to a previous question (QF2) showed that the cost of capital 
does not have a significant impact on the review and adjustment of transfer prices (Chapter 
6 Table 6.26). Except for two companies with cost-based transfers, no particular 
difference was observed between the companies in this respect. However, Pratten (1986) 
argues that when transfer prices are based on cost, interest charges and a profit margin 
have to be included if transfer prices are to reflect total costs of production.
Nonetheless, when examining companies' replies to question QB1 (Chapter 5, 
Table 5.15) one finds that 25 (76%) of the respondents claimed that divisional managers 
have high levels of discretion on investment decisions. This satisfies the controllability 
criterion required by the advocates of residual income as a measure of divisional 
performance so that divisional managers are aware of the cost of finance when making 
their decisions. In other words, if divisional managers exert control over the amount of 
capital invested in their ventures, interest on capital should be included in divisional profit 
measurement to ensure efficient use of capital resources. This is particularly important 
if managers' compensation is tied to profits knowing that interest on debt finance adds 
to the expenses of the accounting period. Therefore, the exclusion of PERM5 does not 
seem justified since divisional managers were reported by the respondents to enjoy high 
levels of discretion over investment decisions. If this hypothesis is adhered to, it would 
imply that companies' replies to question QB1 are biased in that divisional managers may 
not have the claimed autonomy over capital investment. This conclusion tallies with the 
arguments against the inclusion of a charge for interest on capital employed when 
divisional autonomy is curtailed (for instance Amey, 1969 and 1975, Samuels, 1969 and 
Bromwich, 1973).
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On the other hand, it may also be deduced that residual income is generally not a 
popular performance measure. This second hypothesis seems relatively more plausible 
in the light of evidence from previous studies conducted by Mauriel and Anthony (U.S.A., 
1966), Tomkins (U.K., 1973), Reece and Cool (U.S.A., 1978) and Scapens and Sale 
(U.S.A. and U.K., 1981). All reported a limited use of residual income. Of particular 
importance is the finding by Scapens and Sale on capital expenditure as in 83% of 173 
responding companies divisional managers were allowed to spend on individual projects 
but up to certain limits or ceilings. The mean capital expenditure limit of companies 
studied was £104,000. Furthermore, in 86% of the companies, divisions did not have 
authority to raise finance externally. A recent survey by Pratten (1986) balances the 
arguments above. Pratten found that two thirds of U.K.-based private companies did 
charge interest to their operating businesses, provided the latter were enjoying substantial 
degrees of discretion over decisions.
7.1.4 DIVISION VS. MANAGER AND THE UNIFORMITY OF THE PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE
Twenty seven (82%) of the respondents evaluate both divisions (or economic 
viability) and managers' performance on the same (profit) basis. In other words, only six 
(18%) companies seem to take into account non-controllable factors when appraising and 
sanctioning managerial performance. According to responsibility accounting, this 
indicates that the majority of companies hold divisional managers accountable for 
expenses over which they do not have control or which are not directly traceable to their 
particular divisions. A possible reason for judging the division's and the manager's 
performance with the same standard is the difficulty to translate the latter in numerical 
terms and the difficulty of disaggregating performance. However, divisional 
interdependence raises the question of controllability, traceability and equity (Miller, 
1982). The existence of internal trade in the sample companies implies that the achieved 
performance may in fact be the outcome of joint efforts of many participants within the 
company, sometimes using common resources. Therefore, the observed performance 
measures can be considered as surrogate variables or imperfect measures of outcome 
(Banker et al, 1988) of the actual manager's performance.
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A second plausible reason is that, even when the manager is said to have some 
discretion over a decision, it is likely that the decision is affected by factors outside his 
authority. In other words, the divisional manager may not exercise full authority over 
decisions but only influences them in a semi or pseudo-autonomous environment. 
Therefore, the issue of controllability remains a problem of performance measurement 
in the decentralised company because of the failure - deliberate or otherwise - to 
encompass the intervening factors, especially the human factor, in judging the 
achievement of the divisional manager (Likert, 1958).
Nonetheless, the controllability criterion is rejected by some writers on managerial 
control for at least the following three reasons (Merchant, 1987). First, divisional 
managers who are held accountable for outcomes which they do not fully control will be 
motivated not to avoid bearing risk in decision taking. The second reason advanced is to 
make managers realise the effect of their decisions on areas outside their control. The 
third argument discards controllability to enable relative or peer performance evaluation 
of managers operating in similar environments.
However, the above arguments are based on broad assumptions whose applicability 
should be assessed in terms of the specific performance indicators comprised in the 
PMERS. This leads to another explanation - and probably the most plausible - for the 
uniformity of the PMERS of the participating companies, that is, the emphasis on 
short-term fixed period returns as reflected in the companies' major performance 
measures (PERM1, PERMS, PERM4, PERM9). Managerial performance cannot always 
be assessed on a short-term basis as a manager's effort may only come to fruition in a 
couple of years time, i.e. it is of a long-term nature. "Accounting techniques cannot 
accurately assess many contributors to a firm's long-term profitability, such as reputation 
for quality, condition of equipment or research accomplishments" (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 
1985, p. 10). Therefore the noticeable lack of long-term performance measures tends to 
imply that managerial effort is not properly observed and assessed and, as a consequence, 
one can expect managers to resist the way their performance is evaluated and rewarded. 
Further discussion of this point will be found in Section 7.2.2.
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7.2 BUDGET-RELATED PERFORMANCE AND EX-POST MONITORING
7.2.1 PROFIT OBJECTIVES, DIVISIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, PARTICIPATION 
AND BUDGET GOALS
The extensive use of profit ratios (ROI, ROS) requires the pre-setting of targets 
against which actual achievements are compared. Cross-divisional comparisons cannot 
always be conclusive because of the inherent differences between divisions in terms of 
the nature and profitability of activities, the age and efficiency of the production equipment 
and differences in market competition in their geographic areas. Therefore the ratios are 
more useful for time-series analysis for individual companies. The necessity of 
comprehensive budgetary planning and control systems for the large divisionalised 
company is profusely discussed in the accounting literature. A budget is defined as
"an ex-ante statement, generally determined by negotiation and approved 
by management, of the resource inflows and outflows expected during the 
budget period [and] thus is an explicit outlining of expectations between 
superior and subordinate" (Simons, 1988, p. 266).
For the majority of the participating companies, the preparation and monitoring of 
budgets is primordial in the control of the operating divisions.
The observed emphasis on profit performance fosters a competitive spirit and this 
may inhibit the desired levels of co-operation among interdependent profit centres. 
Divisions may be tempted to promote short-term perspectives that hamper the long-run 
interests of the company. Since a ratio expresses a relationship between two variables, 
this may induce managers to try to maintain (or reduce) the denominator of the profit 
ratio to the minimum in order to report an impressive result that will affect the rewards. 
For instance, a divisional manager may forego the opportunity to invest in a long-term 
project just to keep an ROI ratio high in the short term. This sort of manipulative behaviour 
may be lessened by evaluating performance against pre-determined targets or budgeted 
results. Hence, the purpose of control is to secure conformity with prescribed rules (or 
standards), to correct deviations from those rules and to assign responsibility for the 
deviations.
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Compliance with the budget depends on 1) the extent to which divisional managers 
are involved in setting the budget targets and 2) the degree of tightness of the targets, or 
goal difficulty. The reported high levels of participation in budget-setting is supported 
by previous research (for instance, Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975, and Merchant, 1981). 
It implies extensive delegation of authority and responsibility and decisions are made at 
the divisional level by informed managers. This offsets the impact of budgets as 
instruments constraining managers' behaviour in that participation should be expected 
to lead to the acceptability of the budget by divisional managers. Consequently, this is 
likely to curtail the likelihood of information impactedness as participative budgeting 
should motivate towards incorporating divisional private information in the budget. 
Brownell (1982) found that a budget-related evaluation style was most effective under 
conditions of high participation and ineffective where participation was low.
On the other hand, budget goal difficulty has been extensively researched elsewhere 
(for example, Merchant, 1981 and 1985b, and Simons, 1988) and is reflected in the 
managerial response to the performance measures as discussed below.
7.2.2 MANAGERIAL RESPONSE ATTITUDES TO FINANCIAL MEASURES OF 
PERFORMANCE.
Since budgets are control devices they are an important source of learning and 
discovery, and their behavioural dimension - in terms of their impact on human 
relationships in the organisation - has long been recognized in the literature (for instance 
Argyris, 1952 and 1953, Hopwood, 1973 and Parker et al., 1986).
Corporate perceptions of divisional managers' response to companies' APM are 
reproduced in Table 7.2 and 7.3 and can be grouped into 1) the positive response attitudes 
or desirable behaviour (DMRC8, assuming unbiased corporate views) and 2) the negative 
response attitudes or undesirable behaviour (DMRC1 to DMRC7) which undermine the 
effectiveness of the MCS.
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The first group of response attitudes is represented by a total of twelve companies 
which found question QD5 not relevant (item DMRC8) and as such did not report any 
particular managerial reaction to the performance measures. All but one gave their reasons 
for the irrelevance of the question.
It is clear from the information grouped in Table 7.2 below that the majority of these 
twelve companies have very low levels of internal trade, i.e. minimal task interdependence 
or "pooled interdependence" (Thompson, 1967) or "low task uncertainty" in the words 
of Hirst (1981 and 1983). Transfer prices are basically market-based and determined by 
the divisions (TPSG3) without interference from top management. Except for companies 
F and K, the TPS does not seem to have a significant impact on divisional results and as 
such does not represent a potential source of conflict. It is also noticed that in both company 
F and K, the transfer price is market-based and is set by the divisions (TPSG3). In these 
two companies central management adopts an avoidance stance with regard to conflict 
over transfer pricing. Corporate policy is to push divisional managers to be competitive 
and attain targets in order to avoid inter-divisional conflict because of the high impact of 
the TPS on divisional results (item CSFC7).
On the other hand, it can also be inferred from Table 7.2 that the respondents' 
comments tend to indicate high levels of co-operation between divisions. Knowing that 
divisional managers are better informed about their businesses, i.e. they possess 
information about their technology and market conditions that the centre lacks, collusion 
cannot be ruled out in these twelve companies. There is always the risk that divisional 
managers may enter into an agreement to misrepresent their reported performance. This 
could be the case of Companies F and K where the impact of the TPS on divisional results 
is a major source of conflict.
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The perverse results reported by the remaining 21 participating companies and 
summarised below in Table 7.3 may be interpreted as a failure of the companies' MCSs 
to generate the necessary motivational impact that links target attainment with managers' 
expectations. This may be due to:
1) failure to specify objectives correctly which results in task 
ambiguity for the interdependent divisions,
2) inadequacy of the performance (constraining) measure because 
of the incompleteness of the APM to encompass all the factors 
that determine divisional performance,
3) lack of power devolution,
4) lack of fairness of the TPS,
5) divergence (or incongruence) of divisional managers personal goals 
from organisational goals, and
6) inadequacy of the incentive compensation scheme.
TABLE 7.3 (QD5) MANAGERS' REACTIONS TO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES
DIVISIONAL MANAGER'S BEHAVIOUR
[AS VIEWED BY CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
ON THE BASIS OF RECURRING EXPERIENCE]
DMRCi -Complain on fairness of transfer
pricing system
DMRC2-Conflict over transfer prices
DMRCS-Indulge in bickering
DMRC4-Bias and build slack in reported
information
DMRCS-Increase competition not
co-operation
DMRC6-Increase mistrust between divisions
DMRC7-Increase mistrust between divisions
and corporate management
DMRC8-Not applicable
TOTAL
ALL
11
9
3
6
8
5
4
12
-
PATTERN*
SINGLE
2
2
-
2
1
-
-
-
7
MATRIX
9
7
3
4
7
5
4
-
-
(*) 7 companies reported only one type of reaction and 14 companies a 
matrix of behaviour. N = 33.
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The combination of variables DMRC1 to DMRC7 reinforces earlier findings and 
arguments. In Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.5.2) it was mentioned that fairness and conflict 
resolution was the third most important factor for the prevalence of particular transfer 
pricing policies. Further analysis in Section 6.4.3 of that chapter showed that the review 
and adjustment of transfer prices resulted in reducing internal conflict. Given the observed 
managerial reaction to the performance measures, it can equally be said that the review 
and improvement of the performance evaluation and reward system (PMERS) is as 
important as the review and adjustment of the TPS in reducing/resolving conflict in the 
decentralised company. This adds to an earlier conclusion (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.2, 
Finding 13) that conflict is not necessarily dysfunctional. Since the reported managerial 
reaction is part of the learning process for a coalition of individuals whose actions are 
co-ordinated by the TPS and the PMERS, the undesirable behaviour can be turned into 
a functional element if the appropriate and timely corrective actions are operated on the 
TPS and the PMERS. This argument will be discussed further in Section 7.5.
The existence of bias and slack creating (DMRC4) implies that corporate 
management was able to detect and measure them and then take corrective actions. The 
challenge in the detection of bias and slack in these large decentralised companies lies 
in the fact that top management has to rely on the information supplied by divisional 
managers. Since the answers contained in Table 7.3 represent corporate perceptions, it 
can only be assumed that these perceptions are based on past experience - as question 
QD5 emphasises - for instance, through the auditing of past divisional performance 
reports.
Table 7.4 below reveals that bias and slack building are reported by six companies, 
four of them with very high levels of transfer transactions, i.e. "sequential and reciprocal 
interdependence" (Thompson, 1967) or "high levels of task uncertainty" (Hirst, 1981 
and 1983). Hirst (1983) found that when task uncertainty was combined with a 
performance evaluation style that relied primarily on APM, significant job-related tension 
existed. For the present four companies the tension is intensified by the fact that the 
transfers are mostly valued on a cost-basis and divisional managers' freedom on pricing
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Table 7.4 (QD5): COMPANIES THAT REPORTED BIAS AND SLACK BUILDING (DMRC4)
Company
M
N
O
P
Q
R
Industry
Chemicals
Electronics
Electronics
Electronics
Construction
Chemicals
% I! Pricing | Pricing 
Transfers Base Decision
40%
40%
40%
33%
5.4%
<5%
Cost
Cost
Cost
Market
Market
Market
TPSGl
TPSG4
TPSG2
TPSGl
TPS03
TPSG3
OBTP1
OBTP2
**
Very High
Very High
High
High
High
High
Causes of
conflict
***
CSFC7. CSPC8
CSFC2, CSFC3 
CSFC6.CSFC10
CSFC3, CSFC7
CSFC3, CSFC4 
CSFC7, CSFC8
CSFC3, CSFC4 
CSFC6, CSFC8
CSFC3, CSFC4 
CSFC7, CSFC8
Other
DMRC
****
DMRCl, DMRC2 
DMRC3
none
DMRCl, DMRC5 
DMRC6
DMRC3. DMRC5
none
DMRC7
(*) TPSG: Locus of the transfer pricing decision (question QC1) [TPSGl=by corporate management; TPSG2=with consultation of divisions; TPSG3=between divisions; TPSG4=selling division(**) OBTPl=performance evaluation of divisions; OBTP2=performance evaluation of managers](***) CSFC2=centralisation of TPS; CSFC3=lack of trust between divisions; CSFC4=restricted information flow; CSFC6=negotiation of transfer prices; CSFC7=impact of TPS on divisional profits; CSFC8=dmportance of transfer to division; CSFC10=freedom to trade externally.
(****) as in Table 7.3.
transfers and external procurement is curtailed. Interestingly three of these companies 
operate in the electronics sector, i.e. the high technology industry. Among these three 
companies Company P with 33% transfers and market-based prices indicated that the 
reported managerial behaviour (DMRC3, DMRC4, DMRC5) was not critical as it only 
had a "nuisance value". The respondent stressed that local objectives were set in the light 
of existing transfer prices.
As the TPS impacts highly on divisional results in these three high technology firms, 
the transfer pricing policy should take into account the life cycle of the products. When 
the particular product matures and, because of advances in technology and pressure from 
competition, reductions in equipment prices occur. Hence the divisional manager is to 
remain competitive he/she should be provided with sufficient (profit) incentives to be 
able to offer price discounts to the internal as well as the external customers.
In this perspective only Companies N and O in Table 7.4 considered technological 
conditions (question QF2, itemFCTR.10) as a major factor for transfer pricing adjustment. 
As indicated earlier in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.2), the electronics Company N is already 
in the process of reverting to market-based transfers. This company will be the subject 
of a comparative case study in the next chapter where it is referred to as Silicon Ltd.
The existence of bias and slack building or misrepresentation of private information 
also indicates that divisional managers incorporate some of their personal objectives into 
their managerial choices in showing conformity to the targets and rules specified by 
corporate management. Although divisional managers were reported not to be highly 
involved in setting performance evaluation measures (Chapter 5, Section 5.8.8), it can 
be deduced from Table 7.3 above that divisional managers do have a-priori knowledge 
of the performance measure(s) and the incentive scheme, i.e. they know that budgeted 
performance is linked to remuneration after ex-post monitoring. Thus, in these companies, 
divisional participation in budgeting is not necessarily a guarantor of private information 
disclosure. Divisional managers may exploit the ignorance of their superiors in order to
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maintain a degree of managerial independence to assist in the pursuit of their own 
objectives (DMRC3 to DMRC7). They can indulge in collusion or, in Argyris's (1953) 
words, they may form cohesive groups to combat senior management pressure.
The perceived lack of fairness of the financial performance measure also reflects 
the shared risks in achieving outcomes and the consequent impact on the distributed 
rewards or sanctions to the interdependent divisions. The existence of considerable 
amounts of internal trade in the companies that reported attitudes DMRC1 to DMRC7 
requires substantial joint effort or co-operation between the divisions concerned. Since 
the transfer price represents a revenue to the transferor and a cost to the transferee, i.e. it 
is represented with opposite signs in the revenue and cost functions, it can be a source of 
friction between divisions over sharing rewards (Philippakis and Thompson, 1970). 
Therefore, "incentive compensation can influence the way in which division managers 
work together" (Salter, 1973, p. 95). Obviously, interdependent divisional managers 
would prefer less monitoring and lower risks in the reward system (Harris and Raviv, 
1979). Recent research by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) shows that there is a direct 
relationship between monitoring and the risk level of bonuses and long-term income to 
chief executive officers.
Stated otherwise it can be deduced from the foregoing analysis that the actual 
performance evaluation systems of the sample companies may be encouraging the 
observed undesirable behaviour which can be seen in this situation as "rational economic 
behaviour" (Otley, 1985 and Parker et al. 1986) or "moral hazard, shirking and adverse 
selection" in the agency literature. This sort of behaviour seems to persist since 
companies' answers are based on their recurrent experience. This implies that, in general, 
efforts have not been made to improve the situation - or efforts have been made but were 
not successful. As such, the observed undesirable behaviour has become embedded in 
the companies' cultures. The embedding is nurtured by the length of time the particular 
divisional manager has spent and thinks will remain with his/her company and the pattern 
of staff rotation and transfers within the company. This important explicative time element 
has unfortunately not been covered by the present study. Recent research - not covering
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the transfer pricing problem - concluded, however, that demographic variables (age, 
tenure and status) were of little consequence in predicting managerial response attitudes 
(Collins, 1988).
In conclusion to the above discussion one can simply say that, in the multi-divisional 
company, undesirable behaviour is contingent not only on the degree of task uncertainty 
but also on the impact of the TPS on evaluated and rewarded divisional performance, 
especially when there is heavy reliance on APM. In other words, there is an organisational 
dilemma of how to make managers take rational decisions in risky and uncertain contexts. 
It is often suggested in the literature that the answer to this dilemma lies in the design of 
suitable compensation packages.
7.3 MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION SCHEMES
Due to length considerations in the questionnaire, the question on compensation 
schemes has been built around only two standards of measurement, that is, satisfactory 
and unsatisfactory performance. In reality, however, the achieved performance could be 
measured on a multiple-standard scale, for example:
satisfactory/unsatisfactory 
fully satisfactory/unsatisfactory 
more than satisfactory/unsatisfactory 
outstanding/very unsatisfactory
Table 7.5 and 7.6 summarise the direct and indirect formal performance rewards 
and penalising policies of end results reported by the participants. No informal or 
discretionary measures were mentioned, though these cannot be ruled out.
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TABLE 7.5 (QD6) SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
REWARD
PRWDI- Promote
PRWD2- Increase pay
PRWD3- Give bonuses
PRWD4- Give more power
PRWDS- Consult on strategic
decision making
ALL
19
17
29
3
5
SINGLE
1
1
8
-
-
N = 33
TABLE 7.6 (QD6) UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
SANCTION
PSCNl- Dismiss
PSCN2- Transfer
PSCN3- Advise/train
PSCN4- Give more power
PSCN5- Help overcome
weaknesses
ALL
17
19
20
 
18
SINGLE
2
2
3
-
2
N = 33
7.3.1 FORMALITY AND VARIABILITY OF INCENTIVES AND SANCTIONS
The aggregate data in Table 7.5 and 7.6 show that only few companies have 
single-variable schemes. The variability reported by the great majority of companies 
reflects their variability of performance measures discussed earlier. However, the 
multiplicity of schemes in the tables above does not have the same meaning. While 
satisfactory performance is rewarded in most companies with one or a combination of 
the incentives in Table 7.5, penalisation is generally limited to one typical sanction which 
depends on the severity and frequency of poor performance.
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7.3.2 FINANCIAL VS. NON-FINANCIAL SCHEMES
The widespread use of bonuses implies that managers prefer fixed or relatively 
secure salaries. Previous research indicates that it is not a widespread practice in the U.K. 
to relate managers' income directly to their performance (Channon, 1973 and Pratten, 
1986). This substantiates the evidence given in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) on the lack of 
enthusiasm in PRP schemes by large British companies. This can also be inferred from 
Table 7.6 which indicates that poor performance is not sanctioned financially, though 
dismissal (PSCN1) and transfer (PSCN2) may indirectly bring financial losses to the 
person concerned in the same way as promotion has an indirect financial link with 
performance.
The fact that very few companies considered rewarding their divisional managers 
by giving them more power (PRWD4) or consulting them on strategic issues (PRWD5) 
does not necessarily imply that non-financial rewards other than promotion are not 
important. In fact, the few companies that reported PRWD4 and PRWD5 are among the 
19 companies that reward their successful divisional managers with promotion (PRWD1). 
Since these are large M-form companies, promotion of the divisional manager means an 
upward move in the hierarchy to more prestige, responsibility and financial benefits, i.e. 
it leads to more discretion over decisions including the formulation of company strategy.
In contrast no company considered delegating further decision-making power to 
bad performers. This may add to an earlier conclusion that many of the participating 
companies are structurally but not managerially decentralised. Instead of power 
devolution, companies opt for helping their divisional managers overcome their 
weaknesses (PSCN5), but no detail was given as to the nature of the help provided.
Given that 27 (82%) companies evaluate both the manager's and the division's 
performance on the same basis (Section 7.1.4 above), it can be assumed that the 
compensation schemes of the majority of the responding companies are based on the 
financial results of the responsibility centres, not managerial performance. According to 
responsibility accounting, an agent's compensation should only be based on what he 
directly controls. However, in the presence of internal transfers of goods and services,
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especially mandatory transfers and prices, this notion is questionable because divisional 
managers share the same performance. Hence, the need for relative performance 
measures. The reward/sanction schemes of the companies tend to show that divisional 
managers are rewarded on the basis of their absolute outcomes but not according to the 
difference of outcomes, possibly to avoid collusion.
Moreover, in the majority of the companies turnover, absolute profits and profit 
ratios are used for measuring and evaluating divisional performance. As it was earlier 
found (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1) that the major source of internal conflict was the impact 
of the transfer pricing system on divisional profits it can be said that there is an agency 
problem in most companies. This is to say that there are problems in allocating the 
responsibilities and monitoring them. The emerging 'agency theory' seems to provide an 
appropriate framework of analysis for tackling this dilemma.
7.4 THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRANSFER PRICING 
PROBLEM
7.4.1 THE AGENCY MODEL AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE TRANSFER 
PRICING CONTEXT
In its simplest form, an agency relationship exists "whenever one individual depends 
on the action of another" (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985, p. 2). A more formal definition 
views this relationship as "a contract under which one or more persons - theprincipal(s) 
- engage another person - the agent - to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent" (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p. 308) who will be compensated for the service performed (Merchant and Simons, 
1986, p. 188). By contract is meant both the explicit (or written) agreements and implicit 
bargaining process over outcomes, ways of judging performance and the resulting 
pay-offs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The contracting relationship is thought to bring the 
conflicting objectives of principal and agents into equilibrium (Kren and Liao, 1988). It 
should be added that most agency models are limited to a single principal-single agent 
relationship over a single time period.
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Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be motivated solely by self-interest. 
For example a divisional manager (agent) may be aiming at earning esteem and getting 
a promotion whereas top management (principal) emphasises short-term profitability. 
What complicates the situation is that the divisional manager has the advantage of 
possessing private information about the tasks he performs and therefore the potential 
for intra-firm conflict accentuated by information asymmetry cannot be ruled out. Hence 
the agency relationship is not cost-free because of the need to monitor the agent's activities 
to ensure that the agent fulfils his/her fiduciary responsibility (contained in the 
employment contract) of aligning his/her interests with those of the principal.
The derived managerial response to performance measures discussed in the 
preceding section provides a case where the agency theory paradigm can be introduced. 
The relevance of this paradigm to management accounting has already been researched 
by Baiman (1982 and 1990) and therefore the purpose here is not to expound on the theory 
itself but to apply a framework of analysis to the transfer pricing problem. The 
principal-agent model is applied here in the special context of the divisionalised (or 
hierarchical) company with internal 'sales' of goods and services among divisions which 
is the case of the companies participating in the present study. As Eccles (1985) rightly 
observed, the agency-relationship in this context is at least a three-person problem 
involving one principal and two agents, the principal being the corporate manager or 
director and the agents the divisional general managers.
Since every company in the responding sample has more than two divisions, the 
agency relationship in the present analysis is assumed to be multi-agent. The 
appropriateness of this context stems from the varying degrees of interdependence 
between divisions or task uncertainty. Uncertainty is a basic tenet of agency theory. 
Therefore the agency relationship exists at two levels of the decentralised hierarchy. First, 
there is a company-wide agency between central management and the divisional managers 
and second, a divisional-level agency between the parties to the internal transaction. In 
the latter case the transferor division can be considered as the agent performing services
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in the form of supply of intermediate commodities that satisfy the needs of the transferee 
division or principal. The contract that binds the agency relationship here is the transfer 
pricing system and any informal agreements regarding the transfer transaction.
Since the particular transfer price has opposite signs in the objective functions of 
the divisions and, given the agency assumption of motivation by self-interest, the 
transferor division (agent) will try to maximise its revenue from the transfer and the 
transferee division (principal) will try to minimise the impact of the transfer price on its 
product cost. Conflict arises if either division sees its interests undermined. What 
complicates the situation where there is divisional interdependence is when there are 
restrictions imposed on the divisions by central management and the TPS plays a major 
role in monitoring divisional performance. In Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) it was indicated 
that 1) thirteen of the participating companies require approval for external procurement 
and 2) in twelve companies central management fixes or intervenes in fixing the transfer 
price, especially if the internal transaction is important.
7.4.2 ASPECTS OF THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE SAMPLE COMPANIES
7.4.2.1 TASK INTERDEPENDENCE, RISK ATTITUDE, MORAL HAZARD 
AND AGENCY COSTS
The agency model asserts that conflict of interests necessarily exists and that agency 
costs are unavoidable to prevent the agent from taking decisions that divert from the 
principal's interests (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989 and Kaplan and Atkinson, 1989).
The managerial response to the financial performance measures contained in Table 
7.3 above indicates that the agent's choice of action does not conform to the principal's 
preferred action. It also indicates that divisional managers in these companies are 
risk-averse and points to the existence of moral hazard as managers are reported to 
misrepresent their private information because of the TPS and the PMERS. Moral hazard 
is said to occur when the principal is not able to observe the agent's action or level of 
effort and therefore cannot use the agent's effort as a basis for effective performance 
evaluation but rather relies on surrogate measures (Kren and Liao, 1988).
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As far as risk is concerned divisional managers' attitudes do not stem only from 
their concern about the PMERS but may also be viewed in terms of the overall corporate 
attitude towards risk. Since no question was built in the questionnaire to address this 
specific issue, it is rather difficult to assess the degree of risk aversion or risk taking in 
any of the responding companies except through indirect inferences. For example, the 
compensation schemes in Table 7.5 and 7.6 are indicative of divisional and corporate 
attitudes to risk. Divisional managers' preference of relatively secure salaries and the 
lack of enthusiasm for PRP schemes point to risk aversion with regard to tying part of 
the salary to accomplishment. A similar argument applies to the reluctance of corporate 
management to delegate more decision-making power to divisional managers with 
unsatisfactory performance. It may be said in this case that corporate managers are risk 
averse in that they avoid committing further resources to activities with risky outcomes. 
Moreover, the readiness expressed by companies to dispose of unsuccessful managers 
"ifmanagement was the main cause of failure" also aims at reducing the risk from adverse 
employment contracts.
Some further indication about attitude to risk could be gleaned from Table 5.14 
(Current High Priority Management) in Chapter 5. The priority given by corporate 
management to particular business objectives reflects the aspirations and aims of those 
groups of people who have a stake in the firm and, as such, expresses their preferences 
towards risk through the companies' central policy makers. Divisional managers were 
reported to be highly involved in policy making and, therefore, are assumed to have 
internalised their companies' objectives and adopt an attitude to risk similar to the 
corporate stance. Nevertheless, in order to make a useful assessment of attitudes to risk 
further information is required on individual companies about their diversification 
strategy, life cycle of products, specificity of investment in products, position in the market 
and market structure and maturity. For example, in those companies where priority is 
given to maintaining current market share and/or improving customer service for a 
saturated market, it may be deduced that these companies do not attempt further
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investment in the present market as the risks involved will not be rewarding. On the other 
hand, companies that give priority to new product development and technological 
modernisation can be said to be risk bearing as entrepreneurship is encouraged.
Agency costs can be divided into unavoidable or necessary costs and avoidable 
costs. The unavoidable costs are, as stated in the introduction to the present section, those 
defined in the agency literature as necessary to prevent the agent from diverging from 
his contractual obligations to the principal. For the sample companies under study these 
costs are implicit in the TPS and the PMERS which are both formal control mechanisms 
on which depends the integration towards achieving the participating companies' 
objectives or the principal's interests. The costs incurred for designing, administering, 
reviewing and adjusting the TPS and the PMERS are all unavoidable agency costs in 
these large companies.
What can be defined as avoidable costs are those costs resulting from the perceived 
(and unseen) divergence of the agent's actions from the contractual obligations. For 
instance, the reported dysfunctional behaviour (Table 7.3 above) entail agency costs as 
there are losses to the principal whose interests are hindered by the divisional managers 
or agents. These losses are not only financial as the variables DMRC1 to DMRC7 affect 
not only the corporate financial performance but also the social and cultural norms which 
constitute the internal fabric of these companies. Further indication of avoidable agency 
costs could be found in the penalisation policies summarised in Table 7.6 above. All the 
corrective actions mentioned (PSCN1, PSCN2, PSCN3, PSCN5) point to the possibility 
of agency problems and costs in that the responding companies recognise the possibility 
that their divisional managers may lack the appropriate skills for running the operating 
divisions. Whether a company dismisses, transfers, advises, trains or provides some other 
help to the poorly performing manager, this is bound to incur costs which could have 
otherwise been avoided if the right person was selected for the job. Since the unnecessary 
costs are the consequence of inappropriate agency contracts, their avoidance requires the 
proper design of the contract which, in this case of interdependence, must accommodate 
the effect of the TPS on divisional performance.
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7.4.2.2 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND IMPACTEDNESS AND MULTI-AGENT 
COLLUSION
The role of accounting information in monitoring the agent's action has been the 
focus of much of the agency research in accounting, assuming that the outcome of the 
agent's action is observable (Banker et al. 1988).
The setting of rules to monitor the delegated responsibilities and the consequent 
reward or punishment aim at constraining the behaviour of the divisional manager (agent) 
taking actions that fail to further the principal's objectives. The person being monitored 
(or agent) has better information about his situation than those doing the monitoring (or 
principal) and it is usually because he/she (the agent) is expected to have better information 
that he/she is given the power to make decisions. That is to say that information asymmetry 
is implicitly recognized in the decentralised companies participating in this survey. In 
other words, the need for decentralising arises because divisional management possesses 
private information that the centre lacks (Demski and Kreps, 1982).
This creates the opportunity for the divisional manager to indulge in skilful 
manipulation of the costs and revenues, i.e. create information impactedness in order to 
achieve a satisfactory alignment of private and social costs and benefits. This problem 
can be aggravated if divisional managers with task interdependence and sharing rewards 
play their common interests and personal relationships and enter into collusion at the 
expense of global interests. This situation was illustrated earlier in Section 7.2.2 with the 
case of the twelve companies that reported no particular dysfunctional behaviour. Given 
the remoteness of the centre in the large company from the operating divisions and the 
unobservability of managerial effort whose outcome can at best be imperfectly monitored, 
the apparent absence of dysfunctional behaviour may be the result of divisional collusion.
This reasoning also applies to the 21 companies where corporate management 
perceived one or more types of undesirable behaviour (Table 7.3 above) particularly those 
companies ascribed variables DMRC2, DMRC4 and DMRC7.
The few agency problems enumerated above derive from a number of causes already 
outlined in the preceding chapter and are summarised below within the agency framework.
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7.4.3 CAUSES OF THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE TRANSFER PRICING 
CONTEXT OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES
7.4.3.1 CENTRALISATION OF THE TRANSFER PRICING AND THE 
SOURCING DECISIONS.
In a budgetary planning and control environment, the transfer pricing policy is 
undoubtedly formulated alongside the other items of the budget. As seen earlier in Chapter 
5 (Section 5.8.8), the participating companies reported high levels of budget participation 
by divisional managers. Excepted from this high involvement, however, is the transfer 
pricing decision which is an important determinant as far as divisional results (in this 
case, profits) are concerned, particularly in the absence of an external intermediate market.
The centralisation of the transfer pricing decision reported by some of the companies 
(Chapter 6, Section 6.3) - especially when the transfer transaction is important - only 
indicates that central management is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the production 
functions of the divisions. The limited involvement of divisional managers in transfer 
price determination implies that information bias by divisional managers cannot be ruled 
out. It may even be justified given the reported high impact of transfer prices on divisional 
profit performance and the friction it generates (Chapter 6, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.5.1) and 
the consequent compensation schemes. One can deduce that the high reliance on 
accounting measures of performance and the emphasis on profit performance make 
managers expect rewards and sanctions to be contingent upon budget attainment, i.e. 
based on profits or financial results.
Naturally when divisional freedom is curtailed because of centralised transfer 
pricing and external sourcing, the divisional manager could be expected to resort to 
information bias especially if he has a priori knowledge of the PMERS. Hence it can be 
said that information impactedness plays a major role on the reported performance and 
the consequent pay-offs.
259
7.4.3.2 NEGOTIATION OF TRANSFER PRICE TRANSACTIONS
It should not be understood from the foregoing analysis that the agency problem 
and costs are eliminated by simply decentralising the procurement and pricing decisions. 
According to the definition of the agency contract (Fama and Jensen, 1983) the negotiation 
of transfer price transactions described earlier in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.3) should be 
viewed as part of the contract of divisional-level agency. Therefore the role of negotiation 
in narrowing or widening the gap between conflicting interests is worth investigating. 
The theoretical pros and cons of negotiated transfer prices were previously discussed in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
The data in Chapter 6 show that transfer prices are negotiated in twelve companies, 
eleven of which have market-based transfers. The great majority of these companies do 
not impose restrictions on trading in the intermediate market.
Although the whole sample of participating companies reported low levels of 
conflict, it was indicated in the previous chapter (Section 6.5.1) that negotiation of transfer 
prices was considered the third potential source of conflict. In the absence of further 
evidence as to what particular part of the bargaining process causes disagreement, 
assumptions can only be made here. The agency theory motto of self-interest will inform 
such assumptions.
The predominance of the profit objective, the competitive spirit encouraged through 
market prices, the impact of the TPS on divisional profit performance are all factors 
motivating self-interest.
Moreover, the absence of restrictions on external trading means that divisions are 
not obliged to trade the intermediate product internally. Therefore the choice of the internal 
intermediate market over the external market is done on the basis of private information 
possessed by the particular division. Motivated by self interest to limit the risk inherent 
in the outcome of the PMERS, the negotiating divisional manager may withhold some 
or all of his private information and create conflict rather than forego trading internally 
and be worse-off because of a less rewarding external transaction.
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Self-interest in the bargaining process is not necessarily motivated by financial gain 
only. Factors like product quality, reliability of supply, specificity of product and 
availability of substitutes, quality of service, amount of risk in transaction, customer 
relationship, market position and investment opportunities can all affect the behaviour 
of the negotiating divisional managers and may or may not contribute to the agency 
problems and costs. Future research based on individual cases could hopefully shed more 
light on these points.
7.4.33 BUDGET RELATED SHORT-TERM PROFIT PERFORMANCE AND 
THE SURROGACY OF THE PMERS
The commonality or rather the equilibrium of interests sought by the agency model 
necessitates a strong linkage to organisational budgeted objectives, in this case, profit 
maximisation. Therefore the budgetary system reflects well the agency relationship since 
the budget can be considered as a contract that outlines the expectations of the principal 
and the agent. Therefore the non-participation by divisional managers in key decisions 
such as pricing transfers may trigger information impactedness in order to provide 
insurance for the expectations of the divisional manager.
Given the retrospective nature of the PMERS and the noticeable reliance on APM, 
managers may feel insecure because of their recent poor performance, i.e. the causes of 
bias involve rational economic behaviour on the part of the manager concerned. Since 
divisional managers were reported not to be greatly involved in setting performance 
measures (Chapter 5, Table 5.16) and, thus, can be assumed to have only a priori 
knowledge of the PMERS, it can be added that the centrally devised incentive schemes 
are not necessarily guarantors of optimal behaviours that lead to optimal results. The size 
of the company adds another dimension to the problem. The feeling of insecurity and the 
consequent sub-optimal behaviour in the large company is a logical response to 
foreseeable losses due to the impact of the TPS on divisional profits and the indifference 
of the PMERS to this impact. If the volume of internal trade is high, an unfair TPS can 
deprive the manager of an important division in a large company of a large slice of 
otherwise deserved returns for effort. If divisional achievement is not impaired by the
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TPS, it is common sense that the divisional manager would ensure that the contribution 
of his/her division is optimised because of the perceived correlation between company 
growth and rewards.
The length of time the particular managers have been and think they will remain 
with the company also plays an important part on the reaction to the short-term measure 
in order to maximise the reward. As mentioned earlier, this issue is beyond the scope of 
the present study and should be addressed by future research.
The emphasis on the short-term performance indicator indirectly neglects the human 
factor because managerial effort should be considered on a long-term basis. Thus 
managers indulge in behaviour which may be perceived as undesirable by corporate 
management when they feel that their efforts in achieving the results are not considered 
and properly rewarded. For example, because of the impact of the transfer price on 
divisional sales, divisional managers may give biased information to guarantee the 
required level of sales on which their rewards will be based. The agent's behaviour is 
thus directly related to the adequacy of the PMERS. Arguments on the incompleteness 
of APM to reflect managerial effort were earlier quoted in Section 7.1.2 and expanded 
upon in subsequent sections. In the agency framework the problems and conflicts reported 
by many of the participating companies can be viewed as resulting from basing the agency 
contract on APM or imperfect surrogates of managerial behaviour.
The question that derives from the above analysis is how can central management 
(principal) in the M-form company establish an incentive compatible with 
decentralisation so that managers truthfully disclose their private information to allow 
informed judgements by the principal? Stated otherwise, how can the gap between the 
principal's and agent's often diverging objectives be narrowed so as to align these 
objectives and guarantee confluence of perceived interests of both parties?
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7.5 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE TRANSFER PRICING AGENCY
7.5.1 MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AS A PANACEA 
7.5.1.1 INCENTIVES FOR EQUILIBRIUM
Managerial compensation is generally considered the primary solution to the agency 
problem as incentives aim at efficiency by eliciting the private information of divisional 
managers. In theory, the PMERS is supposed to enhance goal congruence and managerial 
effort because it serves as a co-ordinating mechanism in the decentralised company. It is 
argued that a properly designed compensation package would assure managers acting in 
the principal's interest (Rappaport, 1983). The compensation package is intended to 
reward achieved results and provide incentives for better performance. Cherrington and 
Cherrington (1973) argued that it is not budgets per se that affect people but rather positive 
and negative reinforcing consequences and the reward contingencies associated with 
budgets.
Compensation schemes include both incentives and deterrents and both are pay-offs 
to the parties of the agency contract. For example, the distribution of bonuses based on 
profit achievement practised by the companies under study implies that the principal is 
satisfied with the outcome of the agent's actions. As a consequence, the agent is rewarded 
with the monetary pay-off which is only part of his success. The remaining part of the 
profits is retained by the principal. Knowing that the divisional manager is entrusted with 
part of the resources of the company and delegated decision making power, it can be said 
that, although managerial compensation is a recognition of achievement, it also implies 
that the interests of the principal and the agent are not costlessly aligned. The alignment 
of interests is further complicated with the presence of inter-divisional transfers as it is 
not easy to formulate the compensation scheme as a function of each division's actual 
outcome but likely as a function of an accounting aggregate measure (Banker et al., 1988). 
Thus, the equilibrium sought from managerial compensation may not be achieved. To 
counter the problem, the following suggestions are usually encountered in the literature.
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7.5.1.2 DIVISIONAL PROFITS VS. DIVISIONAL OUTPUT
Decentralisation based on divisional profit maximisation is regarded as inadequate 
because of the inherent incentives to violate overall optimality due to the perceived impact 
of the TPS on shared rewards. Philippakis and Thompson (1970) suggest basing rewards 
on divisional output which is tied to a budget profit level instead of actual profits. This 
suggestion is not flawless as it may induce inefficiencies. For example, divisions may be 
tempted to produce for stock. In a vertically integrated firm this may jeopardise the 
sequences of the production and distribution process. Moreover, if transfer prices are 
centrally fixed, the variances between budgeted and actual profits lose their usefulness.
7.5.1.3 DIVISION VS. COMPANY RESULTS
To alleviate the problem of traceability caused by interdependence, it is often argued 
that better informed monitoring would result if rewards were based on corporate rather 
than divisional results (Pursell, 1980 and Harris et al., 1982). This approach raises many 
questions with regard to size and content of the bonus pools and whether to establish 
divisional or corporate pools (Salter, 1973 and Pursell, 1980). It also raises the question 
of uniformity and fairness as divisions may not be of the same size; may not be allocated 
the same amounts of scarce resources; and therefore divisional contributions to overall 
results are not uniform and should be rewarded differently.
7.5.1.4 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE AND UNIFORMITY
Given the disparity between divisions and the problems mentioned above, one 
suggestion is to adopt relative performance evaluation or RPE (Magee, 1986). As seen 
earlier in Section 7.1.4 RPE is favoured by the opponents of the controllability criterion. 
It is believed that agents who are set or pitted against their peers are better informed than 
the principal to monitor each other's effort. However, when divisions are forced into joint 
effort through the TPS, there is always the risk of sub-optimal collusion. Collusion may 
be averted if pitting against external peers is feasible and the principal can reward the 
agent likewise, i.e. use what could be called 'market-based' incentives.
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7.5.2 TAILORING THE PMERS TO COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS
This approach results from the above arguments in the specific context of divisional 
interdependence in large companies in which the agency framework is applied. It is 
difficult to conceive how a compensation package alone could attenuate agency problems 
if the PMERS does not accommodate the policies regarding internal trade. Thus an answer 
to the question asked earlier on how to make incentives appeal to agents in the M-form 
company lies primarily in the proper definition of objectives, the proper decentralisation 
of decision making authority, the adequacy of the TPS and the incentive-reward scheme. 
In short, the answer is contingent upon the strategy, structure and culture of the particular 
company which must be clearly translated by the MCS including the planning, budgeting 
and accounting processes. An important element of culture is the attitude towards change. 
Since it was observed that in many companies the actual PMERS are encouraging 
behaviours which are undesirable, there is need for modifications to both the TPS and 
the PMERS.
Referring back to the previous chapter (Section 6.4.3) one finds that 25 of the 33 
participating companies operated changes in their previous transfer pricing policies. This 
has resulted for most of them in 1) better efficiency of the TPS (RESL1), 2) reduced 
conflict over transfer prices (RESL2), 3) better control and performance evaluation 
(RESL3), 4) improved fairness of the TPS (RESL4), and 5) congruence of goals (RESL6). 
In agency terms, the alteration of the TPS resulted in reducing information impactedness, 
improved the PMERS and narrowed the gap between the principal's and the agent's 
interests. The correlation matrix (Table 6.31) between these variables is indicative of the 
agency role of the TPS. This also points to the inappropriateness of preconceived or static 
PMERS and the contractual problems they may generate. Keeping pace with changing 
circumstances means the recognition of the long range nature of managerial effort and, 
hence, the acceptance of the PMERS by the agent. It also implies the necessity to move 
beyond the single profit maximand which characterises the priority objective of most of 
the participating companies.
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7.5.2.2 CENTRALISED TPS AND COCOONED OUTCOMES
In those companies where undesirable managerial behaviour resulting from the 
impact of the TPS on performance is considerable and recurring, the obvious solution to 
the problem is divisional participation in transfer price setting and review. If divisional 
freedom has to be restrained for some strategic reasons, the incentive scheme should 
provide for the impact of the TPS on divisional results or the company should adopt 
company-based instead of division-based PMERS. In other words, the alignment of 
conflicting interests can be achieved by creating a balance between the need to centralise 
some key decisions in the M-form company and the necessity to alleviate the risk inherent 
in the PMERS on the constrained divisional manager. This applies to companies with 
centralised cost-based TPS as described in Chapter 6, Section 6.3. Only one of those 
companies indicated that the mark-up it adds to its centralise full cost transfer price is 
only for statutory and not management accounting purposes. This company is later studied 
in detail in the coming chapter where it is referred to as Health p.l.c.
In addition to the above, in those companies with substantial amounts of internal 
trade, discretionary incentives may serve to cocoon the divisional manager further and 
encourage more inter-divisional co-operation.
7.5.2.3 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY
In those companies where entrepreneuship is encouraged, that is those companies 
where divisional managers enjoy substantial authority over resources and autonomy over 
decisions, accountability for divisional achievement should be established. This applies 
to many of the companies with market-based transfers and no restrictions on external 
trading. In these cases accountability should be established independently of the 
decentralised TPS unless the friction between divisions over transfer pricing is alarming.
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7.6 CONCLUSION
The above suggestions imply that, as is the case with the TPS, the PMERS should 
be tailored to suit the requirements of the particular company, taking into account the 
circumstantial indigenous and exogenous factors. The analysis that was offered in this 
chapter has emphasised the organisational and behavioural nature of the transfer pricing 
problem in the divisionalised company, particularly when divisional autonomy is 
inhibited and the transfer pricing system impacts the evaluated and rewarded results of 
the divisions.
The agency framework applied to the analysis has put the behavioural nature of the 
transfer pricing problem into a clear perspective. As the PMERS cannot be dissociated 
from the effects of the TPS, solutions to agency problems in the case of joint responsibility 
were argued to depend on the proper design and adaptation of both the TPS and the 
PMERS. If it were available divisional information could have added more substance to 
the analysis. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the combination of the arguments and findings 
in all of Chapter 5, 6 and 7 and the case studies in the next chapter provide enough 
ground to evaluate the remaining four research hypotheses and suggest opportunities for 
future research.
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CHAPTER 8: CASE STUDIES: TRANSFER PRICING
PRACTICE IN FIVE LARGE BRITISH 
COMPANIES
In the previous three chapters the analysis of the transfer pricing problem and its 
managerial implications was based on the aggregate data for the 33 responding companies. 
The current chapter completes the three preceding ones by providing case-based analysis 
involving five large diversified British companies operating in different industries. The 
companies are among the eight firms with the highest levels of transfers (Chapter 6, 
Table 6.7). Soon after they completed and returned the questionnaire, all eight firms were 
approached by telephone to seek access for interviews. Permission was obtained from 
five of them and a one-day visit was scheduled and carried out in each (Chapter 5, Table 
5.1). Most of the information gathered during the course of the interviews i s unquantif iable 
and as such, is used to complement the data contained in the questionnaire. The initial 
drafts of the case studies were sent to the five companies for comments and this has 
produced valuable extra information which added more substance to this chapter.
For confidentiality reasons the names of the companies have been disguised. 
8.1 CASE STUDY ONE: BAUXITE PLC
8.1.1 THE COMPANY: BACKGROUND
This is a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign-based multinational group which is 
one of six major producers in the world that control the world aluminium business in 
terms of technology, investment, prices and end-markets. These companies are highly 
vertically integrated throughout all stages of the industry which include bauxite mining 
and treatment, alumina (or hydrated aluminium oxide) refining, aluminium smelting and 
the fabrication of semi-finished and finished aluminium products (Crough, 1981; Brown 
and Mckern, 1987; Balkay, 1987 and Financial Times, 1990). In other words, the 
companies have integrated forward from mining to metal fabrication.
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These "Big Six" companies control more than 50 per cent of the world bauxite 
capacity (62 per cent of Western world capacity), more than 60 per cent of alumina 
capacity and a large share of aluminium manufacturing (Brown and Mckern, 1987), hence, 
the high degree of concentration in this industry.
The market dominance of this industry is influenced by the intrinsic qualities of 
aluminium which include light weight, durability, non-corrosion, ease of fabrication and 
recycling and energy conservation. Being an easily recyclable material, aluminium saves 
energy, enables product cost control, and protects the environment. Twenty tonnes of 
recycled aluminium can be produced with the energy required to make one tonne of 
aluminium from the ore. The abundance of raw materials (bauxite, in particular), 
especially in the Third World and Australia, and the versatile applications of aluminium 
(building and construction, machinery and communications, containers and packaging, 
the electrical industry, consumer goods, etc.) adds to the superiority of aluminium over 
other materials. However, the energy cost of the product is high and this tends to bring 
other substitute materials such as steel and plastics into competition in the various 
applications and markets.
8.1.2 THE COMPANY: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
The origin of the company under investigation dates back to the end of the nineteenth 
century when bauxite mining began. It has grown through mergers and acquisitions and 
presently operates over thirty manufacturing plants in the U.K., supported by over twenty 
stockholding and distribution points throughout the country. The principal activity of the 
company is the production and processing of aluminium, including the sale of aluminium 
semi-fabricated products and chemicals and the manufacture and sale of a range of related 
finished products. The company restructured its divisional operations in 1987 following 
the publication of a mission statement by the parent company in 1986 which stated that 
the group:
"is determined to be the most innovative diversified company in the world. 
To achieve this position, [the company] will be one, global, 
customer-oriented enterprise committed to excellence and lowest cost in its
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chosen aluminium businesses, with significant resources devoted to building 
an array of new businesses superior growth and profit potential" (Group's 
Annual Report).
The British subsidiary, which is fully committed to this mission, has a new structure 
(Figure 8.1) comprised of seven divisional groups, headed by individual managing 
directors who are "accountable for their operations and for the development of strategies 
within plans approved by the Chief Executive Officer" (Company's Annual Report).
8.1.3 THE COMPANY: DIVERSIFIED ACTIVITIES
Figure 8.1 shows that the Company is characterised by forward integration and 
related diversification with aluminium products as the dominant activity.
The Primary operates both primary and secondary smelters, 
producing aluminium sheet ingot, extrusion billet, remelt ingot and hardeners for the 
foundry trade.
The produces sheet, coil and foil for use in aerospace, 
road transport, building, packaging, lithographic printing and industrial markets.
The produces semi-fabricated plate, tube and 
large extrusions for high performance applications especially in the aerospace, defence 
and transportation markets, as well as metal matrix composites, superplastic materials 
and aluminium alloys.
The is a recent combination of a number of existing enterprises 
involved in a wide range of end-use markets including small-scale rolled products, 
consumer products, commercial extrusion, high pressure gas cylinders, conductor, wire 
and building products.
The operates a network of warehouses supplying a full range 
of semi-fabricated products including copper, brass and stainless steel, as well as 
fabricating services and home improvement products.
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The is comprised of five companies producing a variety of 
alumina chemicals for use in fire retardants, refractories, toothpaste abrasives, ceramics, 
catalysts, paint and aluminium sulphate as well as other chemicals for specialist aerospace, 
defence and other applications.
The consists of one recently formed company with the 
responsibility to develop and manufacture inorganic membranes and filtration and 
separations devices used by the pharmaceutical, medical, food and beverage, and 
electronics industries.
8.1.4 VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND INTRA-FIRM TRADE
Like the rest of the group, the British subsidiary is vertically integrated from 
aluminium smelting and alumina chemicals to end product manufacture and distribution. 
It is common practice in the aluminium industry that a major part of bauxite, alumina and 
aluminium output is transferred internally between subsidiaries of the six major 
companies. They consume around 38% of mined bauxite, over 80% of their alumina 
output and around 90% of aluminium production (Brown and Mckern, 1987). For Bauxite 
p.l.c., internal transfers represent 80% of the total volume sales. This high level of transfers 
consists of a large proportion of the primary smelters output supplied to other divisions 
for use in semi-fabricated and finished products. In the words of the respondent "the 
metal flows downstream with each division adding value via rolling, shaping, extruding, 
etc. Throughout the steps of the metal flow there are outlets by way of sales to customers 
who in the main are themselves manufacturers i.e., onward processors and not end users".
8.1.5 TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION AND PRICE 
DETERMINATION
A general guide-line for pricing intra-firm trade is contained in the fifth policy 
adopted by the parent company in the pursuit of its objectives which reads: "to conduct 
transactions amongst members of the... Group on a fair and equitable commercial basis".
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Although the company reported a market-based transfer price - adjusted for 
long-term and quantity involved - it became clear during the interview conducted on site 
that the market price was determined by a "complicated formula" which allows a 5% 
adjustment margin and that the London Metal Exchange (L.M.E.) daily list price was not 
very relevant. Aluminium has been traded on the L.M.E. since 1978 but L.M.E. prices 
are too volatile (Financial Times, 1990) and thus, price leadership has long rested with 
the major producers, especially Bauxite p.l.c. Obviously when there are high levels of 
vertical integration, and thus market concentration, this leaves only a limited room for 
the spot markets to provide a source of usable price quotations. Research shows that it is 
difficult to establish what could be called a market price since only 10 to 15 per cent of 
bauxite is traded at arm's length and the price of alumina (which is mostly traded 
internally) tend to be notionally determined by transfer pricing formulae or based on 
long-term contracts (Brown and Mckern, 1987). The price domination by the "Big Six" 
has led to legal action in Australia (the world's largest bauxite and alumina producer) 
over tax evasion through transfer price manipulation (Crough, 1981).
Nevertheless, it seems that the situation is changing fast over the last few years. A 
recent communication with the respondent revealed that "the industry has found it difficult 
to anticipate and therefore match supply with demand. A world industrial expansion (e.g. 
construction industry boom) rapidly exhausts supply while a hint of recession moves 
customers into destocking. Because aluminium is an expensive metal the cost of 
stockholding tends to be high - and costly if prices drop". This implies that the producers 
no longer dominate the market. In fact, "customers for unwrought aluminium tend to go 
for regularity of supply at prices which take L.M.E. 3 monthly price quotations into 
account. In recent years customers have tended to benefit from this system more than 
manufacturers". The recent survey by the Financial Times (1990) confirms these 
comments and indicates that aluminium is no longer an "industrial metal" but "a 
commodity metal" , and that the L.M.E. price is becoming more of a world price.
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8.1.6 TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: MANDATED ADJUSTED MARKET PRICE 
AND DIVISIONAL AUTONOMY
Despite the high level of vertical integration it is surprising to find that the pricing 
of the high volume of internalised transactions does not depend on internal cost data as 
much as it is retrospectively affected by the market prices of the final products and results 
in what could be called "0 resale price margin transfer price". In other words, the 
transfer price is calculated backward from the market price of the final product by 
deducting appropriate profit margins for the transferee in order to arrive at the transfer 
price for the transferor division. Final product prices are not easily predictable by the 
manufacturers. The state of the aluminium market in recent years is described in the 
following terms:
"producers [world major producers] do not have control over prices. They 
wish they could get cost plus a decent return but they do not get it. They do 
make money when aluminium prices shoot up and stay high (1988 year, a 
good example) and perform poorly when they drop (1990 year, a good 
example)" ... [Moreover] "imports have been making heavy inroads in 
recent years. The cross exchange rates for £ has also caused problems".
The respondent also indicated that
"in certain markets, prices of substitute materials like plastics, steel and 
copper influence the price of aluminium (eg., plastics: building materials 
market; steel: gas cylinder market; copper: cable and wire market)".
Although raw materials are abundantly available at cheap prices, it remains that 
aluminium is an expensive metal because electrical energy which is vital for the smelters 
is a relatively scarce resource. Energy cost is the most important element in product cost, 
followed by capital cost of smelters, then direct material and labour. The company has 
its own power stations, but its own power supply is not always sufficient and hence the 
need to buy from the National Grid often at high cost. The company indicated that "low 
cost (low energy cost) smelters are in full production while in recent years high cost 
smelters have been shut down. Certain marginal cost smelters orpotline extensions have 
been switched on and off (this takes months and even years) in line with demand and
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prices". Given the above information and knowing that the aluminium ingot price is 
influenced greatly by the cost of processed bauxite or alumina, the transfer price is 
determined by what was called a "complicated formula" that takes into account final 
product prices. For instance, the prices of aluminium products used in making aircrafts 
are not entirely fixed by the producers. They are subject to negotiations with aircraft 
makers who in turn are affected by the state of the end-user market, for example the 
general level of air fares and other market conditions facing the airline companies. Beside 
these external considerations, the costing policy of Bauxite p.l.c. requires that:
"aluminium block costing is done with the planning itself and the different 
production costs are analysed at the different stages of production to see 
what affects the margin squeeze".
The company also reported that the transfer price for the typical internal trade is 
determined by central management through consultation of divisions. Divisional 
managers have less influence on transfer price revision than on price setting. The process 
is described as follows:
"the internal transfer price settings are discussed and negotiated by a 
committee comprising Managing Directors of major business units and 
divisions (buyers and sellers). Central management endorses usually".
Company policy also requires central approval on trading the intermediate 
commodity externally. Divisions need prior permission for external sourcing and this is 
given "within limits at the planning stage". It may be deduced from this that the high 
level of divisional participation in price setting resides in supplying cost data to the centre. 
In fact, company policy requires divisions to report monthly to the centre both the physical 
and the financial movements of product flows. It was also reported that divisions have 
high discretion on bargaining with each other over internal transfers and that this could 
constitute a source of conflict. Combining the above arguments one may say that, because 
of the high degree of market concentration and the emerging competition, the reported 
transfer price is a pseudo market-price and may be termed "mandated large supplier 
market price". In this respect, divisional managers do not seem to enjoy full autonomy.
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8.1.7 TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: CHANGES AND REVISIONS
The dominant "market based" transfer price is reported to be always used and, to 
preserve consistency, there is no variation of the transfer price of the same commodity 
when transferred to different internal buyers. Transfer prices are reviewed quarterly by 
central management, mainly because of market changes, the level of competition and the 
development of the operating plan. Since the bulk of the internal transfers consist of mined 
bauxite and alumina whose prices are mainly controlled by the six major producers, 
changes in raw material and labour costs were considered to have only a moderate effect 
on transfer price review. It has already been mentioned in the previous section that energy 
cost is more important than the cost of raw materials and direct labour. Overall, the TPS 
"has for many years been market linked, so only refinements have taken place". As such, 
the present TPS is thought efficient and satisfactory and "is seen as appropriate for the 
industry as weir.
8.1.8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND REWARD AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Four objectives characterise the company's current high priority management: 1) 
long-run profitability, 2) new product development, 3) technological modernisation and, 
4) customer relations. These objectives concord with the mission statement mentioned 
earlier in Section 8.1.2.
Bauxite p.l.c., which employs over 10,000 people in the U.K., measures divisional 
performance in achieving the objectives with profit ratios such as ROI, sales growth rates 
and cash flows, without differences in the accounting information used for determining 
the division's as opposed to managerial performance measures. The performance 
measures are mostly set by corporate management. Performance is not judged against 
short-term profits because of non-controllable elements in the price and quantity of 
aluminium metals as indicated earlier. Non-accounting data such as "inventory days, 
days in debtors, quantitative data, employee numbers, reduction in accident rates, are
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routinely monitored". The importance of the ROI and cash flow measures derives from 
the huge modernisation programme of the company to replace obsolete plants with capital 
investments worth £50 million in 1988.
Divisional managers are set personal achievement targets as well as company wide 
targets. However, higher weighting is given to divisional results when evaluating 
performance to take into account the effect of the TPS on divisional performance. 
Promotion, bonuses and more power delegation are the rewards for satisfactory 
performance whereas inefficient managers could be transferred or dismissed. Managers' 
pay is not directly related to performance in that the company does not adhere to the 
recent Government PRP scheme but "cash bonuses, which can be substantial, are paid 
annually to senior and middle managers based on their personal performance, their own 
company performance, and for those very senior the performance of the parent company". 
This tallies with the fact that managers have little influence on setting performance 
measures and end results being affected by the mandated TPS.
In the completed questionnaire it was hinted that the reliance on financial measures 
of performance is found to sometimes incite divisions to frequently complain on the 
fairness of the TPS; conflict over transfer prices; increase competition, not co-operation; 
and this may result in creating mistrust between them. These response attitudes to the 
performance measures stem from the high control objective of the TPS, the impact of the 
TPS on divisional profits as a frequent source of conflict, and the importance of the 
transferred commodity to the division as the most important source of conflict. The 
internal typical trade accounts for over 75 per cent of the supplying division's output and 
50 per cent of that of the buying division. Given the characteristics of this large aluminium 
company, the factors triggering conflict and the managers' undesirable behaviours can 
be considered as unavoidable. No wonder then that conflict resolution depends on 
"divisions asking for revision of transfer prices" or "opting for mutual concessions to 
settle differences". As two years have elapsed now since the company was first visited,
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it seems that because of the changes in the aluminium market, the TPS does not cause a 
major conflict: "over lime, people come to accept a market related transfer price as the 
fairest system one could devise".
8.1.9 CONCLUSION
The aluminium industry provides the extreme context for the transfer pricing 
problem. High market concentration, price fluctuation and vertical integration require the 
combination of both centralised and decentralised decision-making. Bauxite p.l.c., and 
the parent company as a whole, moved from a functional structure to an M-form structure 
but the locus of the pricing decision has for a long time resided with corporate 
management, though divisional managers play a participative role in transfer price 
determination. Therefore it can be said in this context that the TPS is dictated by the 
particularities of the industry and the market structure, not by decentralised managerial 
considerations. However, changes could be expected in the future as the dominance of 
the "Big Six" is diminishing "as a result of the diffusion of technology, the rise of economic 
nationalism among bauxite producer countries, and the development of smelting in 
energy-rich countries" (Brown and Mckern, 1987, p. 32). The emerging competition and 
the impact of the price of the final product on the transfer price of the intermediate product 
is likely to result in creating a balance between hierarchies and markets. The increased 
interest in aluminium recycling will also affect demand for and prices of primary 
aluminium as the capital costs of recycling represent around one tenth of the cost of new 
primary smelters. As a consequence the high volume of internal transactions will be 
reduced and external intermediate markets and prices will be more available.
278
8.2.1 THE COMPANY: BACKGROUND
This British firm is an integrated research based multinational group of companies 
whose purpose is the discovery, development, manufacture and marketing of ethical 
pharmaceuticals (i.e. prescription medicines) for sale to hospitals, pharmacies and 
prescribing doctors. It is therefore a company that works on the frontiers of knowledge, 
given that the centre of its business is the human body. The undiminishing demand for 
medicines by the world population testifies to the increase in human ailments. This 
requires constant research to discover new and more effective medicines and this makes 
innovation the bed-rock of success of the pharmaceutical industry.
The pharmaceuticals market is less concentrated than the aluminium market because 
of the absence of obvious benefits from economies of scale, hence the existence of a large 
number of companies, each with a small share of the world market. This leads to high 
degrees of competition, and success for ethical companies depends on drug improvements 
that result from intensive and continuous research. A newly discovered compound can 
take around ten years to pass through the stages of development, testing, clinical trials 
and regulation before it appears on the market. Hence the need for patent legislation to 
protect the intellectual property of the companies and enable them to recover the on-going 
costofR&D.
THE COMPANY: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
Health p.l.c.'s present large size and dominance is largely the result of internal 
expansion through the discovery and the development of major new products. As a 
dominant multinational group, it comprises a marketing company in most developed 
countries and operates a world-wide network of over 80 subsidiaries, most of them wholly 
owned. In terms of research activities the U.K. is the Group's base. The U.K. also had 
the first primary and secondary production sites and remains the largest manufacturer of 
Group products.
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In the pursuit of its planned programme of growth in research, product development, 
production and marketing activities, the company's capital expenditure exceeded £150 
million in 1988. The Group structure is depicted in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2 shows a holding company structure which, in theory, should be a 
collection of independent enterprises or separate investments. The respondent describes 
the company's structure in the following words:
"international management organisation (responsibility and measurement) 
reflects the Group's functional structure and comprises geographical 'profit 
centres' together with cost centres for research and development and the 
Group's central services".
Moreover, within the U.K.,
"the nature of the Group's products and the Group's functional organisation 
leads to a substantial degree of autonomy in UK marketing and overhead 
expenditure decisions (within overall Group strategy)".
The autonomy is restricted by the absence of external intermediate markets and thus 
the unavoidable internal trade and centralised TPS. In fact, it is company policy that:
"decisions on the nature, extent and location of production facilities are 
more influenced by global factors. Marketing functions, therefore, have a 
relatively low influence on product sourcing".
This diversified company presents a special and interesting case for the study of 
transfer pricing because of its mainly functional structure with service and market-based 
divisions. As a holding group for a network of companies with decentralised operational 
responsibility for activities, it should be expected, in theory at least, that there is little 
central involvement in business unit strategy development (Goold and Campbell, 1987) 
and a lack of internal strategic cohesion (Williamson, 1986 and Johnson and Schols, 
1988). In practice, however, the cohesion exists and its basis is stated in the company's 
annual report as follows:
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"[Health p.l.c.] runs its affairs as an integrated business where 
geographically dispersed activities are unified by a common strategy and 
are brought together to work to common policies by a highly developed 
system of central co-ordination".
It may be deduced from the above that a company's face denomination is not 
necessarily indicative of how its activities are organised. The existence of a high volume 
of internal trade and, in the U.K. only, a centralised cost-based TPS, is part of the central 
process of co-ordination that ensures "that the Group's compounds are efficiently 
developed from discovery to marketing". The sequence of product transfers between the 
three principal UK trading units is represented graphically as follows:
PRIMARY PRODUCTION
50%
o r-
J,
D
HEALTH EXPORT 
LTD
90%
SECONDARY 
PRODUCTION
Mainly overseas marketing of bulk 
-> (non-patent protected) 
pharmaceuticals to non-Group 
customers.
->Export to overseas Group companies of 
bulk and packed pharmaceuticals.
->U.K. marketing of packed 
pharmaceutical products.
The sum of A, B and C in Figure 8.3 represents the total of domestic transfers within 
the U.K. The ratio of A+B+C to total U.K. company volume sales (A+B+C+D+E+F) 
gives a global figure of 50%. This ratio would increase to the 50-70% band if the services 
of the research company and central services are counted in the transfers. The existence 
of a high level of transfers in this functionally structured company comprised of a 
collection of profit and cost centres leads to the question once asked by Coase (1937) as
282
to why some economic activities are organised within firms, or in Williamson's (1975 
and 1986) words, why there is preference of hierarchies over markets? The answer to this 
question in the U.K. for Health p.l.c. derives, not from its structure, but from the nature 
of its business. The pharmaceutical industry is quite properly the most regulated industry 
in the British economy. Every aspect of the industry from R & D (e.g. patent approval, 
permission to carry out drug trials on humans) to marketing (e.g. information on drug 
leaflets, persons to whom advertising may be directed) is subject to regulation, including 
Government control of profits through the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
(PPRS), hence, the concern with efficiency, quality and know-how protection.
Thus the nature of the industry results in creating internal markets even if the 
company is not formally vertically integrated. For example, all of the primary production 
of patent protected drugs of the U.K. subsidiary of Health p.l.c. is transferred to the U.K. 
secondary production company or to Health Export Ltd because there is no external market 
for the patent protected primary products (drugs compounds). Similarly, 90% of the 
secondary production is exported to Group subsidiaries, the other 10% being sold in the 
U.K. by the Group's U.K. marketing company.
TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: MANDATED COST-BASED PRICES 
IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY
Transfer pricing policies of Health p.l.c. are summarised as follows:
"transfer of products between UK companies carries a fixed percentage 
mark-up over full cost for statutory, but for management reporting, mark-up 
is not important. Shared services are charged at actual cost. Products 
exported to overseas Group and external customers are invoiced by the 
exporting company at arm's length transfer prices".
Stated otherwise, the measurement of world-wide marketing functions takes many 
forms, one of which is management accounting. For this:
"each UK and overseas marketing profit centre is charged in an approximate 
way with the standard manufacturing cost of products sourced from central 
supply sites in the UK and the total UK production variance (actual cost less
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standard cost) is considered as a central 'cost centre'. Overseas marketing 
companies which perform their own secondary production carry the actual 
manufacturing cost into the profit centre relating to their sales".
As mentioned earlier, transfer prices between U.K. companies are entirely based 
on cost because of the nature of the business. There is no external market for the primary 
product as it is specific to the company and it must be obtained internally. Production 
and overhead funtions are thus considered as cost centres and judged on quality and cost 
efficiency. The statutory mark-up seems to be added to comply with fiscal regulations. 
Full cost pricing is influenced by the need to recover R & D costs as these are treated as 
overheads and cannot be allocated to individual products.
The approach to intra-U.K. transfer prices is centrally fixed at Health p.l.c. and the 
dominant cost-based transfer price is always used. Pricing of the same product transferred 
to different internal buyers is the same in order "to avoid expending resources on matters 
which do not improve Group profitability" . There is a great emphasis in this company 
on production cost and quality control.
The present TPS is considered efficient and satisfactory as it 1) achieves corporate 
goals, 2) pinpoints divisional responsibility, 3) leads to better performance evaluation, 
and 4) fairness and conflict resolution.
Reviews and adjustments of transfer prices take place annually (as costs are set once 
a year as part of the budget cycle) and as new products are introduced. These reviews are 
claimed to have resulted in 1) better control and performance evaluation, 2) optimal 
resource allocation, and 3) goal congruence.
In this highly innovative company dedicated to "the manufacture of safe and 
effective medicines of the highest quality" , U.K. transfer price change is greatly affected 
by the change in production costs caused by factors like raw materials and labour costs, 
technological conditions, rates of inflation, and new product development. To quote the 
respondent:
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"constant review and modernisation of the procedures and technology used 
to achieve quality and safety are integral parts of all production stages. In 
addition, government regulatory agencies aim to ensure, by means of 
frequent inspection and other methods, that quality control is maintained. 
Therefore, their needs are embodied within those of the company".
8.2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT EVALUATION AND REWARD.
Company culture is affected by the delegation of decision-making power which 
enables the general managers to "act as entrepreneurs" . The following excerpt from 
the interview emphasises the importance of delegation:
"we encourage full autonomy. We don't even have an internal audit 
department. Employee participation is encouraged throughout the company, 
at all levels".
Although divisional managers are reported to be highly involved in key decisions 
like setting divisional objectives, performance measures, budget setting, in the U.K. they 
do not seem to have autonomy over transfer price setting and review or bargaining with 
other divisional managers over internal transfers. The respondent emphasised that 
"because intra-U.K. prices are cost plus a fixed constant amount there is no need for 
manager autonomy" .
The same basis of evaluation is used for evaluating division and managerial 
performance. Production performance is monitored on cost and quality and, to avoid 
divergence from this priority, U.K. transfer prices are based on cost. To monitor divisions 
activities, manufacturing company policy requires detailed monthly reporting of every 
production batch. Legislation determines that every pack of drugs can be traced through 
its batch number. All managers of production require reporting the quantity of primary 
product used in a particular drug, labour and overhead usage and variances as well as 
detailed sales and customers. Absolute profits, ratio of profits to sales, sales growth rate 
and market development are all important measures for the world-wide and U.K. 
marketing operations. It is, however, surprising that ROI and cash flow were not listed 
by this high capital and research and development expenditure company. A possible
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reason is the high level of uncertainty of the lengthy and complex process of 
pharmaceutical R&D and new drug registration. Simply the time necessary for invention 
and bringing products to fruition cannot be determined in advance and this eats into the 
patent life cycle. As a consequence, this reduces the profitable life cycle of the product. 1
The company presumes that if U.K. performance were evaluated solely on financial 
measures, divisional managers would 1) complain about the fairness of the TPS, 2) conflict 
over the mandated cost-based transfer prices and, 3) reduce co-operation. Since the present 
performance evaluation system consists of both financial and non-financial measures 
which are appropriate to each function, the company indicated that "there is virtually no 
conflict about transfer prices in the UK companies". If there was conflict it would be 
resolved by corporate management alone as the TPS is centrally fixed.
With regard to compensation schemes, the respondent commented that there exists
"a bonus scheme for all UK employees which reflects UK production 
efficiency and Group profits. While managers performance is often reflected 
in the division performance, there is not necessarily a causal link".
The company also has a Group Share Option Scheme but this does not represent an 
incentive to employees or managers to improve performance in the short term as the 
scheme is a long-term investment with unpredictable fluctuations and outcome.
1 a recent feed-back from the company indicated that ROI and cash flow are important measures for all 
business, but these were omitted because "important international cash movements are outside the scope 
of this survey, for example Royalty income, dividend income, and intra-Group loans".
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The particularities of this company do not allow us to derive general conclusions 
particularly because its business is the research, development, manufacturing and 
marketing of patent protected products The typical internal trade refers to products with 
unexpired patents, i.e. products with mostly no external intermediate market. Therefore 
it may be worthwhile if future research focuses on pharmaceutical products not protected 
by patents and which are traded freely on the market. Companies which make and sell 
off-patent drugs do not generally carry out much research or development, nor do they 
need to create a market for the drugs because that has already been established by the 
inventor company. What could also be of interest is the effect of generic substitutes of 
patented drugs on prices in general and transfer prices in particular. Previous research 
(for instance, James, 1977) shows that earlier attempts by some governments overseas to 
promote the usage of generic drugs as a cost reduction technique were not successful.
Moreover, the advent of a unified European market - with probably unified 
regulation policies - may bring about radical changes in the pharmaceutical industry. The 
impact on transfer pricing policies and managerial implications may also be worth 
researching.
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THE DUO' S BACKGROUND
The Electronic Duo case consists of two independent electronics and electrical 
engineering companies with 40% volume transfers each. The companies are code-named 
Circuit p.l.c. and Silicon Ltd, the latter being a subsidiary of a major multinational, the 
Silicon Group. There is a noticeable dependence in Britain on the presence of a large-scale 
foreign-owned sector in electronics. The British company, Circuit p.l.c., has grown mainly 
through mergers and acquisitions and has subsidiaries throughout the world. These two 
companies are treated in a comparative case study because they have many things in 
common including the industry, the volume of internal trade, the nature of the intermediate 
product and transfer pricing policies. There are a lot of similarities between the activities 
of the two companies as is shown in the summary list below.
Manufacture and supply of networked 
communications and information systems 
consisting of:
- computers
- office systems
- communication equipment and software 
for business and public administration, 
telecommunications service providers and 
defence markets.
-advanced electronic components and 
electrical equipment
Manufacture and supply of:
- lighting products including electronic 
lighting systems, arena-vision sports 
lighting systems and special lamps.
- consumer electronics including 
advanced TV and satellite systems and 
music systems
- electronic components
- domestic appliances
- professional products and systems 
including integrated business 
communications and information 
systems, and test and measurement 
equipment, defence systems and medical 
systems.
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8.3.2 STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
The success of the above activities depends largely on technological innovation. In 
both companies, extensive research and development programmes worth several millions 
of pounds are carried out each year. For Silicon, the Group R & D effort is
"directed towards the development and control of highly complicated 
systems in fields such as consumer electronics, information technology and 
telecommunications".
For Circuit p.l.c., the purpose is stated more specifically as
"the creation of open systems by the development of an integrated product 
set which is fully integratable with other manufacturers' products".
Both companies have a multi-divisional structure and have undergone major 
organisational changes due to mergers and acquisitions and strategic market decisions 
such as the shift of balance towards private sector and service based businesses and the 
move away from the defence sector.
The detailed corporate and divisional structure of Circuit p.l.c. is depicted in Figure 
8.4. Only a hand drawn diagram (Figure 8.5) could be obtained during the interview at 
Silicon. The annual report of the latter states that the company is structured by activity 
and by country. The company' s product related activities are grouped in separate divisions 
responsible for world product policy. The general policy of the Group is determined by 
what is called the "Group Management Committee" which includes "a number of leading 
executives from the product divisions and corporate staff departments". Some of the 
subsidiaries of the Group are completely integrated manufacturing and marketing 
concerns.
Similarly at Circuit p.l.c., the centre works with the business unit managers to 
develop strategy. With the recent re-organisation of the company which resulted in the 
new divisional structure (Figure 8.4) and the definition of new product-market scopes for 
the businesses and the divisions, the centre decided that divisional overlaps and linkages 
should be managed centrally.
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Electronics 
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and Maritime 
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Both companies reported a volume of internal trade of 40% of total annual sales, 
with most of the transfers concerning the core business. For example, at Silicon the 
components division is an important supplier to other parts of the company, mainly to 
the consumer electronics division.
In both companies there are restrictions on external sourcing but more so in Silicon 
as the typical transfer accounts for over 75% to the buying division compared to only 
25% in Circuit. This implies that the buying division of Circuit p.l.c. relies for the supply 
of components on outside sources which could be local or foreign. Knowing that the 
information technology (IT) industry is very competitive, notably with the surge of the 
Japanese in micro-chip production, the dependence on foreign sources for the supply of 
components creates the pressure for collaboration between local companies. This urge 
for collaboration at Circuit p.l.c. resulted in the last few years in mergers and acquisitions, 
the success of which is yet to fully materialise but there are some major long term 
technology collaborations that have proved very successful.
Divisional managers at Silicon are reported to have "very low" discretion on 
"buying externally items available internally". Circuit indicated that "localprocurement 
of products can only be done with the agreement of our centralised manufacturing 
division". The same varying degrees of divisional influence apply to setting and reviewing 
transfer prices.
The policies governing the pricing of internal trade at Silicon are contained in the 
following excerpt from the parent company's financial statement for 1988:
"the transfer prices charged for the delivery of products between 
consolidated companies in different regions of the world are determined on 
the same basis as the sales to third parties. In this respect, the factors which 
are considered include the conditions of delivery, the terms of payment, the 
quantities and the continuity of deliveries and the local practices and customs 
in the various countries. Taking these factors into consideration, the current 
market price is used as the transfer price for inter-regional deliveries 
whenever possible. In the event that equivalent or similar products are not
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readily available from independent suppliers in the same markets, the prices 
for inter-regional deliveries are determined based on the actual 
manufacturing cost plus a margin to cover the normal profits and general 
expenses of the supplying company".
Domestic transfer prices at the British subsidiary are based on the standard unit full 
cost. The company is now reverting to market-based pricing because until now the transfer 
price was determined by the selling division and this has led to internal conflict. The 
buying division was put at a disadvantage while facing increasing competition and not 
being able to trade freely in the external intermediate market. The extremely intense 
competition in the IT market led to sharp falls in prices and loss of control of production 
costs, especially development costs.
At Circuit p.l.c. transfer pricing is also cost-based with the standard unit full cost 
as the prevailing price. The transfer price is centrally determined but with consultation 
of the divisions involved in the transfer. However, "the selling divisions cannot negotiate 
the price".
The predominance of the standard full cost transfer price in the Electronic Duo is 
mainly justified by claimed positive effects on economic decisions and the achievement 
of corporate goals. Overall the main objective assigned to the TPS is the evaluation and 
control of divisional performance, though neither company sought divisional autonomy 
or managerial motivation from its cost-based TPS.
8.3.4 TRANSFER PRICING CHANGE
Each of the two companies claimed that the dominant transfer price is always used 
and, for consistency and cost control, no price variation is allowed on the same transfer 
to different internal buyers. Circuit p.l.c. is also concerned with "facilitating world-wide 
transfer price negotiations with UK and local fiscal authorities".
Five common factors are considered to substantially influence the need for review 
and adjustment of transfer prices. These are 1) changes in raw materials and labour costs,
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2) re-evaluation of standard costs, 3) rates of inflation, 4) new product development, and 
5) technological conditions. The review takes place four times a year in Circuit whereas 
Silicon operates an annual review because:
"standard prices are calculated each year as at first January and these are 
indexed each month in relation to changes in external factors (e.g. inflation, 
and exchange rates)".
In neither company is the review of transfer prices a means of resolving conflict, 
although the centralisation of the TPS is seen as the major potential source of conflict in 
both companies. For Silicon the "dominant transfer pricing system has been in operation 
for many years".
Similarly, neither company considered organisational and strategic change as 
important a factor for altering transfer pricing policies. The recent restructuring of Circuit 
p.l.c. does not seem to have any impact on its cost-based TPS. The company did, however, 
report a major transfer pricing policy change but this was due to other reasons as explained 
by the respondent:
"we used to operate at cost plus a mark-up to recover development cost. 
The mark-up became a vehicle to achieve desired margins (i.e. manipulated) 
and to give marketing messages. This resulted in pricing to customers being 
cost-based rather than market-based. It was felt that better commercial 
decisions would be made based on 'real' transfer prices".
It results from the above that the nature of the information technology sector - in 
terms of sensitivity and market structure - seems to dictate the adequate transfer pricing 
policy, and not necessarily the organisation structure or the "profit centre" concept.
The Electronic Duo companies, like many other participating companies, consider 
performance evaluation and control a priority objective of their TPS. Divisional and 
managerial achievements are measured on the same basis in both companies but Circuit 
indicated that:
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"certain management performance is measured on personal objectives 
which may not be based on accounting information, e.g. market share".
Another difference between the companies lies in the measurement pattern as Silicon 
judges results on the basis of "absolute profits" and "adherence to budgets" whereas 
Circuit gives priority to profit ratios and cash flow performance beside complying with 
budget targets. Since the investment programmes aim at keeping abreast with 
technological advance, the emphasis on ROI at Circuit reflects the desire of the British 
company, Circuit, to see rewarding returns on its investments. The difference may also 
indicate that Silicon, the foreign subsidiary, operates within spending limits determined 
by the parent company, and hence, the emphasis on profitability through the containment 
of costs.
Both companies reported that, when performance is evaluated solely on financial 
measures, divisional managers bias and build slack in reports to the centre. Circuit also 
added that they complain on the fairness of the TPS and that can lead to increased 
competition and mistrust between divisions. Hence, the company's policy is to discourage 
disputes. For Silicon - in which the transfer price has so far been determined by the 
transferor division and where "disputes are not allowed at air - the major reason for 
conflict over transfer pricing is the restricted freedom of external sourcing. This creates 
mistrust between divisions given the control objective of the TPS and the inability of the 
buying division to influence the transfer price. At Circuit restrictions on external sourcing 
are not a major conflict factor as internal transfers account for only 25% of the transferee's 
business. However, there is still "cost-based dialogue" between divisions because of 
the impact of TPS on divisional profits. As stated earlier, transfer prices are based on cost 
and are established by the manufacturing division and the selling divisions cannot 
negotiate the price. Therefore, "there are no 'disputes' as such. They can put pressure 
on the manufacturing division to obtain cost reductions". Normally corporate 
management intervenes to settle disputes at Circuit by "emphasising common interests 
and disregarding differences".
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The Electronic Duo companies agree on promotion, pay increase and bonuses as 
alternative and complementary rewards for satisfactory performance, and transfer and 
dismissal (in extremis) as punishment for unsatisfactory performance. Successful 
divisional managers are also consulted on strategic decision-making at Circuit, and help 
is provided to unsuccessful ones. The latter are advised or trained at Silicon to overcome 
weaknesses.
8.3.6 CONCLUSION
The Electronic Duo case is another example that proves that there is no cure-all 
transfer pricing formula for all situations and reflects the necessity to locate the problem 
not only in its organisational context but to take into account also the technological and 
market considerations. The IT market is described by Silicon to be
"in a state of flux [because] of the rapid trend in hardware and software 
towards standard operating systems and open systems and the radical 
changes in these products' distribution patterns".
The pervasive and vital role of IT for businesses and the increasing use of personal 
computers in networks now demands that systems are able to communicate with each 
other, and this can only be achieved through common design standards. This is already 
part of corporate strategy in the Electronic Duo, as mentioned earlier in Section 8.3.2. 
Hence, the need for collaboration between the electronic companies. Of interest for future 
research are the implications of the trend for collaboration on the IT market structure, 
vertical integration, divisional linkages, transfer pricing and managerial attitudes to shared 
control. The effect on transfer pricing is particularly important for two main reasons. 
First, collaboration is likely to result in increased levels of internal trade. Secondly, 
survival in a very competitive industry characterised by technological advance, depends 
partly on price control. Now with the decision of many companies to move away from 
the defence sector which is based on fixed-price contracts, it is likely that transfer prices 
will be market-oriented.
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THE COMPANY: BACKGROUND
The participating company is a subsidiary of a multinational Group whose 
companies manufacture a wide range of well-known brands of cigarettes, cigars and 
smoking tobaccos for distribution and sale through wholesale and retail outlets throughout 
the world. The Group also has interests in luxury consumer products (fashion, fragrances, 
etc.), printing, confectionery and agriculture. The principal activities of Smoke Ltd are 
the manufacture in the U.K. of cigarettes and other tobacco products under the Group's 
trademarks and the distribution of these products in the U.K. and overseas. The company 
grew over the years mainly through acquisitions and recently through participation in 
several licensing and manufacturing joint ventures in those countries which favour such 
schemes over importing.
THE COMPANY: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
There are two essential elements in the company's strategy: a) participation in joint 
manufacturing ventures overseas and b) its policy of diversification into tobacco (or core 
business) and non-tobacco products as was mentioned above. The respondent commented 
that:
"the company's decision to set up joint ventures is usually taken on 
commercial grounds and voluntarily - for instance, in order to gain greater 
access to an overseas market which has high import tariffs on exported 
finished products. However, in certain countries, government policy, 
especially concerning the total or partial privatisation of parastatals, may 
encourage the company to set up a joint venture".
The decision of many overseas countries to set up local manufacturing joint ventures 
has direct effect on companies like Smoke Ltd, especially because "markets in Western 
Europe (including the UK) continue to show static or slightly declining demand". In the 
U.K. the steady decline in home consumption since 1979 is partly attributed to widespread
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public awareness of the health hazards of smoking (Godfrey and Powell, 1987). To offset 
the loss of income from diminishing exports, Smoke Ltd decided to participate in joint 
ventures overseas.
Moreover, in view of the decreasing demand, the Group as whole divested from 
under-performing assets and disposed of some businesses and, at the same time, invested 
in fields outside the core business. These strategic changes resulted in structural changes. 
The Group's annual report states that:
"long standing, deep seated problems have been tackled. Our core business 
has been re-organised and equipped to contend with a harder trading 
environment; in addition to rationalization measures, we have carried out 
major structural changes in the UK operating subsidiary"
Figure 8.6 reproduces the U.K. company's organisational chart sketched by the 
respondent during the interview. In reality this vertically integrated company is 
decentralised geographically but not managerially because its divisions are not 
autonomous. The marketing divisions are considered as profit centres as they are directly 
involved in the external market for the sale of final products but not for material 
procurement. The purchase of raw materials is the responsibility of the manufacturing 
division which is treated as a cost centre.
8.4.3 VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND INTERNAL TRADE
The production process is described as "simple" and consists of three sequential 
stages 1) primary, 2) product making and 3) packing of final product. In the primary stage 
the dry tobacco leaf pass through initial processing to restore moisture then is blended 
and stemmed. To make the final products (cigarettes and other tobaccos), filters and 
flavouring essences are combined with the stemmed leaf (or lamina). Other materials 
such as paper liners, cardboard cartons, printed labels, cellulose film wrappers are then 
needed for packing and parcelling.
The company reported a 90% volume of internal trade which consists of the 
percentage of the manufacturing division's production sold to Smoke U.K. and Smoke
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Export. This is the highest volume of transfers reported by all the 33 companies 
participating in the survey. The core business of the company consists of tobacco products 
and, as mentioned earlier, is subject to rules and specifications which makes external 
intermediate markets for brand products unavailable.
It should be noted that the high level of transfers concerns only the intermediate 
product. Tobacco companies rely on outside sources for many of the materials used in 
the product making process. This creates backward linkages with suppliers of tobacco 
leaves (the U.K. is a non-leaf growing country), filters, flavours, packaging materials, 
etc. The tobacco industry also creates forward linkages as companies rely on a chain of 
specialist tobacconist shops, grocers, liquor stores, supermarkets, etc. for the distribution 
of final products. For instance, the Group's annual report mentions that: "the Group's 
products are also supplied to international shipping lines, airlines and duty free shops".
8.4.4 TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES: MANDATED COST-BASED PRICES 
FOR BRANDED PRODUCTS
The specificity of products and therefore the non-existence of external intermediate 
product markets, justifies the standard unit full cost transfer price that the company applies 
to the typical internal trade. Labour costs are considered fixed as they do not fully vary 
in proportion to output. It was mentioned in the returned questionnaire that the risk of 
cost inefficiencies being passed on to the marketing divisions is eliminated as variances 
between the standard and the actual transfer price are either incumbent on or beneficial 
to the manufacturing division. Asked on whether inefficiencies would be better eliminated 
if divisions were allowed to negotiate internal trade and pricing, the respondent made it 
explicit that
"negotiated transfer prices are not desirable and, if they were allowed, they 
would be for a maximum of six months. We are very concerned about 
management time that could be wasted because of divisional negotiation, 
especially for our type of business as there is not really much choice for the 
transferee with regard to sourcing and pricing. Thus it is understandable that 
the TPS is directly controlled by headquarters".
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A recent communication from the respondent stressed the fact that this is a complex 
issue and that changes are now taking place in the company. For instance, it was indicated 
that "we measure inefficiencies through both financial and non-financial measures91.
As with the aluminium industry, the pricing policy in the tobacco trade is dominated 
by the manufacturers (Price Commission, 1976). In the U.K. retail prices of tobacco 
products are highly affected by direct and indirect taxation which is an important source 
of government revenue (PEIDA, 1985). Compared to imported cigarettes British brands 
are more expensive because U.K. manufacturers prefer to produce higher quality 
cigarettes at higher cost since the U.K. high specific tax is constant in monetary value. 
Thus the proportion of the specific tax in the final price of high quality cigarettes will be 
minimised (Godfrey and Powell, 1987). However, the recent tax hikes do not encourage 
price stabilisation. The effect of taxes (especially indirect taxes) on the final price may 
explain the absence of a mark-up from the full cost transfer price.
The dominant transfer price is always used and, for comparability of market 
performance, the same price is charged when the same product is transferred to different 
marketing companies. Moreover, "the same transfer price rules apply to trade with 
affiliates". Both the determination and the review of transfer prices are primarily 
centralised decisions.
8.4.5 TRANSFER PRICING CHANGE
The present TPS is considered efficient and satisfactory and has resulted from 
changes to a previous system where the standard variable cost was the dominant transfer 
price. The company indicated that "the growth of business and capacity excesses required 
more precise definitions and better knowledge of market conditions". Customer 
relationship, increase in market share and short-term profitability are all high priority 
management objectives.
Generally, the review and adjustment of transfer prices take place annually in accord 
with the budget cycle, the development of the operating plan and the fiscal year end, or
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"more frequently if there are major changes in circumstances (e.g. 5% +)". Nonetheless, 
despite the "substantial changes made in structure and in mode of operation", these 
changes are reported to have no influence on the need to alter the cost-based TPS.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND REWARD AND MANAGERIAL RESPONSE
Corporate policy requires monthly divisional reports to the centre and divisional 
performance is evaluated with a combination of financial and non-financial measures. 
Individual performance is particularly related to budget targets. Performance evaluation 
and control is a priority objective of the TPS.
In contrast to the multiple performance measures, the incentive scheme is limited 
to only pay increase for satisfactory results, and advice and training for unsatisfactory 
performance. Conflict over transfer prices and mistrust between divisions and the centre 
arise when performance is evaluated solely on financial measures. This attitude should 
be expected in a company where divisional performance is directly affected by a totally 
centralised TPS. In fact, the respondent mentioned that the two major causes of conflict 
are "the importance of the transferred commodity to the division" and "the centralisation 
of transfer pricing policy making". Furthermore, conflict is resolved by corporate 
management alone. The concentration of decision-making power at corporate 
headquarters is not seen as a contributor to generating conflict. The role of the centre in 
this necessarily vertically integrated company is seen as that of "arbiters, brokers, or if 
needed, dictators".
8.4.7 CONCLUSION
The case of Smoke Ltd has once again shown that the context in which a particular 
TPS is applied is crucial to the study of internal trade and pricing. The high level of 
internalised transactions is affected by the degree of concentration of the industry and 
the absence of external intermediate markets for branded products. The transfer price, 
however, is not affected by structural changes as much as it is affected by product 
specificity, the non-existence of an external intermediate market and the impact of the 
U.K. tax system on tobacco products.
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The analysis contained in the case studies presented in this chapter is mainly based 
on corporate views as divisional information was not accessible and, as such, impartiality 
can hardly be guaranteed. Future research which has access to divisional information 
would be more conclusive. Nevertheless, these cases have stressed many of the findings 
of the previous chapters, notably the belief that there is no one best formula for the transfer 
pricing problem which is more of an organisational, behavioural and market than of a 
technical issue. In the two highly vertically integrated companies, Bauxite and Smoke, 
almost all of the intermediate production is consumed internally but their transfer pricing 
policies are not identical. The other three companies also have high levels of internal 
trade although they are not fully integrated. Each of these companies has a paticular TPS. 
Hence, an evaluation of these case studies in the light of the more comprehensive 
framework developed by Spicer (1988) is worthwhile. As divisional information was not 
accessible either in the questionnaire or interview stage in any of the five companies, 
only some of Spicer's hypotheses will be selected for this brief evaluation of the cases.
All the five companies studied have very high volumes of repetitive internal trade 
and are mostly diversified into related markets within their particular industries, some of 
them with speciality products with no outside intermediate markets. The degree of 
standardisation or specialisation varies from one company to another but four of the 
companies have investment specific products.
Bauxite p.l.c has a Speciality and Aerospace Division whose products are designed 
for high performance applications especially in the aerospace, defence and transportation 
markets. The degree of specialisation applies to a greater or lesser extent to its Chemicals 
division and Separations division.
The Pharmaceuticals company Health p.l.c. derives most of its income from patented 
(or speciality) drugs which are the product of long years of scientific research to which 
huge budgets were committed.
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The Electronic Duo companies operate in the very competitive and sensitive high 
technology sector and survival in this market depends on efficient innovation. Most of 
the specificity of investments concerns components which constitute in this case the bulk 
of internal trade.
Finally, the investment characteristic of the product is perhaps less present with the 
tobacco company Smoke Ltd which faces a shrinking market because of increasing public 
health awareness. Although the company specialises in brand tobaccos, their production 
is performed through repetitive processes using usual machinery and materials. These 
five cases do not provide, however, a uniform response to Spicer's hypotheses.
The dimensions ofintra-firm transfers of intermediate products are 
jointly related to a firm's diversification strategy, its product design and its 
organisational structure.
The dimensions of internal trade of intermediate products are not jointly related to 
a firm's diversification strategy, its product design and its organisation structure for Health 
p.l.c. and Smoke Ltd which have 50% and 90% internal transfers respectively. The cases 
of Bauxite p.l.c. and the electronics companies satisfied the assumptions of this hypothesis 
better.
2: Centralised control of the make-buy-decision depends on a) the 
degree of the specificity of investment, b) frequency and volume, and c) the degree 
of uncertainty and/or complexity of the internal transaction.
Restrictions on external trading of the intermediate product exist in each of the five 
companies but with varying degrees depending on the particularities of the product, the 
significance of the transfer to the division and whether an external intermediate market 
exists. It appears that all five companies conform to a certain extent to Spicer's second 
hypothesis.
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The greater (a), (b) and (c) above, the more likely companies would 
de-emphasize performance measurement and incentives based on divisional 
profits.
Despite the disparity observed between companies as to their characteristics and 
performance evaluation patterns, none of them entirely de-emphasised profitability in 
evaluating and compensating performance. This is contrary to the assumptions of Spicer's 
fourth hypothesis.
Transfer pricing policies depend on the degree of customisation of 
the transfer product.
The foregoing analysis of each individual case seems to support all of Spicer's 
assumptions of the contingent nature of transfer pricing policies on the specificity of 
design of the intermediate product. Internal manufacturing costs are the primary basis for 
setting transfer prices in four of the companies (Health p.l.c, Electronic Duo and Smoke 
Ltd) and play a major role in Bauxite p.l.c. This brief testing of the applicability of Spicer's 
framework indicates that there is some practical evidence to support the necessity of an 
organisational study of the transfer pricing problem. Future empirical research carried at 
divisional levels would provide stronger grounds for a more detailed investigation.
This chapter draws on the analysis and findings in the previous chapters in order to 
evaluate the five research hypotheses formulated at the outset for the organisational and 
behavioural study of the transfer pricing problem. A second evaluation of the results will 
also be made using Spicer's (1988) theoretical model. Finally, opportunities for future 
research are then suggested.
9.1.1 NECESSITY OF THE HYPOTHESES
The scope and methodology of the present research project was summarised in the 
introductory chapter where a definitional and research framework was outlined. The 
necessity of the hypotheses formulated in that framework stems from the focus on the 
organisational and behavioural context of the transfer pricing problem and the keenness 
to try to bridge between theory and practice.
9.1.2 INTERDEPENDENCE, DIVISIONAL AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TPS
The acceptance of the transfer pricing system is highly 
effected by the extent of decision-making responsibility delegated to 
divisional management and the way in which the accounting system 
measures that responsibility.
The statements in this main hypothesis were intended at delineating the 
organisational context of the transfer pricing problem by focussing on the two key features 
of the M-form company, that is the need to decentralise and the necessity to integrate. 
The next three hypotheses derive from this main hypothesis and are meant to elucidate 
further the relationship between the efficiency of the TPS and the two key variables of 
divisional autonomy and performance evaluation and reward.
306
There are two statements contained within this hypothesis. First, it is assumed that 
divisional managers of interdependent divisions would reject the TPS if their authority 
over decisions is curtailed. Second, it is assumed that the acceptance of the TPS is 
contingent upon the accounting performance measures or APM. The relationship between 
the TPS and these two variables was discussed in the previous three chapters. Overall it 
was found that divisional managers were reported by the sample companies to have high 
levels of discretion on decisions but this discretion was restrained in many companies by 
limits on trading in the external intermediate market and the setting of transfer prices. 
These restrictions particularly applied when the internal transaction was of an important 
size and recurring and the transfer price was dominantly cost-based.
The acceptance-rejection of the TPS is reflected in the causes of conflict discussed 
in Chapter 6 and the pattern of undesirable managers' behaviour reported by 21 of the 
33 participating companies and reproduced in Chapter 7. Performance evaluation was 
found to rely heavily on accounting data, i.e. focuses on financial criteria and divisional 
involvement is minimal with regard to setting the criteria on which they are judged. 
Conflict over transfer prices was essentially caused by the impact of the TPS on divisional 
results, particularly when the transfer transaction is important and the transfer pricing 
decision is centralised.
It can be concluded that, by being an important feature of the decentralised but 
interdependent environment, the TPS is in reciprocal interaction with the level of 
divisional autonomy and responsibility and the role of the accounting information system 
in judging performance. It should be added that divisional autonomy is affected by the 
size and frequency of the transfer transaction and whether the pricing policy is cost or 
market-based.
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9.1.3 INTERDEPENDENCE, DIVISIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE PMERS: THE 
MOTIVATIONAL DETERMINANT
The evaluation/reward of divisional performance in the 
large company on the basis of a single corporate objective (e.g. maximum 
profits) can have adverse motivational consequences, particularly if 
divisional managers have no or limited control over the factors they are 
judged on.
There are at least four reasons that support the statements in this second hypothesis. 
First, the dominance of profits as a priority objective in all the 33 companies; second, the 
profit orientation of the TPS; third, the lack of divisional autonomy on transfer price 
setting and review and design of the PMERS; and finally, the reported dysfunctional 
behaviour by divisional managers.
However, as adverse motivational consequences were observed in 21 companies 
(that is including a large number of companies with market-based transfer prices and 
unrestrained external trading), it seems that the PMERS plays the most important role in 
shaping managerial behaviour than any other company characteristic. That is to say, if 
the single profit objective is predominant and divisional autonomy is restricted for one 
reason or another but the divisional manager is cocooned as far as rewards and 
punishments are concerned, the likelihood of adverse behaviour is minimised. This is so 
because the main cause of such behaviour is removed. Similarly, if the divisional manager 
has freedom on transfer transactions and prices but lacks control over the PMERS, there 
is no guarantee that the divisional manager under review would remain indifferent to the 
situation she/he faces.
9.1.4 INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE TPS-PMERS CO-EXISTENCE
The greater the impact of the transfer pricing system on 
performance evaluation of profit centres, the greater the conflict over 
transfer prices
The fact that transfer-price transactions can create conflict in the multi-divisional 
company is something to expect as responsibilities become less clear to define. Whether
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this is ambiguity by design or by necessity, it remains that the gravity and the frequency 
of the conflict is obviously related to the TPS-PMERS paradox. The analyses in both 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide enough evidence to substantiate this claim. In line with the 
arguments in the preceding sections, it can be added that whatever transfer pricing policy 
corporate management would like to prevail, the acceptance by divisional management 
of the TPS and therefore the alignment of interests, depends on the perceived equity of 
the PMERS.
9.1.5 INTERDEPENDENCE, AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE CULTURE 
METAPHOR
The degree of dysfunctional behaviour is likely to be affected 
by company culture and division managers' perception of fairness of the 
transfer pricing system.
Dysfunctional or undesirable behaviour was discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 through 
the examination of conflict and divisional managers' reactions to the financial 
performance measures. The implications of the previous analysis for the above hypothesis 
are now examined. In this hypothesis the additional element of corporate culture is 
assumed to partly explain the existence and extent of (perceived) dysfunctional behaviour.
Organisational culture may be defined as the "pattern of beliefs and expectations 
shared by the organization's members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms 
that powerfully shape the behaviour of individuals and groups" (Schwartz and Davis, 
1981, p. 33) who learn to solve problems (Bernardi, 1988). Culture is therefore a metaphor 
which represents a causal relationship between aspirations and the norms to materialise 
them (Dillard and Nehmer, 1990).
In the context of the present study of large decentralised companies, the focus is on 
two groups of organization members: corporate managers and divisional managers. In 
the previous three chapters it was found that the beliefs and expectations of these two 
groups do not always converge and hence the existence of the agency problem of conflict 
of interests. The norms examined related to the TPS (or the integrative mechanism in the
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presence of joint responsibility) and the PMERS (or the formal management control 
system). Moreover, since the data gathered only gives corporate perceptions, the culture 
metaphor is inevitably represented here with some degree of partiality.
The pattern of corporate beliefs and expectations could be directly read from the 
priority of objectives and the degree of decision-making autonomy described in Chapter 
5. Divisional beliefs and expectations are indirectly deduced from the pattern of 
managerial behaviour as perceived by central management. This was discussed at length 
in Chapter 7, especially through the agency theory framework.
The preponderance of the profit objective in the participating companies is the 
central theme of corporate strategy, and the predominance of APM ensures that divisional 
managers internalise this core objective and aspire to optimise it. The reported undesirable 
behaviour pointed at the divergence of expectations of the organisation's members or the 
principal and the agents, and was argued to be encouraged by the management control 
system which is fundamentally the set of norms that shape behaviours. It was also argued 
that, since corporate perceptions of undesirable behaviour were based on recurring 
experience, the reported managerial behaviour had become imbedded in the companies' 
cultures. This is despite the fact that many companies reported having operated changes 
in their previous TPS and that these changes brought about positive results. The 
explanation that can be offered about the recurrence of dysfunctional behaviour is that 
the changes operated were only partial as they only affected the TPS which is only one 
part of the set of the formal cultural norms. It can also be added that in a historical 
perspective the changes in the TPS, while maintaining a financial-based PMERS aimed 
at getting divisional managers to align their expectations to company ideology and 
objectives, i.e. imbedding ideology and objectives in the formal system which is the TPS. 
In other words, given that the reward system is a vital mechanism for promoting and 
shaping culture, the non-adjustment of the PMERS to changing circumstances implies 
that one type of behaviour is being rewarded or punished while another is desired.
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Therefore, unless the change affects the whole system including the PMERS, 
undesirable behaviour can always be expected particularly because of the perceived lack 
of fairness of the TPS. In other words, the answer to the agency problems associated with 
joint responsibility does not reside only in the choice of the particular transfer pricing 
policy but essentially in adapting the entire MCS to structural, strategic, ideological and 
environmental developments. Otherwise managerial resistance to the norms that are 
meant to shape their behaviour will perpetuate and the conflict of beliefs and expectations 
will persist. Thus it can be said that the above arguments support the validity of Hypothesis 
Four, especially in those companies where centralisation adds to the felt and perceived 
lack of fairness of the TPS.
9.1.6 THE STRATEGY-STRUCTURE DETERMINACY OF THE TPS
Changes in organisational structure and strategy result in 
changes (or need for changes) in transfer pricing policies.
In global terms this hypothesis was also supported through the detailed analysis in 
Chapter 6. Nevertheless, the evaluation of the preceding hypotheses shows that other 
factors which are of a psychological nature also press for the need for change. Since the 
organisation is a collection of individuals with different abilities and expectations, their 
interaction with the formal and informal organisational variables results in behaviours 
which may or may not be optimal. For instance, the empirical evidence has shown that 
the divisional manager's response to the way his achievement is evaluated and rewarded 
can bring about change in the TPS. The examples in Chapter 6 and 8 of companies that 
operated changes to their previous TPS indicate that it was managerial pressure and the 
keenness to align interests that forced these changes. It can therefore be concluded that 
the above hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that its validity is viewed in terms of the 
validity of the other hypotheses. Further evaluation of the results is attempted below 
through Spicer's theoretical framework.
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In conclusion to his suggested research hypotheses Spicer (1988), who has 
developed the most comprehensive organisational framework to date for the study of the 
transfer pricing problem, has called for empirical investigation to test the validity of his 
hypotheses. Such a testing was briefly done in the previous case-study-based chapter. It 
should be mentioned that Spicer emphasises the role of investment specificity and 
complexity of the internal transaction and this requires divisional and sub-unit 
information. The non-availability of such information for the present study does not allow 
a comprehensive evaluation of the results in terms of Spicer's model.
The dimensions of intra-firm transfers on intermediate 
products are jointly related to a firm's diversification strategy, its product 
design and its organisational structure,
It can be said that this hypothesis is generally supported by the findings in Chapters 
6 and 8. The relationship between internal trade and diversification strategy depicted in 
Chapter 6 showed that high volumes of transfers were associated with low and moderate 
diversity. The dimension of internal trade was also found contingent on the 
divisionalisation structure. The relationship between internal trade and product design 
could only be referred to in the very few cases of companies with the highest volumes of 
transfers and that is due to the lack of information on divisional operations.
Centralised control of the make-buy decision depends 
on the degree of a) the specificity of investment, b) frequency and volume, 
and c) uncertainty and/or complexity of the internal transaction.
The issue of external procurement of the intermediate product was investigated in 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.1). As hypothesized by Spicer, it was found that centralisation of 
the make-buy decision was associated with high volumes of transfers. The investment 
specificity of the transfer transaction was also alluded to in some cases, for instance in 
four of the five case studies in Chapter 8. It must be stressed again that divisional 
information is essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the degree of investment 
specificity and uncertainty and/or complexity associated with the internal transaction.
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3: Well specified arbitration procedures are associated 
with the degree of a) investment specificity, b) frequency and volume, 
and c) uncertainty and/or complexity or the internal transaction.
No particular evidence could be found to support Spicer's assumption that, when 
intra-firm transfers are recurrent and material in volume, firms have well developed 
arbitration procedures to overcome information asymmetries and to promote coordination 
and adaptation between divisions. In Section B of the survey questionnaire (Question 
QB4) companies were requested to mention whether they had regulations for the 
enforcement of buy/sell agreements and to supply a copy of these regulations. Only four 
companies indicated having such rules but no company disclosed any specific 
information.
The greater the degree of a), b) and c) above, the more 
likely companies would de-emphasize performance evaluation and incentives 
based on divisional profits.
The analysis throughout Chapter 7 showed that, contrary to Spicer's claim, no 
company de-emphasized performance measurement and incentive mechanisms based on 
profitability. As far as transfer pricing is concerned the analysis in Chapter 7 shows more 
support to Onsi's (1970, p. 535) observation that "the problem is material when the 
performance of a divisional manager is measured based on profit, and incentive 
compensation is so determined", and Abdel-khalik and Lusk's (1974, p. 23) proposition 
that "transfer pricing may blur the evaluation perspective when the evaluation of 
performance is strictly profit-oriented".
The greater the degree of a), b) and c) above, the more 
likely the conflict over internal transfers.
Only the first part of the hypothesis relating to the "general conditions under which 
conflict is most likely to occur" is considered here. The analysis in Chapter 7 supports 
Spicer's theory that the occurrence of conflict is strongly associated with the dimensions 
of the internal transaction and the profitability-geared PMERS.
Transfer pricing policies depend on the degree of 
customisation of transfer product.
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Despite the lack of divisional and sub-unit information, there is some evidence in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 to support the statements contained in this hypothesis. The 
relationship between idiosyncratic products, specificity of investment and cost-based 
transfer prices is obvious in the companies with the highest volumes of transfers. In 
general, the intermediate products of these companies do not have external markets and, 
if the market existed, the make-or-buy decision was centralised. In Chapter 7 it was 
shown that conflict over transfer pricing was specifically present in these companies.
For the rest of the sample companies, and especially for the majority with low levels 
of transfers and market-based prices, it can be deduced from their industrial classification 
that their intermediate products are either the standardized or the low/moderate 
customized types. Central intervention on intermediate product trading was found to be 
minor and negotiation was reported by twelve companies. The case of customized 
intermediate product can be illustrated with the case of the automobile company 
mentioned in Chapter 6, (Section 6.1.4 and Section 6.2.3). The company has a volume 
of transfers of only 4%. It was argued, on the basis of previous research, that it was 
customary in the British motor industry to rely on external sources for the supply of 
vehicle parts. However, the development of new car models or the revamping of existing 
models requires parts with new specifications. Hence the parts maker must invest in 
appropriate facilities to meet the specificity of the intermediate product. Given the low 
level of internal trade and the heavy reliance on the outside market, vertical integration 
takes place within the industry, not within the particular firm and the supplier's price can 
be considered as a transfer price (Monden and Nagao, 1988).
A word of caution should be said here about the viability of comparing the results 
across different time horizons. The pattern of response to questionnaire surveys, 
interviews, the observations and conclusions that a researcher can make are affected by 
the time and space contexts in which the research is conducted. The changes that have 
taken place in strategy, structure and management styles of companies over the last few
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decades all affect the contents and outcome of empirical research. Langrana (1977, p. 
165) concluded that "an exhaustive discourse on transfer pricing problems and 
possibilities is neither feasible nor desirable. Corporate idiosyncrasies spell out the basic 
requirements and they are to be met with ingenuity". Moreover, the methodology adopted 
by the particular researcher also has a direct impact on the analysis and the outcome.
A total of 47 empirical studies on the transfer pricing practices of companies in ten 
different countries were examined in Chapter 4. As the present study was restricted to 
domestic transfers the comparison will exclude previous findings on multinational 
transfer pricing. The most obvious common result that the present study shares with all 
the previous works is that transfer pricing is a practical problem across the whole spectrum 
of industrial sectors and that individual companies endeavour to find appropriate solutions 
to the problem. However, it was concluded that most of the previous studies were limited 
to exposing companies' practices and fell short of giving explanations as to why particular 
policies were adopted. Therefore a central feature that distinguishes the present study 
from those in Chapter 4 is the organisational approach adopted and the emphasis of the 
behavioural aspects of the problem, i.e. the focus on the interaction of the human factor 
with company characteristics.
9.3.1 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS BRITISH STUDIES
The three previous PhD-based projects completed by Channon (1973), Emmanuel 
(1976) and Mostafa (1981) on British transfer pricing are of particular interest to the 
present comparison.
All of Channon's (1973) findings on the large companies he studied are mirrored 
in the observations made on the present sample of very large companies. For instance, 
Channon's findings on the relationships between high volumes of transfers, 
diversification pattern, vertical integration and centralised cost-based prices are 
duplicated in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The same applies to the profit-based PMERS and 
the preference of stable salaries to profit related pay by divisional managers.
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The similarities with Emmanuel' s (1976) study reside in the variety of transfer 
prices with the predominance of market prices, the impact of the TPS on divisional 
performance evaluation, and the constriction of the external trading and pricing decisions 
in many companies. There is no corroboration, however, of Emmanuel's finding that 
companies with market and negotiated transfer prices evaluated performance on a profit 
basis while those with cost-based prices evaluated performance in terms of cost 
performance. Profitability and profit-geared PMERS apply to all the 33 companies in the 
present survey.
Some of the results of the present study also confirm those reported by Mostafa 
(1981) in her study of transfer pricing determinants. The predominance of market prices, 
the unpopularity of marginal price and shadow price transfers, the profit objective of the 
TPS and its impact on performance are comparable to the findings reported in Chapters 
6 and 7 of this thesis.
Many of the similarities outlined above are also shared with the remaining ten studies 
on British practice discussed in Chapter 4 as well as the overseas surveys briefly revisited 
below. The recurring themes are the dominance of market prices, the profitability 
objective, the TPS-PMERS relationship and the locus of the transfer pricing and sourcing 
decisions when the transfer transaction is important.
9.3.2 COMPARISON WITH AMERICAN STUDIES
In the forefront of overseas transfer pricing practice the American experience takes 
precedence because of the historical development of the M-form company. Apart from 
the recent study by Eccles (1985), all the American surveys were similar to the British 
ones in terms of scope and methodology. The emphasis of the transfer pricing techniques 
and the neglect of the organisational context is a common feature. Eccles' contention that 
"without mandating transfer transactions it was difficult or impossible to implement a 
strategy of vertical integration" was substantiated with the evidence in Chapter 6 and 
the case studies developed in Chapter 8. In essence Eccles' proposal on the 
structure-strategy determinacy of transfer pricing is corroborated by the results of the
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present study. But it was added in Section 9.1.6 above that psychological factors also 
influence the TPS because of the centrality of the human factor in the TPS-PMERS 
paradox.
9.3.3 COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES
The findings of the present study on decentralisation, transfer pricing practices, 
external sourcing and profit orientation of the TPS and the PMERS bear some similarity 
to the Swedish case (Arvidsson, 1971), the German case (Drumm, 1972), the Indian case 
(Govindarajan and Ramamurthy, 1983) and the Japanese and Canadian cases (Tang, 1979 
and 1981).
The Australian survey (Chenhall, 1979) is the one study that compares best because 
of its scope and coverage. The similarities are significant with regard to the bases of 
divisionalisation, diversification strategy, the independence of volume of internal trade 
from company size; the multiplicity of transfer prices; the dominance of market-based 
prices and profit-based PMERS. One main differing result is the reported degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by divisional managers in Australian companies. Chenhall also did 
not address the crucial issue of internal conflict.
The Yugoslav case (Sacks, 1983) locates the transfer pricing problem in a different 
political context. Much has been written about self-management in Yugoslavia, and the 
results of Sacks' study show great contrast between the philosophy of decentralisation in 
socialist and Western countries. Compared to the present study, the Yugoslav practice 
shows more divisional autonomy on intermediate product trading and pricing and the 
dependence of pay on performance. The comparison is, however, limited because of the 
lack of information on dimensions of transfer transactions, divisionalisation structure and 
corporate strategy.
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CONCLUSIONS
What can first be concluded from both the theoretical and empirical presentations 
that comprise this thesis is that transfer pricing has been a subject of concern for both 
academicians and managers for at least the last fifty years. However, the extensive 
literature review, and particularly the empirical works discussed in Chapter 4, have 
revealed that the study of the transfer pricing problem has tended to be confined to the 
examination of the technicalities without relating them to the attributes of the 
divisionalised company which is the seed-bed of the problem. No wonder, therefore, that 
more often than not previous studies ended up describing transfer pricing practice without 
giving explanations as to why particular policies prevailed. As early as 1929 Camman 
(p. 37) commented that "the further one enters into the subject, the more perplexing 
become the considerations". More recently Wraith (1983, p. 16) commented that 
"transfer pricing is a necessary evil despite its inherent difficulties". Vancil (1978) 
succinctly summed up these frustrations by noting his disappointment at not being able 
to arrive at any definitive conclusions despite the wealth of data gathered. He concluded 
that "the issue remains a perennial puzzle to academicians while practioners continue 
to cope. I wish the best of good fortune to the next researcher to tackle the problem". 
Hence, "this topic offers much potential for further research" (Vancil, 1978, pp. 142 and 
176).
Through the organisational and behavioural framework adopted for the present 
research it was possible to give explanations as to why companies use particular transfer 
pricing policies. It was indicated at the outset that, because transfer pricing consisted of 
both a movement in time and space and the placement of a monetary value, the transfer 
pricing process involved the interaction of six elements. These are the transferred 
commodity (WHAT), the subject or agent (WHO), the place (WHERE), the time 
(WHEN), the reason (WHY) and the procedure (HOW). These elements were translated 
into the research hypotheses which aimed at elucidating the TPS-PMERS relationships 
in the large company by examining companies' transfer pricing practices and their
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managerial implications. The application of the agency theory model to the analysis in 
Chapter 7 added substance to the necessity of locating management control issues into 
their organisational and behavioural contexts.
The timely framework proposed by Spicer (1988) also added substance to this 
perspective. The summary evaluation of the results in terms of Spicer's model, in 
particular through the case studies in Chapter 8, has revealed why previous research fell 
short of explaining the underpinning reasons of observed transfer pricing practices. In 
short, these practices cannot be dissociated from their organisational and behavioural 
contexts.
Notwithstanding the above conclusions it remains that, by being part of the 
management control system of companies, the transfer pricing mechanism operates in a 
constantly changing environment that affects and is affected by both the organisational 
set-ups of companies, their strategies, their cultures and their people. Hence, the subject 
still offers opportunities for future research.
9.4.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
One of the major obstacles in doing research on transfer pricing is the difficulty to 
obtain sufficient and reliable information. One limitation of the present study is its 
complete reliance on data supplied by corporate headquarters and this only gives a 
one-dimensional view of the problem. As management accounting systems measure 
production-related activities at the divisional and sub-unit levels, and corporate 
management relies on information supplied by divisional managers for decision-making 
and control, future research on transfer pricing requires ideally access to such information. 
A data-base comprised of both corporate and divisional data would provide a more 
balanced organisational and behavioural investigation of the transfer pricing problem in 
the light of agency theory and Spicer's model. The TPS-PMERS paradox would be better 
understood if direct access to divisional views could be secured.
Beyond the data collection problem, the future researcher could consider including 
the following points in their investigation:
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1) the relationship between transfer pricing and the different stages of the life 
cycle of the intermediate product,
2) the degree of idiosyncrasy of the intermediate product and at what stage of 
its life cycle is the investment in specific human and/or physical capital more 
pertinent,
3) the reasons why the particular product is idiosyncratic and the market position 
of the company with regard to that product,
4) the relationship between product idiosyncrasy, the dimension of the transfer 
transaction and the locus of the pricing decision,
5) the extent of divisional control over overheads and the degree of discretion 
divisional managers have on investing in specific assets,
6) the attitude to risk taking and risk avoidance by both corporate and divisional 
managers,
7) the relationship between risk attitude and job stability,
8) the effects of quality requirements, on-time delivery, automation, etc. on the 
cost content of cost-based transfer prices,
9) the causes, the severity and the frequency of conflict over transfer pricing 
and the way conflict is managed,
10) the availability of external intermediate markets and market prices and the 
effect of the locus of the procurement decision on the efficiency of the TPS 
and the PMERS,
11) the elements involved in the negotiation process and, if any, the arbitration 
rules in the case of unresolved disputes,
12) the expectations of both corporate and divisional managers from the 
employment contract,
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13) the perceptions of divisional managers of the leadership style and the 
management control system in general and their conceptions on aligning 
corporate and personal objectives.
14) the involvement of divisional managers in the budgeting process and what 
place transfer pricing occupies in this process,
15) the role of relative performance evaluation (RPE) and non-accounting based 
PMERS in reducing dysfunctional behaviour.
The above suggestions could be integrated in an organisational and behavioural 
research package that could cover both the domestic and multinational dimensions of the 
transfer pricing problem. The TPS-PMERS paradox will be accentuated with transfer 
pricing across national frontiers if only because of differing cultural factors between the 
country hosting the subsidiary and the parent company's base country.
As a final note it should be added that the experience of the present study has shown 
that in-depth research on selected companies that could be later developed as case study 
material may be the best approach to adopt to understand real world phenomena and 
contribute to knowledge.
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A Inland Revenue notes on multinational transfer pricing. 323 
B Hirshleifer's theoretical model for the two division company. 327
C Gould's reconciliation of differing market prices for the same 330 
intermediate product for a two-division company.
D Literature reviewing (R) or proposing (P) particular transfer 333 
pricing policies (1950s to 1980s).
E Table 4.1: major (published) empirical studies on transfer 337
pricing (and related topics) in chronological order. 
Table 4.2: Number of studies by year and country. 341
F Figure 4.1: World-wide trend of empirical research on transfer 342
pricing since 1956. 
Figure 4.2: distribution of research by decade. 342
G Questionnaire package including: 343
1) - cover letter;
2) - re-drafted cover letter,
3) - follow-up letter.
4) - title page;
5) - notes for completing questionnaire;
6) - 8-page questionnaire;
H Acronym key and sequence number of coded questionnaire 356 
entries.
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APPENDIX B HIRSHLEIFER'S THEORETICAL MODEL FOR THE 
TWO-DIVISION COMPANY
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